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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Entrepreneurs develop new technology ventures in uncertain conditions with unproven 
technologies and limited resources. The majority of such ventures fail, yet entrepreneurship is 
regarded as a national (and regional) engine for economic growth. This thesis aims to examine 
entrepreneurs’ attitudes to failure in order to reveal insight on how entrepreneurs learn and how 
they identify subsequent opportunities, and investigate possible regional differences in such 
attitudes and entrepreneurial responses. 
There is much literature on entrepreneurial failure but relatively little that is focused on attitudes 
to failure, the high-technology industry, or international comparisons. This thesis examines how 
entrepreneurs’ attitudes to failure in early-stage technology companies differ in the USA (Silicon 
Valley), UK (Cambridge) and Germany (Munich), and implications for entrepreneurial learning 
and opportunity identification in these regions. Interviews with habitual entrepreneurs explore 
their experiences of failed ventures, using a methodology from qualitative psychology - 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) - for the gathering and analysis of data to reveal 
emergent trends. This analysis is then used to compare attitudes to failure within and between 
each region, and a preliminary conceptual framework is proposed for analyzing future 
experiences of entrepreneurial failure. 
Findings from this idiographic study suggest that although each entrepreneur’s experience of and 
attitudes to failure is unique, there are more commonalities than differences between regions. 
Furthermore, these findings reveal the importance of the use of language and narrative in the 
analysis of such accounts. In addition, the results allow reflection on the appropriateness and 
limitations of methodologies such as IPA for this subject. 
This thesis contributes to theory by examining ‘effectuation’ as a way to understand these 
experiences, and discussing the impact of findings in relation to attribution theory, prospect 
theory and real-options theory. This thesis contributes to practice by augmenting existing 
knowledge of entrepreneurial failure through the comparative (regional) approach and the 
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industry-specific (high-technology) focus. It may also improve the preparedness of new 
practitioners and entrepreneurs, with positive implications for future entrepreneurial success. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Most new technology ventures end in failure: between fifty and ninety per cent of new 
technology ventures fail (Bhidé 1992; Kirchhoff 1997; Stokes and Blackburn 2001; Delmar and 
Shane 2003; Knott and Posen 2005; McKenzie and Sud 2008; Gulst and Maritz 2009; Lerner 
2009; Pretorius 2009; Timmons and Spinelli 2009). Many more business plans receive no 
funding and therefore fail before they begin (Lerner 2009). Entrepreneurs start firms with the 
knowledge that statistically, most will fail. Do they fully appreciate the likelihood of success 
when they begin? What do they learn from ventures that do not succeed? What can be learnt 
collectively from the majority of startups that end in failure? 
Entrepreneurship appears vital for economic growth, especially in technology-related industries. 
Baumol suggests: “the role of entrepreneurs and their new small enterprises, … are more 
important than ever, and … their significance seems unlikely to evaporate in the foreseeable 
future.” (Baumol 2004: 316). Yet based on failure rates, seeing a venture fail may be a common 
experience for entrepreneurs. An examination of this phenomenon may therefore provide insight 
into how founders behave and react: how they learn, recover and respond. Failed ventures may 
represent an untapped pool of practice and learning, offering valuable lessons for entrepreneurs, 
their staff, investors, suppliers and customers. 
There may also be a regional context to failure. Levels of entrepreneurship vary between 
countries and this has been widely studied by longitudinal research projects such as the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor or GEM (Bosma, Acs et al. 2008; Brixy, Hundt et al. 2010; Ali, Brush 
et al. 2011; Kelley, Bosma et al. 2011) and more recently the Global Entrepreneurship and 
Development Index, or GEDI (Autio, Cleevely et al. 2012). These studies provide rankings of 
entrepreneurial standing for a number of countries, for example GEDI research for 2010 
indicates the USA ranks first in entrepreneurial profile including attitudes, aspirations and 
activities, Britain is 15th, ahead of Germany (Autio, Cleevely et al. 2012: 5). The GEDI research 
includes a survey variable for ‘fear of failure’ but does not address detailed attitudes and 
outcomes related to failed ventures and the entrepreneurs that start them. Furthermore, these are 
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general entrepreneurship studies and there is a significant difference between founders of small 
local service businesses and scalable new ventures in a field such as high-technology. 
While survey-based international research enhances our understanding of entrepreneurship, there 
are limitations to how this helps study the causes, experience and consequences of failure. There 
is some support for new approaches to this: reviewing the landscape of possibilities in the next 
wave of entrepreneurship research, Wright and Zahra suggest they should consider two trends: 
“[1] developing and using richer indicators of entrepreneurial activities, [and] [2] engaging more 
fully with the context when studying entrepreneurship.” (Wright and Zahra 2011). Approaches 
that investigate this context of entrepreneurs’ experience might address social and economic 
factors that inspire new entrepreneurs, or psychological examination of entrepreneurs’ 
personality traits and behaviours. Such context-based approaches may alternatively simply listen 
to the undiluted experience and reflections of the entrepreneur regarding the failure of an early-
stage venture and interpret these reflections to identify what these experiences mean to the 
entrepreneur. Such an approach may offer a promising source of future insight. The late Jason 
Cope understood this, reflecting on his own phenomenological work: “If learning from failure is 
indeed a journey then further research is required to understand what this journey entails, what 
stages are involved and what obstacles may line the way.” (Cope 2011). 
Technology startup companies often provide a complete set of company experience in a 
compressed time with a small group of actors. Most technology companies share common 
experiences: the development of product, validation and communication with markets, sales and 
ongoing support and service to customers, management of people and partners, and all the legal 
and financial activities needed to manage a corporate entity (Evans and Bahrami 1995). Startups 
also experience these activities, but they are often compressed: rapid startup timelines means 
tasks are done in parallel and faster, product development and customer interaction are often 
meshed together, especially in technology companies (Baron, Hannan et al. 1998). The intensity 
of these experiences is often due to the concentration of workload among a small number of 
founders (possibly just one). Many of these activities are driven by passion and invention 
(Cardon, Gregoire et al. 2012). When startups fail, this same concentration of many activities in 
the hands of few people may concentrate the pain as well as the opportunity to learn. Issues such 
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as these provided a rationale for focusing research onto an examination of early-stage high-
technology companies.  
This study will focus on ‘habitual’ entrepreneurs (Gulst and Maritz 2009) in multiple technology 
sectors (software and media, semiconductors and computer infrastructure) and compare their 
attitudes to setback and failure in three geographic areas: Silicon Valley (California, USA), 
Cambridge (United Kingdom) and Munich (Germany). The broad research question this research 
seeks to address is: 
How do attitudes of habitual high-technology entrepreneurs to early-stage failure differ in Silicon 
Valley, Cambridge and Munich? 
There is much literature on entrepreneurship, and major themes have emerged regarding the 
characteristics, motivation and behaviour of entrepreneurs. These themes are outlined in major 
works ranging from Schumpeter and Kirzner on economic opportunity (Schumpeter 1989; 
Kirzner 1997), to general theories of entrepreneurship such as the individual-opportunity nexus 
(Shane 2003) and Sarasvathy’s work on Effectuation (Sarasvathy 2008). If failure rates are 
indeed so high, then failure is a frequent and therefore important aspect of the entrepreneurial 
experience: “It is impossible to talk intelligently about a theory of entrepreneurship without 
acknowledging the pivotal role of failure.” (Cardon and McGrath 1999).  
Research	  Focus	  
 
This researcher is drawn to the research question above by his personal experience of having 
built both successful and failed technology ventures. This has advantages and drawbacks: while 
experience in many regions (including Munich, Cambridge and Silicon Valley) provides contacts 
and networks to identify suitable interviewees and offers a broad context for this research, there 
may be various types of personal bias. In this thesis, I attempt to explicitly recognize potential 
areas of personal bias, and discuss and implement counter-strategies to address them. 
From the broad intention to study ‘entrepreneurial failure’ the focus shifts to asking interrelated 
questions: what should be done, and where and how should these studies take place? 
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Several terms in this question require further definition. The ‘high-technology’ sector was 
selected because of the researcher’s prior industry experience and network; the industry’s large 
and pervasive impact on the wider economy; and the speed at which early-stage companies have 
grown (Google, Cisco, Apple) and often failed. The sector is also rich in invention (as indicated 
by the high levels of generation of Intellectual Property or IP) and innovation. It is possible that 
the researcher’s ‘confirmation bias’ exists here, but this may be offset by the prospect of direct 
access to people and companies with which academic research can be conducted. 
A further definition of ‘failure’ is required. For this research, failure represents the termination of 
a business (see Chapter 2). Other subjective definitions may include ‘disappointing successes’ 
(interviewee D4) and ‘successful failure’ (B1), but as a pre-condition, at least one of our 
entrepreneurs’ ventures must have ceased trading at some point. 
Also, ‘habitual’ entrepreneurs may be serial or portfolio founders (Gulst and Maritz 2009), but 
all have multiple experiences upon which to reflect, and are likely to have sought new 
opportunities after (at least) one failed venture. There are various permutations of experience to 
consider such as failure followed by success (‘F-S’) or success followed by failure (‘S-F’), and 
other combinations. Interviewee A5 has experienced five failed ventures (‘F-F-F-F-F’). In this 
research focus, participants qualify if they have started multiple ventures, one of which has 
failed. 
The locus of research is three technology-rich regions that were accessible to the researcher. 
These were chosen to extend prior research that had examined only one or two regions (Cope 
and Cave 2008; McKenzie and Sud 2008), and Munich, Cambridge and Silicon Valley were 
selected after exploratory work confirmed that suitable candidates could be found in these 
locations. 
The question of how to conduct the research was answered after reflection on extant literature 
and exploratory interviews. This revealed that failure presents itself as a personal and painful 
experience and care is required to determine how to approach the subject. It also suggested there 
are many variables in the failure process – complex reasons and emotions, inter-personal 
conflict, and loss of control that is difficult to manage and hard to understand. This environment 
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makes it difficult to pre-define a set path for research: with such variety of experience and so 
many combinations of factors, how could a survey, interview guide or case study approach 
address the richness of the situation? These questions led to a phenomenological approach, one 
that starts with an understanding of the ‘lived world’ of entrepreneurs experiencing failure, and 
interprets the meaning emerging from such encounters. 
Overall, the research focus is derived from asking three questions – what, where and how? It is 
hoped that this uncovers hitherto unobserved themes and helps further understand the 
phenomenon of entrepreneurial failure. 
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Structure	  of	  Thesis	  
 
Chapter Title Contents 
1 Introduction Introduction of research topic; motivation and goals for research; 
research objectives and questions; review of preliminary findings; 
preliminary conceptual framework. 
2 Literature Review Review of academic literature on entrepreneurial failure. 
3 Methodology Review of potential methodologies and related literature; selection and 
justification of IPA (Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis). 
4 Research Design and Plan Research questions and approach; research design for planning, data 
gathering and analysis. 
5A Analysis: Munich, Germany IPA analysis of six transcribed interviews in Munich including 
enfolding literature. 
5B Analysis: Cambridge, UK IPA analysis of six transcribed interviews in Cambridge including 
enfolding literature. 
5C Analysis: Silicon Valley, 
USA 
IPA analysis of six transcribed interviews in Silicon Valley including 
enfolding literature. 
6 Analysis: Cross-country Analysis of regional commonalities and differences; discussion of the 
impact of national culture. 
7 Discussion Discussion of findings; discussion of research limitations; impact on 
academic theory and practice; possibilities for further research. 
8 Conclusion Conclusion and assessment of research findings against original goals; 
acknowledgements. 
 References  References to academic literature. 
Table 1. Contents of Doctoral Thesis 
 
Exploratory	  Interviews	  and	  Development	  of	  Initial	  Conceptual	  Framework	  
 
This thesis represents the results and conclusions from research carried out over a period of three 
years. In the first year, two activities were planned and performed: (1) Exploratory interviews in 
Munich, Cambridge and Silicon Valley and (2) a preliminary literature review. These activities 
were documented in a First Year Report, which also included the development of a Conceptual 
Framework outlining how entrepreneurial failure might be examined in future cases. 
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Ten exploratory interviews with experienced technology entrepreneurs were planned and 
conducted in early 2010. Each interview consisted of an in-person meeting lasting about an hour, 
which was recorded and transcribed. Candidates were contacted directly or indirectly (by 
referral) from a network of personal contacts by the researcher established over a 25-year career 
in the technology industry. Interviewees were selected based on having experience of failed 
ventures as founders or investors, with a view to gathering insight and guiding the formal 
research design. These interviewees can be regarded as ‘habitual entrepreneurs’ (Gulst and 
Maritz 2009) who founded early-stage technology firms. 
Exploratory interviews were transcribed and subject to textual analysis to derive themes, and an 
impressionistic pass through all transcripts was performed to identify major issues and concerns 
from the interviews. General conclusions from these initial interviews are summarized in Table 2 
below. 
 Conclusion from Exploratory Interviews 
1 Attitudes of entrepreneurs to setback and failure do appear to differ in the countries examined. 
Germany appears to be radically different from the UK and USA in this regard. 
2 Setback and failure, and responses to them, are regarded and valued as an important aspect of the 
entrepreneurial experience. 
3 The emotional intensity of failure provides an unusual stimulus for reflection and knowledge 
acquisition. 
Table 2. Summary of Conclusions from Analysis of Ten Exploratory Interviews Conducted in 2010 
 
In addition to these exploratory interviews, a preliminary literature review identified a landscape 
of academic research with many themes and sub-domains, clustered around a number of major 
themes as documented in Figure 1. This figure was developed using manual cross-referencing of 
themes identified from reading the literature and searching EndNote, in which the researcher has 
indexed all references. 
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Figure 1. Schematic of Themes Identified in the Field of Entrepreneurial Failure in Preliminary Literature Review (by Author, 
2010) 
 
Based on these exploratory interviews and literature review, a (preliminary) conceptual 
framework was developed - see Figure 2. At this stage, the framework was an attempt to 
establish a consistent way of examining the experience of entrepreneurial failure, in order to 
accelerate understanding and awareness of what might happen next (the ‘entrepreneurial 
response’). Briefly, the conceptual framework provides a lifecycle for analysis of venture failure. 
It starts with (A) the failure event, followed by analysis of this event in context (B). 
Environmental factors such as the background of the entrepreneurs (C) are considered alongside 
their personality characteristics (D). Based on this examination the entrepreneur may decide 
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what to do next (E): whether to exit the direct entrepreneurship domain and seek employment at 
a larger firm or adopt an alternative career (F) or re-engage and start another venture (G).  
 
Figure 2. Proposed Preliminary Framework for Examining Entrepreneurs' Attitudes to Setback and Failure in Early-Stage 
Technology Ventures (by Author, 2010) 
 
To develop this framework, transcripts of each interview were analyzed and major themes 
arising from each meeting were highlighted. These were listed, evaluated and sorted into 
categories, and combined with the major literature themes outlined in Figure 1 (Failure Context; 
Environmental Factors; Personality Factors; Entrepreneurial Response). It is hoped that the 
conceptual framework in Figure 2 might offer opportunities both to practitioners (entrepreneurs 
whose recent venture has failed) and academics to assess new instances of the failure experience. 
This framework establishes a reference model for further examination, and it will be re-examined 
in Chapter 7 in light of detailed research findings. It was not used to derive the detailed research 
design, but is being held for later review. In the spirit of Engaged Scholarship (Ven 2007), the 
conceptual framework has been presented and discussed at several conferences (Cotterill 2011a; 
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Cotterill 2011b; Cotterill 2011c) where feedback from fellow academics was obtained. The 
proposed value of this framework is twofold. At a micro level, an improved understanding of 
how entrepreneurs take their ‘re-entry’ decisions (Jenkins and Brundin 2009; Nielsen and 
Sarasvathy 2012) may be desirable; and at a macro level, the level of re-engagement by 
entrepreneurs in future startup activity (or ‘flexible re-cycling’) may be seen to improve the 
health of the wider economy (Evans and Bahrami 1995; Evans and Bahrami 2011). If it is true 
that much learning can be derived from failed ventures and start-ups represent a strong source of 
economic growth, then it may be desirable for a national economy to ‘re-cycle’ entrepreneurs 
and technologies and keep the cycle of economic re-generation turning. Entrepreneurs who fail 
and give up, thereby leaving the system, may represent a loss to the economy. Understanding and 
supporting entrepreneurs to help them evaluate their failure might encourage their re-entry to the 
world of startups. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section (1) reviews the theoretical background and prior literature in entrepreneurial failure; 
(2) reviews a range of five major themes in the literature; and (3) provides a summary of 
research gaps and key conclusions. 
Prior	  Work:	  Theoretical	  Background	  and	  Literature	  Review	  
 
There is much literature on entrepreneurial failure (Cardon and McGrath 1999; McGrath 1999; 
Zacharakis, Meyer et al. 1999; Shepherd 2003; Holland 2008; Gulst and Maritz 2009; Pretorius 
2009) but relatively little that is focused on attitudes to failure (Cope and Cave 2008; McKenzie 
and Sud 2008), the high-technology industry, or international comparisons. The annual Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) captures and ranks regional attitudes to ‘fear of failure’, yet 
the GEM model and ensuing reports make scant reference to venture failure in particular or 
responses to failure (Ali, Brush et al. 2011: Figure 3, Page 10). 
Within the broad scope of entrepreneurial behaviour and motivation (Hindle 2010), this thesis 
addresses the following research question: 
 
How do attitudes of habitual high-technology entrepreneurs to early-stage failure differ in Silicon 
Valley, Cambridge and Munich?  
 
One of the challenges in addressing this question is the focus of literature. Figure 3 outlines four 
main fields of research: entrepreneurship, failure, national (and comparative) studies, and the 
high-technology sector. These areas (and Figure 3 specifically) were created by taking reading 
notes, including searches of this researcher’s EndNote library, and mapping out themes and 
domains using whiteboards and Post-it ® notes, before formalizing this into the ‘literature map’ 
below. Many publications address one of these areas or a combination of two or three, but there 
is little that maps directly onto our focus of research. For example, in a search of 
webofknowledge.com, there are 13,527 references to ‘entrepreneurship’ but only 22 to 
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‘entrepreneurial failure’ (September 2012). Pioneering work by the late Jason Cope applied 
methodologies derived from qualitative psychology to investigate attitudes to failure amongst US 
and UK technology entrepreneurs with recent experience of failed ventures (Cope 2011): this 
maps closely to our focus but it remains a rare example of highly relevant literature. 
It is important therefore to glean insight from related studies and themes in the academic 
literature (highlighted in Figure 3) while concentrating on the core topic of comparing attitudes 
of entrepreneurs to failure in high-technology ventures. Some themes arising from this literature 
review must be placed in context of this core topic. For example, studies on women 
entrepreneurs (Garcia-Tabuenca, Crespo-Espert et al. 2011; Shinnar, Giacomin et al. 2012), and 
many studies involving empirical research on students (Cardon and McGrath 1999; Mueller and 
Thomas 2001; Bagheri and Pihie 2010; Gasse and Tremblay 2011; Gelard and Saleh 2011; 
Aghajani and Abbasgholipour 2012) contribute to entrepreneurship literature but do not directly 
address the topic of failure. Similarly, biographical attributes such as age, gender, marital status, 
social status, education and experience may have an important role to play in the ‘entrepreneurial 
spirit’ (Aghajani and Abbasgholipour 2012), but may not directly impact our study of attitudes to 
failure. Other studies on firm-level failure (Gong, Baker et al. 2009) and project failure 
(Shepherd and Cardon 2009; Shepherd and Kuratko 2009; Valikangas, Hoegl et al. 2009; 
Shepherd, Patzelt et al. 2011), however compelling, may overlap with the experience and 
attitudes of entrepreneurs as a whole but do not address the individual entrepreneur, which is our 
‘unit of analysis’ for this thesis. 
 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 27 of 216 
 
Figure 3. Literature Review. Map of Various Domains in Entrepreneurial Research Juxtaposed with Themes Identified in 
Literature Review 
 
A further challenge to answering the research question is obtaining access to failed 
entrepreneurs. “Evidence on failed entrepreneurs is well nigh impossible to come by. People just 
simply do not walk around with business cards that say ‘failed entrepreneur’” (Sarasvathy and 
Menon 2002: 7). Furthermore, reliability of data has limitations: “We have an instinctive 
tendency to deny, distort, ignore, or disassociate ourselves from our own failures” (Cannon and 
Edmonson 2004: 7). McKenzie and Sud highlight the potential inadequacy of quantitative 
research methods to deal with this (McKenzie and Sud 2008: 124) and propose examining 
personal stories told by entrepreneurs about their failed ventures. When dealing with ‘attitudes’ 
to failure, it must be remembered that entrepreneurs may have to withhold the truth and ‘tell 
stories’ to survive – to delay creditors, boost employee morale and assuage investors. 
Furthermore, failure may be preceded by a struggle for survival, fraught with emotion and lack 
of clarity: it is not just the final closure of a business but the long decline into closure that is of 
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interest. Accordingly, in common with prior research (Cope 2005; Cope and Cave 2008; 
McKenzie and Sud 2008; Cope 2011), a qualitative approach has been adopted to study this 
complex and sometimes contradictory behaviour. 
This literature review covers major themes arising from research into entrepreneurial failure. 
From an initial literature review illustrated in Figure 1, these include (1) the context of failure as 
a business event; (2) environmental factors affecting the entrepreneur’s background; (3) 
personality traits and psychological makeup of the entrepreneur, and (4) factors leading to how 
entrepreneurs respond. The detailed literature review revealed the importance of overlapping 
areas that impact the study of entrepreneurial failure in various ways: this is illustrated in Figure 
3. As a result, (5) a comparison of national studies is provided, including literature regarding the 
USA, UK and Germany (see Table 3). 
Failure	  Analysis	  in	  Context	  
 
‘Failure’ and failure rates have been researched in many ways: there is much literature on the 
context and reasons for failed ventures yet ‘failure’ remains hard to define. It may be objective, 
defined in terms of bankruptcy or dissolution (Warren and Westbrook 1999; Thornhill and Amit 
2003; Ooghe and De Prijcker 2008; Primo and Green 2011); or subjective, based on 
interpretation of outcome versus objectives (McKenzie and Sud 2008). Cope is drawn to the 
definition of failure as “the termination of a business that has fallen short of its goals” (McGrath 
1999; Politis and Gabrielsson 2009; Cope 2011). 
Business failure appears to be commonplace and “most new businesses do not survive beyond 
three or four years” (Kelley, Bosma et al. 2011). In addition to high failure rates in new ventures 
(50 – 90%), a larger number of venture plans never make it to incorporation (Bhidé 1992): 
perhaps only 0.5% – 1.0% of business plans submitted to Venture Capital firms are funded 
(Lerner 2009). Some authors have questioned data sources and biases in the computation of 
survival rates (Yang and Aldrich 2012), and there may be a complicating distinction between 
“entrepreneur failure” and “business-venture failure” (Gulst and Maritz 2009; Read, Sarasvathy 
et al. 2011: 64), but the consensus appears to be that (at least) the majority of new ventures fail. 
Most studies of entrepreneurial failure address US startups and although there are some non-US 
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and cross-country comparisons, this study hopes to contribute to the academic literature by 
expanding the scope of such review and comparison to include additional regions. 
If we wish to predict and prevent failure, then frameworks for analyzing business failure are 
valuable. Pretorius highlights four causes (Pretorius 2008): human; business factors (internal or 
external); structural; and financial. Others propose three: personal characteristics; managerial 
deficiencies; and financial shortcomings (Larson and Clute 1979). To these factors, the “liability 
of newness” and the “liability of smallness” may be added (Zacharakis, Meyer et al. 1999). 
Garnsey, building on the work of Edith Penrose (Penrose 1995), outlines five areas of interest: 
patterns of survival, continuousness of growth, turning points, reversals and cumulative growth. 
(Garnsey, Stam et al. 2006: 18). 
As early advocates of the flexible re-cycling concept in Silicon Valley, Evans and Bahrami offer 
an alternative view (Evans and Bahrami 1995: 62). They argue that ‘permanence’ as a business 
goal does not fit comfortably in Silicon Valley. When venture failure rates are high, the “flexible 
re-cycling” culture enables new ventures and re-purposed components to thrive. In light of this 
natural cycle, DeTienne provides insight into various definitions and meanings of the business 
exit as part of this renewal process (DeTienne 2010). 
Environmental	  Factors	  
 
Environment may affect how entrepreneurs regard failure, introducing issues of immigration, 
education and socio-economic background, as well as reputation, stigma and luck. 
‘Environment’ may be defined in multiple ways, including a loose collection of economic, 
geographical and social factors, as well as an eco-system, bringing together education, 
immigration, financial, human and technical resources (Evans and Bahrami 1995). Alternatively 
the environment may be viewed in terms of a regional economic ‘cluster’ (Sternberg and 
Litzenberger 2004; Garnsey and Heffernan 2005; Herriot and Minshall 2006). 
Immigration and ethnicity are significant factors in Silicon Valley: Bhidé states that 60% of 
founding teams studied included immigrants among their members (Bhidé 2008) and Saxenian 
highlights the contribution of immigrants to the technology sector between 1980 and 1998 
(Wadhwa, Saxenian et al. 2007). Hart offers a balanced view of how failure is regarded by 
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immigrants: they may have less to lose, but also find it more difficult to re-enter the job market 
when they do (Hart, Acs et al. 2009: 124). Others argue that ethnicity, family background, 
education, age and experience may determine why people become entrepreneurs in the first place 
(Roberts 1991), and potentially impact why they fail. 
 
Figure 4. Model for Development and Diffusion of Stigma Arising from Failure (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann et al. 2008) 
 
Stigma and the issue of personal reputation are also important considerations. “Entrepreneurial 
activity varies substantially across regions and sectors and appears to be related to the stigma of 
failure.” (Landier 2005: 1). The impact of culture upon entrepreneurs introduces ‘dimensions’ 
such as individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, Hofstede et al. 2010), leading some authors to 
study the resulting effect on stigma:  “collectivistic societies are generally understood to be less 
forgiving and more stigmatizing of failure and thus not conducive for entrepreneurial risk 
taking” (Damaraju, Barney et al. 2010). Wiesenfeld et al. go further in their model for stigma 
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(see Figure 4): “Stigma, … is the denigration or stain the person experiences, which negatively 
impacts his or her image and reputation” (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann et al. 2008). The personal 
cost of failure is tragically demonstrated for example by the suicide of Ilya Zhitomirskiy, co-
founder of Diaspora: “failure is one thing when you have a track record of success and a wide 
network of contacts; its quite another when you’re 22, just out of college, far from your family 
and friends, and completely green” (Hasbun 2012). 
We are often compelled by the public spectacle of failure and the stigma associated with those 
affected. The intensity of stigma has been discussed in high-technology ventures (Sutton and 
Callahan 1987) and as a self-reinforcing phenomenon: “stigma is posited to lead to a vicious 
cycle of inferiority” (Damaraju, Barney et al. 2010). It may also have impact on subsequent 
ventures and the “reentry career choices of stigmatized entrepreneurs” (Simmons and Wiklund 
2011). The national legal and commercial environment may also affect the importance of stigma 
for failed entrepreneurs. A region with entrepreneur-unfriendly bankruptcy laws where liability 
can endure for up to thirty years may discourage startups, while the opposite may support 
increased risk taking by encouraging more new firms (Seung-Hyun, Peng et al. 2007: 261). 
Perhaps there is a useful distinction here between ‘business-venture failure’ due to events and 
circumstances beyond the control of founders, and ‘entrepreneur failure’, attributable directly to 
poor individual entrepreneurial performance (Gulst and Maritz 2009; Read, Sarasvathy et al. 
2011). “In Silicon Valley, there is no stigma attached to honest failure …. It is immeasurably 
better to try something risky and to fail, rather than to wonder about what might have been.” 
(Evans and Bahrami 1995: 73). ‘Honest failure’ of course might imply the existence of 
‘dishonest failure’. 
Luck is also part of the entrepreneurial experience. Liu indicates that “people tend to over-
attribute their own successes to superior skill but failures to bad luck” (Liu 2010: 3), revealing an 
asymmetry between how entrepreneurs view themselves versus the rest of the world (Miller and 
Ross 1975). In other research, 81% of entrepreneurs believed they had a 70% chance of success, 
with the remainder anticipating a 100% chance of success (Cooper, Woo et al. 1988). 
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Entrepreneurial	  Personality	  Factors	  
 
Personality traits and entrepreneurial characteristics figure prominently in the literature on 
entrepreneurship (Gartner and Shane 1995; Lee 1997; Gürol and Atsan 2006; Pavlovich and 
Corner 2006). Particular attributes include confidence, optimism, passion, self-efficacy and 
persistence. Some authors have suggested: “individuals with different personality traits 
experience success similarly, however [they] have very different reactions to failure” (Cardon 
and McGrath 1999).  
Perhaps the most important attribute studied in recent years is self-efficacy, particularly in work 
directed by Sarasvathy (Sarasvathy 2001; Read and Sarasvathy 2005; Sarasvathy 2008; Dew, 
Sarasvathy et al. 2009; Read, Sarasvathy et al. 2011; Sarasvathy and Venkataraman 2011). 
“Extensive research supports the notion that individuals who believe in their own skills 
(entrepreneurial self-efficacy) and who are willing to accept risk (no fear of failure) are more 
likely to be both interested in and to succeed in becoming entrepreneurs” (Estrin, Mickiewicz et 
al. 2011: 8). However, there may be a contradiction between the desirability of self-efficacy and 
the negative consequences of overconfidence (Cardon, Wincent et al. 2009). Entrepreneurs need 
sufficient confidence and self-efficacy to start and manage a new venture, but not too much 
(Trevelyan 2007). Indeed, ‘effectuation’ may represent a broader way of describing how 
entrepreneurs engage with their world (Read, Sarasvathy et al. 2011). 
Efficacy may also involve components including (self-) motivation, and the measurement of 
effectiveness against goals (Locke and Latham 1990). Early work by Bandura outlined four 
factors of self-efficacy: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, 
and physiological states (Bandura 1977). More recent research indicates that entrepreneurs may 
start new ventures with an effectual view evaluating the level of “affordable loss” (Dew, 
Sarasvathy et al. 2009), but venture failure may challenge the levels of self-belief for the 
entrepreneur. However, the persistence of repeat, serial and portfolio entrepreneurs demonstrates 
they remain confident in their own abilities despite setbacks (Estrin, Mickiewicz et al. 2011), and 
perhaps their own perception of risk is more important than any objective evaluation of risk 
(Busenitz 1999). 
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Confidence appears a pre-requisite for starting a company. Perhaps “…the tendency toward 
optimism is unavoidable …It's unlikely that companies can, or would even want to, remove the 
organizational pressures that promote optimism.” (Nielsen and Sarasvathy 2012). Some authors 
approach this issue from a psychological perspective, examining how founders draw benefits 
from previous failures while filtering out negative aspects (Lovallo and Kahneman 2003: 1). 
Optimism may also affect perceptions of risk (prospect theory): “entrepreneurs … tend to 
perceive existing risks as smaller than they are and smaller in magnitude than other persons do.” 
(Cannon and Edmonson 2004). Taking this further, Baron suggests that Dispositional Positive 
Affect (DPA) can influence how founders respond to failure (Baron 2004: 224), yet this must be 
balanced with potential downsides, including the impulsiveness arising from inattention to 
negative forces. Baron also proposes that counterfactual thinking is more prevalent among 
entrepreneurs (Baron, Hmieleski et al. 2012), and perhaps reflecting on failure forms a 
significant part of such ‘what-if’ analysis. 
We might see confidence and persistence as admirable and essential qualities. Trevelyan 
provides quantitative evidence for the role of confidence (Trevelyan 2007), suggesting that 
confident entrepreneurs might devote more effort to distracting or un-productive tasks. Some 
celebrate the optimism and confidence of serial entrepreneurs (Carland, Carland et al. 2002), 
while others address the issue of hubris, or the over-estimation of one’s capabilities (Hayward, 
Forster et al. 2010). Perhaps the degree of passion helps to define the difference between 
overconfidence and hubris: Cardon examines entrepreneurial passion and evaluates why some 
entrepreneurs retain or lose this over time (Cardon, Wincent et al. 2009). In a similar way, the 
‘right’ amount of confidence is needed to avoid both ‘analysis paralysis’ as well as stimulating 
action “before it makes sense” (Chandler, DeTienne et al. 2011). 
Persistence involves the pursuit of action in the face of opposing forces (Evans and Leighton 
1989). Such persistence may lead to improved performance: 30% of previously successful 
entrepreneurs will succeed in subsequent ventures, where the probability is 18% for first-time 
and 20% for previously failed entrepreneurs (Holland 2008; Holland and Shepherd 2011). 
However, while persistence and tenacity might demonstrate admirable adherence to a consistent 
vision they might alternatively conceal a stubborn refusal to face contradictory facts. 
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“Attribution theory might thus provide a useful means to understand why some entrepreneurs 
simply give up when facing setbacks, while others persist.” (Gompers, Kovner et al. 2008: 2). 
‘Big Five’ personality traits (conscientiousness, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and 
neuroticism) are often cited in reference to entrepreneurial capabilities, but not specifically 
regarding failure (Digman 1990; Costa and McCrae 1995). However, Cantner outlines how these 
characteristics have different impacts on entrepreneurs: “[of] the Big Five traits openness, 
conscientiousness and extraversion positively relate to entrepreneurial performance. Contrarily, 
neuroticism is detrimental to entrepreneurial performance and agreeableness has no effect” 
(Cantner, Silbereisen et al. 2012). 
The	  Entrepreneurial	  Response	  to	  Failure	  
 
As stated above, ‘failure’ can be defined in objective or subjective terms, but these typically 
involve the termination or cessation of a venture, leaving entrepreneurs with the need to find 
their next opportunity. Various authors have examined how entrepreneurs respond to failure, 
both personally (regarding stress and grief) and developmentally in the way they learn and view 
new opportunities. Venture failure may be stressful but not all negative: “strain (psychosomatic 
complaints, susceptibility to stress) activates strategies that have positive effects on long-term 
survival and performance” (Rauch, Liebig et al. 2007). However, some founders experience 
burnout from such stress, which may be heralded by exhaustion and disengagement (Coombs, 
Webb et al. 2009). 
Like personal bereavement, recovery from business failure passes through several stages. 
Entrepreneurial failure can be viewed through a framework of grief, with emphasis on the 
personal recovery process of the entrepreneur (Cope and Cave 2008). Shepherd reaches four 
conclusions using this approach: (1) Failure is an important source of learning for entrepreneurs; 
(2) Bankruptcy and other failure events are stressful on the entire family; (3) Failed 
entrepreneurs should seek support and (4) a lack of separation between person and business 
makes recovery harder (Shepherd, Douglas et al. 2000; Shepherd 2003; Shepherd and DeTienne 
2005; Shepherd, Wiklund et al. 2009). Furthermore, psychology literature on coping has 
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investigated why some individuals are able to ‘recover from’ and ‘grow as a result of a major 
loss’ (Shepherd, Patzelt et al. 2011). 
Perhaps we are drawn to stories of failure because they are compelling human dramas, and easy 
to understand in the context of everyday setbacks. Cope and Cave conducted phenomenological 
interviews with failed entrepreneurs, identifying a traumatic yet significant entrepreneurial 
learning experience which is different for each individual (Cope and Cave 2008). Perhaps in 
small startup companies where people work in close proximity and have co-dependent 
relationships, learning-by-doing becomes a more intense experience. Learning may also be made 
more effective by iteration and experimentation. Evans and Bahrami describe how the Silicon 
Valley “emphasis on continuous recalibration is especially critical when there are no historical 
precedents or successful recipes for a given product or market arena” (Evans and Bahrami 1995). 
Although learning-by-doing may destroy companies and careers, it may add value to the wider 
economy, leading to re-cycling of ‘failed’ people, assets and technology. 
Holcomb takes this further and suggests such learning occurs at an increasing (non-linear) rate 
when the accumulated knowledge is a learning skill. In early-stage ventures, setback and failure 
encourage the entrepreneur to learn how to learn (Holcomb, Ireland et al. 2009). This highlights 
the phenomenon of ‘double-loop learning’: faced with immediate and personal consequences of 
decisions, learning is immediately re-presented to the individual in a double feedback loop, 
reinforcing significance and increasing the chance it will instruct future decision-making 
(Argyris 2002). Cope takes this further: “recovery and re-emergence from failure is a function of 
distinctive learning processes that foster … higher-level learning outcomes.” (Cope and Cave 
2008). However, failure might stimulate learning and increase the probability of future success 
only if the entrepreneur is capable of identifying and analyzing the failure event to recognize and 
learn the appropriate lessons (Cannon and Edmonson 2004). Perhaps this is a two-stage process: 
“we become better individuals because entrepreneurship allows failure, and from failure we 
learn” (Acs and Szerb 2011). A further refinement of this argument examines types of 
entrepreneurs, concluding that the strong emotions experienced by serial founders results in more 
blaming of others (an “attributional bias”), and making them less capable of learning than 
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portfolio entrepreneurs, who spread the risk and intensity across multiple ventures (Ucbasaran, 
Westhead et al. 2011). 
Entrepreneurial failure may also affect decision-making in uncertainty. In startup conditions, 
judgment and decision-making is often based on incomplete and uncertain data. Kahneman 
observes: “complex judgments and preferences are called ‘intuitive’ in everyday language if they 
come to mind quickly and effortlessly” (Kahneman 2002: 481). Such rapid, intuitive judgments 
are typical of entrepreneurs and are often made at the margin, raising the idea of prospect theory. 
Learning ‘at the margin’ is perhaps made more immediate and profound to the entrepreneur 
when confronted with the failed outcome of his decisions. Berglund and Sarasvathy offer a 
further detailed analysis of how entrepreneurs make decisions in uncertain conditions (Berglund 
and Sarasvathy 2010). 
Another aspect of failure-response lies in the identification of new opportunities: some authors 
have suggested this might involve ‘real options’ analysis (McGrath 1999; Cave and Minty 2004), 
scrutinizing entrepreneurs’ ability to evaluate entrepreneurial opportunities and their tolerance 
for risk. “Real options confer the right but not the obligation to take strategic action … they are 
small investments that provide access to potential opportunities” (Klingebiel and Adner 2012). 
Dew and others offer an alternative perspective on how opportunities are assessed: “Affordable 
loss is one component of effectuation, a set of heuristics for making decisions under 
uncertainty.” (Dew, Sarasvathy et al. 2009) This latter approach may help describe how ‘plunge 
decisions’ are made, and is representative of intuitive entrepreneurs who may view the world 
through ‘Rose-Tinted Spectacles’ (Cave and Minty 2004), rather than the rational approach of 
more analytic individuals who apply a ‘real options’ filter to their economic opportunities. 
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Figure 5. Model of Entrepreneurial Alertness, Describing Three Stages of Alertness on the Part of the Entrepreneur: (1) 
Scanning; (2) Connecting; and (3) Evaluation (Tang, Kacmar et al. 2012) 
 
Alternatively, opportunity identification may involve a degree of “entrepreneurial alertness” 
(Tang, Kacmar et al. 2012). In Figure 5 three stages of alertness are defined: scanning and 
search, in which new ideas are sought in a “persistent and unconventional” way (Busenitz 1996); 
association and connection, including bisociation or “the sudden interlocking of two or more 
previously unrelated matrices of information or thoughts” (Koestler 1964); and evaluation and 
judgment in which the opportunity is assessed for relevance and fit to the individual 
entrepreneur. After a failed venture, perhaps this alertness is a factor in how the entrepreneur 
responds. Put another way “do the roots of such failures possibly reach back into the 
entrepreneurial alertness process?” (Tang, Kacmar et al. 2012). 
Finally, in the distinction between the discovery and creation of opportunities (Alvarez and 
Barney 2010), an inability to learn from failure might limit an entrepreneur’s ability to create 
new opportunities but he may still be open to discovery. Berglund has examined the underlying 
differences between Schumpeterian discovery and Kirznerian creation opportunities at length 
(Berglund 2007), and his phenomenological approach suggests entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the 
opportunity indicate whether it is ‘discovered’ or ‘created’. 
International	  Comparisons	  
 
Jones et al. provide a comparative survey of literature in three main areas of research: 
Entrepreneurial Internationalization, International Comparisons of Entrepreneurship and 
Comparative Entrepreneurial Internationalization (Jones, Coviello et al. 2011). However, this 
work mentions failure just once, and only in connection with firm failure. Similarly comparative 
studies of entrepreneurship in different countries and cultures (Tajeddini and Mueller 2009) do 
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not specifically address the experience and consequences of failure. Sources of international data 
such as the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) provide annual reports of trends and new 
lines of research, including fear of failure. For example, in 2010 UK GEM Report, “fear of 
failure among those who perceived opportunities in the UK was the same as the G7 average” 
(Hart and Levie 2010), and an earlier comparative study of “Failure Tolerance and Second 
Chancing” was also based on GEM data (Burchell and Hughes 2006). 
 
Country Research papers and studies 
North America (Cooper, Woo et al. 1988; Saxenian 1996; Cave, Eccles et al. 2001; Delmar and Shane 
2003; Landier 2005; Cope and Cave 2008; Holland 2008). 
United Kingdom (Cave, Eccles et al. 2001; Stokes and Blackburn 2001; Cave and Minty 2004; Garnsey 
and Heffernan 2005; Cressy 2006; Cope and Cave 2008; Saridakis, Mole et al. 2008; 
Ucbasaran, Westhead et al. 2010). 
Germany (Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans 1999; Bergmann 2002; Wagner 2002; Welter and Kautonen 
2005; Bergmann and Sternberg 2007; Buenstorf 2007; Boden, Nett et al. 2009; 
Buenstorf and Fornahl 2009). 
Australia (Trevelyan 2007; Gulst and Maritz 2009). 
Canada (Thornhill and Amit 2003; Mitchell, Mitchell et al. 2004). 
China (Engelen 2010; Tang 2010; Yang and Rocher 2012). 
Dominican Republic (De Castro, Alvarez et al. 1997). 
France (Landier 2005). 
Iran (Aghajani and Abbasgholipour 2012). 
Israel (Gulst and Maritz 2009). 
Korea (Lee and Lee 2005). 
Spain (Vaillant and LaFuente 2007). 
South Africa (Pretorius 2008; Pretorius 2009; Pretorius and Le Roux 2011). 
Sweden (Renko, Carsrud et al. 2008; Wetter and Wennberg 2009; Wennberg, Wiklund et al. 
2010). 
Table 3. Sample of National and Comparative Studies of Entrepreneurial Failure 
 
Much of the literature concerning entrepreneurial failure is created in, or focuses on, North 
America. Looking outside the USA reveals a scattered picture of single-country studies and 
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multi-country comparisons of venture failure, including research into the UK and Germany (see 
Table 3). 
A number of studies in Germany have examined the startup rates of small businesses (Hinz and 
Jungbauer-Gans 1999); nascent entrepreneurship (Brixy, Sternberg et al. 2012); regional 
variations in entrepreneurship within Germany (Lückgen, Oberschachtsiek et al. 2006; Fritsch 
and Mueller 2008), and rates of self-employment (Staber and Bogenhold 1993). This work offers 
some comparison between Germany and the UK, concluding: “promotion of the entrepreneurial 
culture, especially in Great Britain but increasingly also in Germany, is desired to support the 
structural change of the economy” (Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans 1999: 319). Only a limited number 
of papers focus on high-technology firms: a case study of Intershop is notable here (Buenstorf 
and Fornahl 2009), as well as an empirical examination of entrepreneurship in innovative and 
non-innovative firms in Thuringia (Cantner, Silbereisen et al. 2012). 
A comparison of attitudes to failure in multiple countries invokes the issue of national ‘culture’ 
(Mueller and Thomas 2001; Klyver, Hindle et al. 2007; Bloom and Van Reenen 2010; Hofstede, 
Hofstede et al. 2010; Shinnar, Giacomin et al. 2012) and multiple international, regional and 
cross-regional studies performed on data generated by GEM (Wagner 2007; Bosma, Acs et al. 
2008; Hechavarria and Reynolds 2009; Brixy, Hundt et al. 2010; Hart and Levie 2010; Kelley, 
Bosma et al. 2011; Martinez, Yang et al. 2011). The work of Hofstede is instructive here, 
especially his identification of ‘collectivism versus individualism’, and ‘uncertainty avoidance’ 
(see Figure 6) as two of his five dimensions in defining culture (Hofstede, Hofstede et al. 2010). 
This framework was expanded by Shinnar with gender roles to compare entrepreneurial 
intentions in China, USA and Belgium (Shinnar, Giacomin et al. 2012) and Bloom examines 
differences in how national managers (including entrepreneurs) behave in different countries 
(Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). Klyver extends to this by establishing a connection between 
entrepreneurial intentions and nation culture in a 51-country study (Klyver and Thornton 2010), 
although, once again this rich data does not address the issue of failure. 
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Figure 6. Comparison of Values for Five Hofstede Dimensions for Germany, UK and USA (Hofstede, Hofstede et al. 2010) 
 
Bergmann suggests that “attitudes and beliefs” differ between individual entrepreneurs but 
variations also exist between regions, particularly in his study of Germany (Bergmann 2002). He 
points out a social pressure in Germany not to start a business. “In Germany … [some] people 
have a negative opinion of entrepreneurs because they regard them as capitalists or exploiters” 
(Bergmann 2002: 9). These national views are explored by Autio, et al. who describe the 
consequences of national culture on entrepreneurial behaviours with respect to GEM data from 
44 countries (Autio, Pathak et al. 2010) and this is clarified in Figure 7 below. One of the 
resulting hypotheses is “in societies with a high level of institutional collectivism, the effect of 
fear of failure on entrepreneurial growth orientation will be stronger” (Autio, Pathak et al. 2010), 
and this is confirmed to be the case by Autio’s research. We might conclude from this that 
German collectivist society may have a problem with failure, whereas the UK, with its apparent 
lower deference to authority and higher levels of individualism, might be less severe. 
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Figure 7. Theoretical Framework for Cultural Consequences, Aligning Three Main Components: Individual Attitudes, Cultural 
Norms, and Entrepreneurial Behaviours (Autio, Pathak et al. 2010) 
 
Regional variations have also been studied in the USA. Cardon cites author Michael Lewis: 
“Where Silicon Valley exalts failure, Wall Street punishes it ruthlessly” (Cardon, Stevens et al. 
2011: 80). Also in Silicon Valley, “this process of ‘flexible re-cycling’ is enhanced in the 
absence of the typical stigma associated with organizational failure” (Evans and Bahrami 1995: 
81). Saxenian compares East Coast with West Coast, quoting a Boston-based professional: “In 
Silicon Valley failure is an accepted way of life, unlike in the East where failure is viewed as a 
death sentence” (Saxenian 1996: 68); and overall, Hart points out that twice as many Americans 
planned to start a business in 2005 than residents of other G-7 countries (Hart 2008: 3). Such 
views are reinforced by Cooper, who suggests that in the USA successful entrepreneurs are 
viewed as “folk heroes” (Cooper 2005). 
International comparisons also address bankruptcy law and the treatment of creditors, suggesting 
that countries with tougher practices tend to be less forgiving of venture failure, attaching more 
social stigma to adverse outcomes (Landier 2005). While there are multiple insolvency options in 
the USA and UK, Germany does not typically offer such routes. “… In Germany, reorganization 
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bankruptcy is available, but only 0.3 percent of all financially troubled firms actually use it” 
(Seung-Hyun, Peng et al. 2007: 261). 
Literature	  Review:	  Conclusion	  
 
There is much literature on the field of entrepreneurial failure from which we can draw multiple 
conclusions: (1) Although there is a wide range of writing on entrepreneurship and much less on 
failure, relatively few of these studies focus on the experience of the individual entrepreneur. (2) 
Definitions of failure are varied but we are drawn more to subjective characterizations where 
failure represents a shortfall against expectations. (3) Stigma and the fear of failure represent 
powerful forces in certain cultures, and might appear to suppress the appetite for risk in new 
ventures. (4) Of the many personality factors in the entrepreneurial mix, an examination of self-
efficacy holds much potential. (5) The response of entrepreneurs to failure often involves 
learning as well as a sense of ‘alertness’ to new opportunities, and finally (6) there are relatively 
few comparative national studies of entrepreneurial failure and industry-specific studies are rare. 
Therefore, several research gaps emerge: comparative studies of the entrepreneurial experience 
and response to failure, especially in specific industries such as the high-technology sector; 
research papers covering direct, narrative accounts of the entrepreneur’s experience, and studies 
that examine a holistic experience of failure from the point of view of the entrepreneur. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
Methodology:	  Introduction	  
 
This section reviews (1) prior literature and examines various methodologies applied to 
entrepreneurial failure; (2) the methodology selected for this research; (3) the reasons for its 
selection, and (4) the research design. A further review of the literature on methodology is 
included here in addition to the previous chapter. If we hope to investigate the detailed 
experiences of entrepreneurs in multiple countries there are multiple methodologies available, 
and we start with an examination of these options. 
Literature	  Review	  (Methodology)	  
 
Academic literature on entrepreneurial failure is based on various methodological approaches: 
some papers are specifically concerned with methodological issues. A brief survey of literature 
in this area, based on relevance to the research question as assessed by the author, is outlined in 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Map of Key Research Papers on Entrepreneurial Failure Grouped by Type 
 
Quantitative approaches have been applied in many, if not most academic papers in this area. 
These have addressed multiple failure-related topics including failure rates (Bhidé 1992; Delmar 
and Shane 2003; Cressy 2006; Dimov and De Clercq 2006; Wu and Knott 2006) and bankruptcy 
(Warren and Westbrook 1999; Thornhill and Amit 2003; Seung-Hyun, Peng et al. 2007). Other 
authors have applied statistical analysis from surveys and economic datasets to issues including 
confidence levels (Camerer and Lovallo 1999) and perceptions of opportunity and self-efficacy 
(Cooper, Woo et al. 1988; Landier and Thesmar 2009; Liu 2010). The perspective of investors, 
primarily venture capitalists, have also been investigated this way (Zacharakis, Meyer et al. 
1999). More general aspects of entrepreneurial activity and failure have also been addressed 
using quantitative methods (Evans and Leighton 1989; Sarasvathy and Menon 2003), including 
national and comparative studies (Vaillant and LaFuente 2007; Wetter and Wennberg 2009). 
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Several authors have performed literature reviews and surveys within the domain of 
entrepreneurial failure. Most prominent among these include work from South Africa (Pretorius 
2009) and Australia (Gulst and Maritz 2009), which have categorized the literature to develop a 
landscape of academic output. This includes an assessment of ‘conceptual’ papers which outline 
theory in several areas including real options analysis (McGrath 1999), ‘flexible re-cycling’ 
concepts (Evans and Bahrami 1995), and the grieving process of recovery from failure (Shepherd 
2003). Theoretical development is also clear in the area of economic recovery (Weitzel and 
Jonsson 1991), business planning (Cannon and Edmonson 2004), affect and ‘passion’ (Cardon, 
Wincent et al. 2009; Baron, Hmieleski et al. 2012) and survival (Shepherd, Douglas et al. 2000; 
Pretorius 2009). More explicitly, cognitive and psychological research includes theory 
development on regret and counterfactual thinking (Baron 2000; Baron 2004). 
From this analysis of literature several major trends regarding methodology present themselves 
to the author. Firstly, the evolution of the theme of self-efficacy into a more rounded theory of 
‘effectuation,’ the concept that entrepreneurs believe in their own skills and can have an effect on 
their environment rather than be merely a subject of causation (Sarasvathy 2001; Read and 
Sarasvathy 2005; Sarasvathy 2008; Read, Sarasvathy et al. 2011). The entrepreneur operates at 
the centre of many conflicting forces and events and studying his ability to affect and control this 
environment represents a powerful approach to increasing understanding of the entrepreneurial 
experience. This approach has implications for methodology: examining effectuation may 
require different ways to evaluate causation. 
Secondly, a number of authors see the virtue of qualitative approaches that examine the lived 
experience of the entrepreneur (McGrath 1999; Berglund 2007; Cope and Cave 2008; Cope 
2011). “Grounded in an ontology that sees individuals as inseparable from the world, i.e. as 
‘being-in-the-world’, such entrepreneurship must … be understood in terms of individuals who 
sense, hold on to and engage with anomalies that they perceive in their everyday social and 
cultural practices.” (Berglund and Sarasvathy 2010). This qualitative approach lends itself 
closely to phenomenological methods (Seymour 2006), and once the phenomenon has been 
examined, a hermeneutic approach is required to ascertain meaning from this experience 
(Seymour 2006; Smith 2007; McKenzie and Sud 2008). 
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Thirdly, there is an increasing awareness that entrepreneurship is a rich and complex 
phenomenon and can neither be measured nor placed in theoretical structures until it is better 
understood. Some writers have strongly criticized the devotion to theory in management science. 
“The requirement that every paper must contribute to theory is not very sensible; it is probably a 
sign of our academic insecurity” (Hambrick 2007: 1346) . Although this may represent an 
extreme perspective, for some phenomena perhaps simply ‘understanding what happens’ is 
enough to begin with, and a rush to theory is premature. This is particularly true for 
phenomenological studies: perhaps, as explored by von Krogh: “Phenomenon-based research is a 
pre-theoretical research strategy because it explores and informs research designs that enable 
scientific inquiry to proceed.” (von Krogh, Lamastra et al. 2009: 1). 
Finally, there is the rise of narrative analysis in which rich and complex ‘lived-world’ experience 
is examined and interpreted (Downing 2005). For example, a series of articles analyze the 
narrative of a toy store entrepreneur from multiple perspectives in one edition of the Journal of 
Business Venturing (Ahl 2007; Baker 2007; Steyaert 2007). Narrative analysis of transcribed 
interviews – perhaps using Downing’s perspective of Storyline, Emplotment, Structured 
Narrative Enactment, or SENSE (Downing 2005) – is able to interpret the meaning of unsolicited 
stories as well as structured interview data. 
Research approaches that combine narrative analysis with phenomenological approaches and 
hermeneutics have included elements of qualitative psychology (McKenzie and Sud 2008; 
Smith, Flowers et al. 2009; Cope 2011). The work of Jason Cope in particular (Cope and Cave 
2008; Cope 2011) has employed Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine 
attitudes to failure among entrepreneurs (and investors) whose ventures have been unsuccessful. 
The definition and exploration of IPA techniques represents a body of literature in itself (Smith 
1996; Cope 2003; Eatough and Smith 2008; Smith and Osborn 2008; Smith, Flowers et al. 
2009).  This will be examined in more detail in the next section. 
In summary, various methodologies have been applied in the study of entrepreneurial failure. 
However, the present research question addresses ‘attitudes’ of entrepreneurs in a group 
consisting of hard-to-locate individuals with complex experiences and perspectives: this may 
best be addressed using a phenomenological approach, and analyzed by listening to the narrative 
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stories from such experiences. It is proposed that the most appropriate methodology is a 
qualitative approach, specifically the qualitative psychology-inspired methodology of IPA. 
 
Selection	  of	  Methodology	  
 
From a review of entrepreneurial failure literature and a series of preliminary and exploratory 
interviews, a research gap emerges regarding in-depth studies of the personal experiences and 
narratives of entrepreneurs whose businesses failed. Given the high public interest in technology 
entrepreneurship, little academic research has taken place in this regard, with the exception of 
two key studies (McKenzie and Sud 2008; Cope 2011). 
As context to this research, the following is instructive: “Whilst conceptual clarity regarding 
failure is being achieved there remains a noticeable paucity of supporting qualitative studies that 
have sought to tell the entrepreneur's story, grounding theoretical discussions of failure in rich 
narrative accounts.” (Cope 2011). This research is intended to address this particular gap in the 
literature. 
Research	  Methodology	  
 
Selected methods of research should originate from a clear philosophical position.  
This researcher enjoyed a 25-year career in business and technology before embarking on his 
doctoral research: his personal experience has confirmed the importance of meanings and 
motivations in human interactions. Among a real world of physical actions and phenomena, it is 
held that what gives meaning to the human experience are the relationships, intentions and 
emotions of people, how they interact with the physical world and each other. This may be 
regarded as an ‘internal realist’ perspective and provides a basis for a phenomenological 
approach to research, where the research purpose is to understand how and why entrepreneurs 
respond, act and relate to the world around them. 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 48 of 216 
Cope examines the phenomenological perspective at length (Cope 2003), including the 
supporting philosophical tradition dating back to Husserl. At an epistemological level, 
phenomenology seeks to explore and reveal the essential types and structures of experiences 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979), and to do so without any preconceptions or assumptions. In some 
ways, Husserl sees “science as a second-order knowledge system, which depends on first-order 
personal experience” (Smith, Flowers et al. 2009: 15), and this establishes the importance of 
examining the lived experience (‘life world’) in detail to scrutinize the meaning of human 
activities, motivations and relationships. Husserl was a natural scientist, but in regard to the 
social sciences it can be argued that this philosophy favours an interpretative approach: later 
exponents of this position echo this. “The aim of phenomenological inquiry is to understand the 
subjective nature of ‘lived experience’ from the perspective of those who experience it, by 
exploring the subjective meanings and explanations that individuals attribute to their 
experiences.” (Cope 2003). The examination of ‘attitudes’ as part of this exploration makes this 
phenomenological approach compelling when dealing with complex situations such as 
entrepreneurial failure. 
Berglund takes this approach further. “Phenomenologists … argue that the world and the objects 
we perceive exist to us through the meanings we give to them, through an act of interpretation. 
This does not necessarily deny the existence of an external physical world independent of our 
perceptions, but it does imply that the only way things exist to us is through the way we interpret 
and give meaning to them.” (Berglund 2007). To apply Husserl to practical research requires two 
steps. Firstly, the bracketing or disregarding (or transcending) of personal socialized and learned 
prejudices – to eliminate the personal in order to examine the pure phenomenon. Secondly, the 
free and imaginative interpretation of different aspects of the phenomenon “to understand the 
limits of its identity, which are its transcendental essences and which are its conditional 
features.” (Berglund 2007). A subsequent development emerges in interpretative 
phenomenology, which is derived from the work of hermeneutic philosophers such as Heidegger 
and Ricoeur, who advocate the “embeddedness in the world of language and social relationships, 
and the inescapable historicity of all understanding.”(Finlay 2009). 
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Finlay surveys various strands of phenomenological methodology (Finlay 2009) across multiple 
authors and schools (including: van Manen 1990; Giorgi 1997; Ashworth 2003; Halling, Leifer 
et al. 2006; Garza 2007; Dahlberg, Dalhberg et al. 2008). She identifies certain conflicts and 
inconsistencies in her review. While being concerned about research which purports to be 
Husserlian without reduction, she is also skeptical of researchers who “claim to have bracketed, 
and therefore transcended their assumptions while using a hermeneutical approach [and who] 
would seem to be both naïve and confused” (Finlay 2009). She describes the multiplicity of 
phenomenological approaches (King, Finlay et al. 2008) and highlights their over-riding 
benefits: “Phenomenological researchers generally agree that our central concern is to return to 
embodied, experiential meanings. We aim for fresh, complex, rich descriptions of a phenomenon 
as it is concretely lived.” (Finlay 2009). Perhaps the rich, complex and often contradictory stories 
of entrepreneurial failure are well-suited to the phenomenological approach. 
Phenomenological research is idiographic and descriptive, examining the lived world of 
individuals, their detailed experiences often recalled through narrative. As Patton writes: “If you 
want to know how much people weigh, use a scale… If you want to know what their weight 
means to them, how it affects them, how they think about it, you need to ask them questions, find 
out about their experiences, and hear their stories.” (Patton 1990: 13). This is echoed by Smith: 
“The aim of IPA is to explore the participant’s view of the world and to adopt, as far as is 
possible, an ‘insider’s perspective.” (Smith 1996: 264). In this way, there is strong alignment 
between our research objectives and an IPA approach. 
The subjective, personal experiences of entrepreneurs and situations in which their ventures have 
failed will be explored using IPA methods: the views arising will be documented and evaluated 
using IPA content analysis, supported by narrative analysis. Given the individual and 
idiosyncratic personalities within the cohort of habitual entrepreneurs, and the objective of 
revealing and evaluating attitudes, this qualitative approach is regarded as the most appropriate. 
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Justification	  of	  Methodology	  
 
Why apply IPA, when other qualitative techniques such as grounded theory or ethnographical 
‘thick description’ might seem appropriate to this research topic? Grounded theory appears to 
offer suitable ways to study the failure experience of entrepreneurs and construct a view of their 
motivations and behaviours (Glaser and Strauss 1967), but this method aims to build substantive 
and formal theory. Alternatively, ethnography offers an approach to study the entrepreneurial 
experience, with thick description (Geertz 1973) of experiences, events and relationships. Both 
of these methodologies take an ‘outside-in’ approach, however, seeing the individual 
entrepreneur as one actor among a cast of other people, events and locations. To study the 
perspective of the entrepreneur, we need an ‘inside-out’ approach, hence the leaning here 
towards phenomenological methods. In this respect, this author is drawn more to the Keatsian 
concept of ‘Negative Capability’ than writers on methodology in social science. The complexity 
of behaviour and contradictory actions of entrepreneurs in times of decline and failure seem to 
demand an open approach to revealing insight rather than a drive to resolve certainty. In 
understanding individuals (or animals), Keats tries to perceive the thoughts, feelings and 
intentions of that person, without prejudice, reaching a state of “Negative Capability, that is 
when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact & reason.” (Keats 2002: Letter to George & Tom Keats. 21 December 1817. Page 41). 
Regarding the academic world, Finlay asks: “Is it sufficient to strive for rich description of lived 
experience, or are additional aspects required such as having a special phenomenological stance 
or attitude?” (Finlay 2009). This is particularly pertinent in light of Giorgi’s criticism of 
contemporary IPA studies (Giorgi 2010). Smith’s response to Giorgi’s concerns, as described in 
Table 4, helps to justify the selection of IPA for this research (Smith 2010). 
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 Concern over IPA  
(Giorgi 2010). 
Response (Smith 2010). 
1 IPA has a weak grounding 
in the philosophy of 
phenomenology and 
hermeneutics. 
Giorgi has failed to examine a number of philosophical studies of IPA in 
various papers and books (Smith 2004; Larkin, Watts et al. 2006; Smith, 
Flowers et al. 2009). These study the key thinkers in phenomenology and 
hermeneutics and the relationship IPA has to them, and represent a direct 
challenge to Giorgi’s assertion. In addition (not mentioned by Smith), 
other papers have examined IPA’s philosophical underpinnings (Cope 
2003). 
2 IPA is unscientific. Giorgi makes two assertions here, regarding prescription and replication. 
Firstly, IPA does not claim to be prescriptive: guidance on best practice is 
provided, but it is the skills of the researcher that leads to high quality 
results. Regarding replication, the validity and quality of qualitative work 
requires different criteria to quantitative techniques. In idiographic studies 
of individuals, replication may not make sense. Alternative ways to 
evaluate quality have been proposed (Yardley 2008), but it is inappropriate 
to apply positivist scientific validity checks such as replicability to 
qualitative methods such as IPA. 
3 General concerns. Smith suggests that Giorgi’s claims are based on selective and incomplete 
literature, based on introductory reading for undergraduates (Eatough and 
Smith 2008; Smith and Osborn 2008) and ignoring a body of work (Smith, 
Flowers et al. 2009) outlining the philosophical foundation, theoretical 
framework and practical guidance for researchers. 
Table 4. Summary of Smith Responses to Concerns and Criticisms of Giorgi Regarding IPA (Smith 2010) 
 
IPA involves the capture and interpretation of data arising from (in this case) transcribed 
interviews. The researcher is making sense of (interpreting) the attitudes, behaviours and actions 
of the entrepreneur. Indeed the researcher is making sense of the interviewee, who is in turn 
making sense of his own experience – a ‘double hermeneutic’. Arguably, the ultimate 
examination of this doctoral thesis represents a ‘triple hermeneutic’, when an academic examiner 
is making sense of the researcher, who is making sense of his interviewee, who is making sense 
of his own experience. 
Although there are risks of a researcher’s experience influencing the conduct of such research, 
IPA encourages the explicit removal or ‘bracketing’ of such bias as part of the analysis. 
Furthermore, the multi-level analysis process highlights the importance of detailed examination 
of perspectives, viewpoints and the lived experience of others. IPA involves a combination of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics and is regarded as highly suitable for the design of our current 
research. 
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Research	  Design	  
 
How do attitudes of habitual high-technology entrepreneurs to early-stage failure differ in Silicon 
Valley, Cambridge and Munich?  
 
The unit of analysis of this study is the individual ‘habitual’ entrepreneur (Gulst and Maritz 
2009). The attitude of these individuals to failure in early-stage ventures in the high-technology 
sector (software and media, semiconductors and computer infrastructure) has been studied in 
three geographic areas: Silicon Valley (California, USA), Cambridge (United Kingdom) and 
Munich (Germany). 
Multiple research gaps have been identified based on a literature review and ten exploratory 
interviews in Silicon Valley, Cambridge and Munich. Firstly, phenomenological research in 
entrepreneurial failure to date has been limited to the US and UK (Cope and Cave 2008). 
Extending a comparative study to include nations with different business cultures is intended to 
add to this body of knowledge. Second, prior research has examined ‘critical incident’ theory, 
through which specific events may lead to ‘double loop’ learning outcomes (Hughes, Williamson 
et al. 2007), but a wider perspective of entrepreneurial learning and knowledge acquisition, 
arising from an extended analysis of the ‘lived experience’ (rather than a single ‘critical 
incident’) may augment our understanding of the impact of venture failure. Furthermore, 
exploratory interviews with failed habitual entrepreneurs have revealed entrepreneurs’ interest in 
how setback and failure fits into a wider context of economic activity. Additionally, a review of 
literature on entrepreneurial failure in Germany indicated that interpretative, qualitative research 
has not been widely applied in examining the personal experience of entrepreneurs. This offers 
an opportunity for new research. 
Research objectives include an improved understanding of comparative attitudes to early-stage 
venture failure. It is hoped that this will provide two main contributions to knowledge. Firstly, 
themes arising from interviews might provide entrepreneurs and academics with increased 
awareness and understanding of a common business experience and how to cope with similar 
experiences in future. Secondly, comparative findings may enable reflections on the wider 
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economic context, such as how entrepreneurial learning and opportunity identification might be 
impacted by education, policy and business support in each country. 
Research	  Approach	  and	  Potential	  Limitations	  
 
In-depth interviews with experienced entrepreneurs have been conducted to gather details of 
experiences, attitudes to failure, and reflections on experiences for learning and opportunity 
identification. These face-to-face interviews were recorded electronically, then transcribed and 
analyzed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). A leading practitioner of this 
approach, the late Jason Cope, was consulted on the use of IPA for this thesis. 
Potential limitations of the research approach arise from the sampling strategies, the reliability of 
historical recollections, issues of second-language filtering, and validity of the research findings.  
Firstly, the validity of sampling might be undermined by the inter-connectedness of the subjects 
yet this research is not attempting to prove a pre-defined hypothesis, but to reveal meaning from 
the actions of a small, hard-to-access group of individuals. Identification of interviewee 
candidates was iterative: initially reaching out into networks and communities of entrepreneurs 
and investors, then drawing up long lists of possible candidates before approaching individuals 
through personal introductions. The subjects are not necessarily connected to each other: IPA is 
an idiographic approach and selected interviewees do not ‘represent’ a population. Small sample 
sizing is an established part of the IPA approach and this partly addresses problems identified in 
nomothetic psychology in which findings may reveal group-level claims without examining the 
experience of individuals (Smith, Flowers et al. 2009: 49).  
A second limitation lies in how the role of memory and ability to recall past experience raises 
questions of accuracy and veracity (Draaisma 2006; Zimbardo and Boyd 2009). However, 
phenomenological approaches investigate the ‘lived world’ of the subject, including their 
storytelling skills: an entrepreneur might recall events perfectly yet distort their recollection, or 
recall poorly and change the story anyway. The issue of memory raises a potential ‘interaction 
effect,’ when interviewees’ recollections of earlier and later experiences may conflict. The 
analyzed transcript may represent the combined and adulterated product of all the individual's 
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attitudes and attributes, but what they learnt and when, and how it affected subsequent behaviour 
is highly relevant. 
Language too could be an issue. German interviews were conducted in English (like UK and US 
interviews) with strong English speakers, and this may conceal multiple problems. “Challenges 
in the interpretation and representation of meaning may be experienced in any communicative 
action, but are more complicated when cultural contexts differ and inter-lingual translation is 
required.” (van Nes, Abma et al. 2010). Although the selection of strong English speakers may 
limit German subjects (all non-English speakers were de facto excluded), we are not trying to be 
representative. Furthermore, the German recruitment of subjects occurred through the Munich 
Network, where many exchanges and presentations are conducted in English. 
A fourth anticipated objection to the research methodology relates to triangulation and the wider 
issue of validity (Yardley 2008). Triangulation is problematic in studying the attitudes of 
entrepreneurs to failure. Although one can crosscheck an entrepreneur’s account of events with 
other involved parties (investors, partners, colleagues), the focus of analysis remains the 
entrepreneur’s attitude to failure. A founder might conceal their personal views in a failing 
company to maintain morale, creating multiple and contradictory viewpoints and thus making 
triangulation difficult and misleading. Furthermore, as Smith and Osborn suggest: “the 
respondent’s story can itself be said to represent a piece of the respondent’s identity.” (Smith and 
Osborn 2008: 66). Rather than establishing the authenticity of outcomes, the research 
investigates attitudes and intentions regardless of outcomes. 
Yardley provides a useful framework for evaluating validity in qualitative research (Yardley 
2000; Yardley 2008), summarized in Table 5. This researcher intends to reflect these principles in 
all stages of the research plan, and to make available on request all materials for independent 
audit upon its conclusion. 
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 Principle Commentary, adapted from (Yardley 2000; Yardley 2008). 
1 Sensitivity to 
Context 
Researchers may establish sensitivity to context through an explicit awareness of the 
socio-cultural milieu (Smith, Flowers et al. 2009: 180), the relevant literature or the 
research material obtained from subjects. 
2 Commitment and 
Rigour 
This applies to how data is gathered and analysed. In data collection, the engagement 
between interviewer and subject is essential to obtain relevant and insightful data. In 
data analysis, the time commitment and skills needed for multi-stage IPA review is 
significant. Thoroughness is demonstrated in the careful conduct of interviews and 
the transition from factual to interpretative analysis. 
3 Transparency 
and Coherence 
Transparency can be demonstrated through the explicit publication of subject 
selection, interview techniques, and the appropriate disclosure of interview 
transcripts and analysis to appropriate (independent) experts. This research has been 
presented at multiple conferences (Cotterill 2011a; Cotterill 2011b; Cotterill 2011c) 
and in peer-reviewed journals (Cotterill 2012) for external assessment and comment. 
Coherence may apply to the arguments derived from analysis  – does it ‘hang 
together’ and is there coherence between methods and underpinning philosophies? 
4 Impact and 
Importance 
Is completed research interesting, important or useful (or any combination thereof)? 
This is perhaps the most subjective and holistic criterion.  
Table 5. Criteria for Evaluating Validity of Qualitative Research (Adapted from Yardley 2000, 2008) 
 
This research has produced detailed transcripts of interviews with multiple ‘failed entrepreneurs’ 
in multiple countries: it is intended that all working papers will be made available upon request 
to appropriate academics with requisite permissions. This could potentially enable another 
researcher to reconstruct the research process from source data and thereby confirm the internal 
consistency of the process application, as well as matching data outcomes against inputs. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
This section outlines (1) the overall research design and plan for this thesis; (2) approaches to 
interview subject selection and sampling; (3) data gathering, and (4) the multiple stages of data 
analysis leading to conclusions. 
Research	  Design	  
 
Our research design involves in-depth interviews with habitual entrepreneurs who have started 
multiple new technology ventures, and experienced failure of at least one of these ventures. The 
interview subjects were drawn from three locations (Cambridge, UK; Munich, Germany; and 
Silicon Valley, California, USA). 
The interview and analysis process follows the approach of Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA), a method derived from work by Thompson in the field of consumer research 
(Thompson, Locander et al. 1989), and used extensively by Cope and Cave in their studies of 
investors and entrepreneurs (Cope, Cave et al. 2004; Cope and Cave 2008; Cope 2011). 
Thompson analyzed the philosophical position of existential-phenomenology and incorporated 
this into a methodology for social research: “The goal of a phenomenological interview is to 
attain a first-person description of some specified domain of experience” (Thompson, Locander 
et al. 1989: 138) and this is particularly fitting for research into the personal, sensitive and 
individualized experiences of entrepreneurs and their attitudes to entrepreneurial failure. IPA has 
been developed through research domains including healthcare and well-being (Smith and 
Osborn 2008); research into entrepreneurial behaviours have engaged phenomenological 
methods, including a 2002 study of Swedish entrepreneurs into risk (Berglund and Hellström 
2002). 
This methodological context has a significant impact on our research design. First, IPA requires 
in-depth interviews and sharing of experience with individuals, often regarding difficult or 
traumatic events in a subject’s life (frequently in areas of healthcare and psychology on issues 
related to pain and loss). Therefore the selection of subjects and the setting of expectations with 
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them requires careful design and planning: this is made more complex by the difficulty of 
finding subjects who are willing to share their experiences with an academic interviewer. This 
researcher has experience of starting unsuccessful (and successful) technology companies and 
this empathy with ‘failed entrepreneurs’ is an asset that had to be applied carefully. Secondly, the 
gathering of data is a sensitive process. Literature on IPA recommends the minimal prompting of 
questions in the interview: having identified the subject let him do the talking. In our 18 
interviews, all were triggered by one simple question: ‘Can you describe your experience of 
failure in an early-stage technology venture?’ Once started, the interviewer then guides the 
subject – there are no structured questions or checklists to complete: in this respect, as Smith 
suggests: “doing good IPA requires the development of some complex skills - interviewing, 
analysis, interpretation, writing, and researchers at different stages will have different degrees of 
fluency and adeptness at these skills. It is the degree of proficiency in these skills which will 
influence the quality of the research carried out more than the conscientious following of 
procedures” (Smith 2010).  
More important, however is the impact of IPA on data analysis. This researcher found the 
selection and securing of interviews to be challenging but manageable, and the conduct, 
recording and transcribing of interviews demanding; but the time needed for data analysis was 
far in excess of what was anticipated. IPA requires a multi-step process outlined later in this 
chapter, with much manual re-reading and note-taking at each turn: this stage took seven months 
instead of the anticipated three. 
Therefore, the research design reflects the demands of IPA in how the interviews were selected, 
conducted and analyzed. The research plan and timeline was presented for review early in the 
doctoral cycle, and has generally run on schedule, apart from the extended period of time needed 
for data analysis. A schedule of tasks over this timescale is presented in Figure 9 (below), which 
shows the research plan and timeline as it has developed, along with external review points and 
validation of the research topic at conferences and through submission, rejection, acceptance and 
publication of this research. 
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Figure 9. Doctoral Research Plan and Timeline, with Major Milestones 
 
In Figure 9, a particular reference is made to the Babson College Entrepreneurship Research 
Conference (BCERC) in Lausanne, June 2010. At this stage of my research I had identified a 
strong interest in IPA and approached Jason Cope, of the University of Strathclyde. We met, 
discussed my research and agreed to collaborate further as the research plan came together. 
Tragically, Jason died within four months of this meeting and we were unable to fulfill this plan. 
Jason’s clarity, enthusiasm and optimism for my project remain with me: talking to others who 
knew Jason much better than my own brief encounter, confirmed that this is how he made all his 
collaborators feel. I like to believe that the impact of Jason’s prior work, passion and energy is 
present in the research I have performed for my PhD thesis. 
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Figure 10. Overall Process Flows and Activities for Data Gathering and Analysis 
 
The overall process flow for data gathering and analysis is outlined in Figure 10. Assuming a 
completion of methodology selection and a literature review, the three main steps are defined in 
Figure 10 as ‘IPA Data Gathering’, ‘IPA Detailed Analysis’, and ‘Writing up.’ With six 
extended interviews in each location completed, the IPA analysis takes transcripts for each 
interview and develops profiles of each subject, a thematic analysis for each subject, and 
enfolding literature for major themes arising from this work. This is done for each interview in 
turn, and then themes are identified across the six interviews in each country in order to identify 
emerging themes for each region. Once complete, these summary findings are re-evaluated on a 
cross-case comparison to identify commonalities and differences in themes between each region. 
 
Subject	  Selection	  and	  Sampling	  
 
Selection of interviewees for qualitative research has practical and methodological constraints. 
Habitual entrepreneurs in the technology sector are hard to find, generally busy, and often 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 61 of 216 
reluctant to discuss their own failed ventures. Access represented a significant challenge, so a 
combination of referral and chain (or ‘snowball’) sampling was employed to select candidates, 
stimulated by pre-existing personal contacts into entrepreneur networks in the UK, USA and 
Germany. The personal introduction was essential to establish the credibility and empathy 
needed for a satisfactory interview. 
Interviewees were selected who had direct experience of founding multiple technology ventures: 
as ‘habitual’ entrepreneurs (Gulst and Maritz 2009) they were more likely to have greater variety 
of experience and less likely to be dominated by one-off economic distortions such as the dot-
com bubble. Personal introductions to this small group were required to ensure willingness to 
share sensitive or traumatic experiences. Subjects were selected on a purposive (or purposeful) 
basis, initiated by pre-existing direct and indirect connections of the researcher. Using 
snowballing, referral or opportunistic methods is purposeful: “The logic and power of purposeful 
sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth.” (Patton 1990: 230). This 
approach is necessary: the demise of ventures in their early-stages is poorly recorded. Private 
companies are difficult to track and they may join the ‘living dead’ (Pretorius 2009: 10) long 
before their eventual dissolution. Similarly, entrepreneurs who start such companies are not well 
documented: there is no official registry or licensing process from which we can derive a list of 
appropriate entrepreneurs. The failure of a venture goes un-celebrated, and therefore un-
documented. In the absence of a suitable source of habitual entrepreneurs who have had at least 
one failed venture, the purposive sampling approach, based on an initial source which leads to 
others (and so on), was considered appropriate. 
In Germany, subjects were introduced through Oliver Gajek, a Munich-based software founder 
who had established the Munich Network for technology entrepreneurs. Herr Gajek invited this 
researcher to present at his Munich forum and multiple volunteers emerged: eight interviews 
were conducted, of which only six were used in the analysis phase. In Silicon Valley, as in 
Cambridge, personal contacts of the researcher provided indirect referrals to suitable 
interviewees: meetings with a potential interviewee often led to another, indirect connection. 
Attempts were made to distance the selection from the researcher: although the sample is not 
intended to be representative, this goal of ‘two degrees of separation’ aims to minimize the 
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presence of “groupthink” in which similar conclusions might be drawn from a group of like-
minded associates. The potential limitations of this approach have to be compared to the robust 
set of interviewees that was reached as a result. A list of the eighteen interviewees is provided in 
Table 6 below.  
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 Profile Summary 
D1 American-born male, 
early-50s.  
Now running a university entrepreneurship centre, D1 founded multiple 
ventures in software in Austria and Germany over 30 years with several 
major failures before succeeding. 
D2 White German male, mid-
40s. 
Physicist in Munich who founded a technology company with a large 
group of colleagues. This failed, made him bankrupt and he had to 
resurrect his career. 
D3 White German male, mid-
40s. 
Munich scientist who started companies as a student and mid-career. 
His software company failed and he became an academic, now running 
a successful technology incubator. 
D4 White German male, mid-
50s. 
Software company founder, with multiple failed ventures and a recent 
ten-year effort to build a company to exit through difficult periods. 
Studied in Texas and has worked extensively with US firms. 
D5 White German male, mid-
40s. 
Software co-founder who has seen his firm fail three times. Very 
persistent and effective, he has recovered multiple times from failure. 
D6 White German male, mid-
50s. 
Medical scientist who founded a biotech company before moving into 
software. Very severe impact of his failed venture on health and family. 
Now keen to develop new models for building companies. 
B1 White British male, mid-
40s. 
Cambridge University engineer with an early e-commerce success. 
Made his name as CEO closing down a venture that others wanted to 
keep going. 
B2 White British male, mid-
50s. 
30+ years of entrepreneurial experience in engineering companies, 
including Germany. Multiple failures but has had multiple turnarounds. 
B3 White British male, mid-
50s. 
Swedish born, but British raised, B3 is an economist turned computer 
scientist. Keen to target difficult problems, he has failed in multiple 
ventures. 
B4 White British male, mid-
50s 
Entrepreneur for 30 years since leaving Cambridge with strategy 
consulting experience. Multiple successes but also recent failures. 
B5 White British male, late-
40s. 
Cambridge University engineering academic with multiple start-ups: 
one failed lifestyle company, another new venture in progress and keen 
to try more in future. 
B6 White British male, early-
40s. 
Cambridge University scientist turned entrepreneur. Has founded 
multiple companies in the same technically challenging market without 
success. 
A1 Chinese-American male, 
mid-40s. 
Successful software executive and VC who has founded two 
unsuccessful start-ups in the same healthcare field. 
A2 White American male, 
mid-40s. 
Child programmer who combined Computer Science and Art, and has 
built a number of companies. Very intense failure experience for his 
most recent company. 
A3 Indian-born female, mid-
40s. 
Computer scientist who had several jobs gaining experience for a start-
up: involved in multiple failed ventures and a successful social venture. 
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A4 Iranian-born male, mid-
40s. 
Started multiple failed ventures and now runs an engineering consulting 
company to manage risk and build a portfolio of new companies. 
A5 White American male, 
mid-40s. 
Software executive and founder, who has worked at five unsuccessful 
start-ups, some as co-founder. 
A6 Iranian-born male, early-
50s. 
Successful executive at a global company, whose first solo start-up 
failed and he now runs a portfolio of early-stage company interests. 
Table 6. Listing of 18 Interview Subjects Interviewed and Analyzed for this Research, with Basic Profile and Summary 
Commentary (by Author) 
 
Eighteen interviews were analyzed for this research, six from each country. Each candidate 
needed to have founded multiple ventures, and one of these had to have ‘failed.’ Regarding the 
size of the sample, there are various guidelines for IPA research. Smith and Osborn suggest that 
projects may involve between one and twenty in-depth interviews, concluding that five or six is 
seen as a reasonable sample (Smith and Osborn 2008: 56). Bann also discusses selection strategy 
in her 2009 study of entrepreneurial experience: “In phenomenological research, sample size is 
not necessarily a consideration, as it is in other research approaches, due to the 
phenomenological approach and its basis in philosophy, the depth and breadth of data needed 
from subjects, and the ultimate data and insights that it will bring. The sample size for a 
phenomenological study does not follow any notion of representation similar to quantitative 
studies.” (Bann 2009: 10). 
In the research plan, six interviews were targeted in each country, a total of eighteen. In fact, the 
connections arising from the selection process (at networking events and through personal 
introduction to individuals or groups of entrepreneurs) led to more than 18 interviews being 
conducted. Some of these were not used for the analysis phase: some were inappropriate – for 
example, one German interviewee turned out to have no experience of failure at all but rather a 
series of impressive successes. 
Data	  Gathering	  
 
During the initial stage of this research, ten exploratory interviews were conducted with habitual 
entrepreneurs in Munich, Cambridge and Silicon Valley. Lessons from this research were fed 
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back into the planning of subsequent interviews. The main body of research consists of 18 
transcribed interviews based on formal IPA guidelines (Smith, Flowers et al. 2009). 
Interviewees were selected, engaged and sent briefing materials before the meeting. In this 
preparation work, expectations were clearly set regarding the experience sought from 
interviewees, the unstructured nature of the interview process, and confidentiality of findings. 
Informed consent was obtained as part of this process, typically by email exchange. Interviews 
were conducted mostly in person and recorded digitally before being transcribed. Several 
interviews were conducted via Skype video conferencing when logistics became too complex: 
obtaining a clear interview was more important with these busy individuals than having direct 
face-to-face meetings. 
IPA techniques were used to gather data but there are multiple contrasting (and potentially 
contradictory) sets of guidance on how to do this. On the one hand, Thompson provides strict 
guidance on interview technique. In this approach, the interviewer should let the interviewee 
drive the discussion: apart from an initial stimulus, interview questions should probe and extend 
the ‘lived experience’ of the subject – responding to, rather than driving forward the discussion. 
Thompson goes further: “establishing equality among participants, having questions follow from 
respondent discourse, employing short descriptive questions, and not asking “why?” are some 
methodological procedures for preventing the interviewer from assuming an overly intrusive 
role.” (Thompson, Locander et al. 1989: 139). This requires the elimination (or minimization) of 
a priori questions or assumptions before the interview: although the interview subject needs to be 
aware of the context of the meeting in advance to provide informed consent, the descriptive 
questions should flow from the course of the dialogue and not a predetermined path. 
Alternative guidance for IPA-based data gathering is also offered (Smith and Osborn 2008). This 
proposes a more relaxed approach, supporting the use of semi-structured interviews and some 
degree of prepared questions, although “the respondent should be allowed a strong role in how 
the interview proceeds.” (Smith and Osborn 2008: 64). Perhaps the domain in which their IPA 
techniques are applied can help to explain the difference between Thompson, and Smith and 
Osborn. Thompson’s work is based on consumer research, which frequently addresses general 
preferences and ‘transactions’ such as purchasing certain products or brands. Smith and Osborn 
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discuss IPA in the context of more sustained human experiences such as attitudes to ongoing 
pain, enduring conditions such as dialysis, and views on sexuality. The latter may involve a 
higher degree of complexity over an extended period of time: perhaps this complexity helps to 
justify the degree of planning recommended for IPA data gathering. 
The interviews were conducted at the pace of the interviewee: apart from requests for more 
detail, or to elaborate on comments, this researcher only asked one question and steered the 
conversation to remain on narratives of failure experiences, bringing the subject back to this 
wherever necessary. 
On balance, the study of entrepreneurial attitudes to failure appears more suited to the Smith and 
Osborn approach: although a single trigger question was used, a checklist of issues was prepared 
for the interviewer’s use only. Further recommendations include the expectation that the 
schedule of questions is a guide, not a prescription: “Good interview technique … often involves 
a gentle nudge from the interviewer rather than being too explicit.” (Smith and Osborn 2008: 
61). 
Smith et al provide a detailed explanation of the IPA data gathering approach, along with 
practical examples and case studies in Chapter Four of their reference book (Smith, Flowers et 
al. 2009: 56-78). In this they outline multiple approaches to question development, interview 
planning and conduct: this reference source was considered excellent preparation for the conduct 
of this research. 
Data	  Analysis	  
 
IPA-based data analysis has identified experiences, attitudes, viewpoints and learning 
experiences of the entrepreneurs interviewed. This involved a large amount of manual effort to 
read, review and mark up appropriate themes from the text (the high, labour-intensive workload 
is seen as a potential drawback to the approach). The analysis followed guidelines on IPA to 
transcribe, comment, gather and collate themes from the source transcript (Smith and Osborn 
2008; Smith, Flowers et al. 2009) before gathering common themes from across multiple 
interviews. 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 67 of 216 
A process map of how analysis was performed in detail is provided in Figure 11, below. This 
chart shows a number of steps in the ‘IPA Analysis’ stage, including how transcripts are read, re-
read multiple times, and evolve through a series of incremental steps to reveal emergent themes 
for each transcribed interview. Focused on the ‘unit of analysis’ each case is documented 
through each step on a manual basis (using Word and Excel). Once this is done and a ‘thematic 
analysis’ is complete for each case (thematic codes identified), these documents are further 
researched to pull together a case comparison within each country. 
 
Figure 11. Detailed Process Schematic of Analysis Steps and Activities Applied to Sample Interview for Subject D1 (by Author) 
 
As with data gathering, there appear to be two contrasting viewpoints when applying IPA 
techniques to data analysis: these might be classified as ‘purist’ and ‘pragmatist’ approaches. 
A ‘purist’ view of data analysis is presented (Thompson, Locander et al. 1989) in which IPA 
provides three main areas of guidance. First, any normative terms used to analyze the text should 
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be those of the subject, not of the researcher. Second, the principle of the “autonomy of the text” 
regards the transcript as a stand-alone source. This may be useful in studying failure, where 
attributions of blame and fault are likely to be highly subjective and emotionally driven. Textual 
autonomy means that “interpretation [analysis] should not incorporate hypotheses, inferences, 
and conjectures that exceed the evidence provided by the transcript.” (Thompson, Locander et al. 
1989: 140). Also, any preconceptions or hypotheses should be “bracketed” (the third point of 
IPA guidance, and a core tenet of the phenomenological approach) and separated from the 
textual analysis. This raises a potential reflexivity problem, regarding whether a researcher can 
truly isolate their prior experience and insight from the analysis. 
A second, more pragmatic approach is recommended in several works, including Jason Cope’s 
IPA-based study of failed entrepreneurs, in which he outlines multiple stages of data analysis 
required to derive conclusions from the text (see Table 7). 
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 Process of 
analysis  
Level of 
analysis  
Description of analysis 
1 Familiarization / 
gaining insight 
Reading of the 
case 
Reading and re-reading of the transcribed interview to gain 
an appreciation of the whole story and recall of the interview 
in both a cognitive and affective sense. 
2 Immersion and 
sense making 
Diagnosis of the 
case 
During this process, a free textual analysis is performed, 
where potentially significant excerpts are highlighted. Units 
of meaning are identified for each transcript, forming 
common clusters of meaning. 
3 Categorization Developing 
intra-case 
themes 
It is intended that linking the holistic reflective analysis with 
the clusters of meaning will lead to the emergence of salient 
themes (a ‘master-theme’ list) for each transcript. 
4 Association / 
pattern 
recognition 
Developing 
inter-case 
themes 
A meta-level analysis across the cases is conducted, 
comparing master-theme lists to identify and explain 
similarities and differences, and thereby creating links 
between accounts. 
5 Interpretation / 
representation 
Writing up A formal process of writing up a narrative account of the 
interplay between the interpretative activity of the researcher 
and the participant's account of her experience in her own 
words, without the use of any relevant academic literature. 
6 Explanation and 
abstraction 
Enfolding 
literature 
This analytical discussion of the data involves the theory-
building process of ‘enfolding literature’, which is required 
to produce a theoretical explanation at a higher level of 
abstraction. Hence, the research is phenomenologically 
grounded but also interpretative and hermeneutic, requiring 
an iterative and comparative process of tacking back and 
forth between existing theory and the data. 
Table 7. IPA Approach Adapted from Jason Cope (Cope 2011: Table 3 Page 611) 
 
This practical approach can be seen in the analysis process performed by this researcher (see 
Figure 11) and is extended by Smith and Osborn’s guidance, which they outline alongside a 
worked example related to a study of chronic benign pain (Smith and Osborn 2008). The 
approach begins by recognizing the central importance of meaning rather than events: “meaning 
is central, and the aim is to try to understand the context and complexity of those meanings rather 
than measure their frequency.” (Smith and Osborn 2008: 66). Like Cope, they recommend an 
idiographic approach of beginning with individual examples (interviews) and slowly building up 
to more general themes and claims. This process is described in detail (Smith and Osborn 2008: 
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67-79) and is primarily a paper-based, manual series of steps to derive themes and meaning from 
the text. 
Both the purist and pragmatic approaches inform the present analysis. Furthermore, although the 
researcher performed the analytical tasks by hand, manual annotation of transcribed interviews 
was captured on a computer using Microsoft Word and Excel. This involves a two-step process, 
starting with printed transcripts and handwritten comments with colour coding on paper before 
capturing this same input on a computer. This two-step process involved some redundant 
activity, but computer-based capture of a cumulative body of commentary and note taking was 
easier to backup, reprint and search at a later date. Furthermore, repeated engagement with the 
text is part of the overall IPA approach. From the Jason Cope paper on IPA analysis (Cope 
2003), the steps outlined in Table 7 have been followed as closely as possible. 
Steps 1 (Familiarization / gaining insight) and 2 (Immersion and sense making) were performed 
through an iterative process of reading and re-reading the transcripts, including listening to the 
audio recordings of the original interview. At the start of the analysis process in step 1, the text 
was made anonymous, so that names of people (but not companies or locations) were excised 
from the text. In line with IPA guidance, where the interview strayed into personal interactions 
between the interviewee and researcher, this text was ‘bracketed’ by redacting the text in the 
transcript, with the effect of removing such text from the analysis source. The use of audio replay 
served two purposes: firstly, it provided an additional check on the accuracy of transcription and 
minor corrections were made to the text as a result; secondly, it provided additional context at 
various points of the interview recalling gestures and interactions. These also helped to make the 
long process of repeated analysis more interesting and compelling to the researcher. [Note - as a 
doctoral student experiencing this scale of data analysis for the first time, I found this took much 
more time and effort than expected.] 
Step 3 (Categorization) involved the distillation of many comments and highlighted sections of 
text (all recorded in the Microsoft Word transcription of each interview) into a categorization 
scheme. This scheme evolved over time, and two major observations can be made about this 
experience. Firstly, the categories tended to fall into two types – some simple (such as ‘bitter’, 
‘decisive’, ‘stigma’, etc.) and others more complex and qualified hybrid codes such as 
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“BETRAYAL. By Finance Director walking away with reputation” (interview with B2). 
Secondly, each interview was read (multiple times) and analyzed in sequence, and it became 
clear that certain codes were common to multiple interviews. While efforts were taken to look at 
each interview afresh, some codes applied to only one interview whereas others were prevalent 
in all interviews. Step 3 involved an intense effort to transpose the codes arising from analysis of 
an interview into a thematic view. This was done manually, by listing codes in a new document 
and posting any codes, comments and quotations from the original transcription into a new 
document layout. The result of this, for each interview, was a list of codes, together with 
extensive supporting examples, instances and quotations for each code. This process involved 
some natural consolidation of codes, merging some together into one (for example “Ethics” and 
“Honesty” into “Ethics and Honesty”). The listing of codes, and the consolidation of these codes 
where appropriate, is then reviewed to develop a list of thematic codes, or emerging themes: this 
is depicted in Figure 11, where the box labeled “D1 Analysis v01” becomes “D1 (Thematic) 
Analysis v02.” The transformation from codes to themes is also referenced in Figure 12 (Saldana 
2009). 
In Step 4 (Association / pattern recognition) the themes identified from each interview were 
consolidated into a master document for all interviewees from each region: for example, 
emergent themes for all six German interviews. This provided the basis for analyzing cross-case 
themes and patterns. For example, the consolidated thematic list brought together diverse 
interview conversations about the same issue, allowing comparison and discussion of 
commonality and differences between subjects. Furthermore, it exposed categories that were 
unique to only one interview – these extreme cases also provided a basis for commentary. After 
this stage, findings were reviewed and written up in two ways: as a series of profiles of 
individual entrepreneurs, and a thematic review assessing all six interviews at once. 
One major comment arising from this research to date is the role of narrative and use of 
(English) language in revealing insights into the attitudes and perspective of each entrepreneur. 
A summary of each interview is provided in Table 6. 
Prior to this analysis, a pilot interview (for A1) was conducted and analyzed to ensure this 
research design was practical and to identify any concerns. In addition to the guidance from 
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Thompson and Cope (Thompson, Locander et al. 1989; Cope 2011), this pilot exercise refers to 
guidance outlined in Chapter Five of the reference work on IPA by Smith et al (Smith, Flowers 
et al. 2009: 79-107): the key components of this are outlined in Table 8 below. This pilot exercise 
was reviewed with doctoral supervisors and advisors before embarking on the full range of 
interview and analysis work. 
 
Overview Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis is characterized as an iterative and inductive cycle. 
Multiple readings and note-taking stages are proposed to familiarize the researcher with the 
data. This is time-consuming and intended to take place over an extended period of time, 
reading, leaving and coming back to the material. 
Reading & re-
reading 
In line with Cope’s comments regarding “immersion” into the data, a number of readings is 
suggested. The detailed attention needed here comes with a warning: “Sometimes the process 
of beginning analysis is accompanied by a feeling of being overwhelmed by ideas and 
possible connections.” (Smith, Flowers et al. 2009: 82) 
Initial noting Exploratory comments represent comments on significant interest in the text and could 
include (1) descriptive comments, (2) linguistic comments, and (3) conceptual comments. In 
addition to providing a direct commentary, these comments are also useful in the subsequent 
step of identifying themes. Furthermore, deconstruction techniques such as reading 
backwards or recording commentaries aloud can assist in focusing on the text. 
Developing 
emergent 
themes 
“Themes are usually expressed as phrases which speak to the psychological essence of the 
piece and contain enough particularity to be grounded and enough abstraction to be 
conceptual.” (Smith, Flowers et al. 2009: 92). In the literature, themes are likely to be 
identified as much from the researcher’s exploratory comments as the transcript itself, and 
thus emergent themes might emerge as a natural next step from prior notes. 
Connecting 
emergent 
themes 
Techniques here include abstraction (identifying patterns and a ‘super-ordinate’ theme), 
polarization (looking for differences rather than similarities), contextualization, numeration 
(identifying the frequency of theme occurrence) and function. This step attempts to connect 
and group themes for subsequent summarization and write-up. 
Moving to the 
next case 
IPA indicates that each case (or interview) be taken as an individual unit before wider 
comparisons and cross-case review is conducted. Therefore care should be made to bracket 
any assumptions or crossover knowledge from one interview, when analysing the next. 
Patterns across 
cases 
This can be represented graphically or through a nested table structure, pulling cross-case 
themes into focus while making reference to the supporting cases for each. 
Deeper levels 
of analysis 
Beyond the level of analysis outlined above, there may exist a deeper psychological level of 
meaning based on metaphor or even psychoanalysis. This can be seen to go beyond a 
‘hermeneutics of sympathy’ in which the researcher understands the subject, to a 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ in which the researcher is on guard for hidden meanings in the 
text.  
Table 8. Stages in IPA Analysis Adapted from Smith Textbook on IPA Methodology and Practice (Smith, 
Flowers et al. 2009) 
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The IPA-based approach brings to mind the subject of ‘discourse analysis’. In general, 
‘discourse’ covers communication (verbal, non-verbal, visual, etc.) between individuals. 
Although discourse analysis can be seen as different from IPA, we can glean much from it: a 
2003 article entitled “Discourse Analysis Means Doing Analysis” (Antaki, Billig et al. 2003), 
suggests that this technique is really a part of a wider analytical fabric. The field of discursive 
psychology would seem to offer much to the study of attitudes and motivations of entrepreneurs: 
a detailed examination of language in interviews with people who persuade, articulate vision and 
construct new ventures (entrepreneurs) appears to be highly appropriate. Willig suggests that in 
her discourse analysis “language was seen to construct versions of social reality, and it was seen 
to achieve social objectives.” (Willig 2008: 161). As a result, discourse analysis should be 
considered suitable for inclusion in our research. Antaki outlines six ways in which analysis can 
fall short of ‘discourse analysis’ (see Table 9) and these provided a solid aide memoire: they 
were specifically reviewed after the analysis of each interview. 
 Potential Shortcoming Commentary 
1 Under-analysis through 
summary 
Summary is essential in qualitative research, but the level of 
summarization is critical. Too much and themes of substance may be 
ignored. 
2 Under-analysis through 
taking sides 
The IPA approach of letting the interviewee lead the conversation is 
valuable here. In entrepreneurial failure, “taking sides” on a subjective 
issue may distort or adversely affect the evaluation. 
3 Under-analysis through over-
quotation or through isolated 
quotation 
The analyst fails to get beyond the text or texts. Under-analysis through 
over-quotation is often revealed by a low ratio of analyst's comments to 
data extracts. 
4 The circular identification of 
discourses and mental 
constructs 
This occurs when, for example an analyst claims that discourse shows 
evidence for the existence of a particular psychological state or process, 
such as 'attitude', and then explains the production of that discourse in 
terms of the existence of the attitude. 
5 False survey The qualitative equivalent of an unrepresentative “representative” sample. 
When analysis makes over-generalized claims from a specific group to a 
wider community. 
6 Analysis that consists in 
simply spotting features  
Superficiality. Rather than simply listing specific features, “good analysis 
always moves convincingly back and forth between the general and the 
specific.” (Antaki, Billig et al. 2003: 7) 
Table 9. Potential Shortcomings of Discourse (and General) Analysis (adapted). (Antaki, Billig et al. 2003) 
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The techniques of discourse analysis will assist in taking account of the language and 
terminology arising from interview transcripts. Phillips and Hardy suggest: “Discourse analytic 
approaches share an interest in the constructive effects of language and are a reflexive – as well 
as an interpretative – style of analysis” (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 5). This reflexivity is 
important: in the interviews, entrepreneurs frequently talk about themselves, as well as their 
experiences. 
The general topic of thematic analysis also requires examination, particularly how themes are 
identified from this analytical work. Using guidance as outlined in Table 7 and Table 8, the 
process of analysis to identify emergent themes involves multiple readings of the text, allocation 
of categorization codes to the text, and then a re-working of the text to produce a thematic 
version of the interviews (‘thematic codes’), illustrating how points in the interview relate to 
codes, and how these in turn group together in emergent themes (Saldana 2009: 12). A graphical 
representation of this process is shown as Figure 12. 
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 Figure 12. Emergence of Themes from Codes (Saldana 2009) 
 
In the present research, themes emerged through the manual process of taking notes and 
continual summarization and re-assessment of these notes to develop category codes (thematic 
codes), along with comments. Thematic codes and themes can be summarized in the following 
five groups: Business Context; Language and Narrative; Environmental Factors; Personality 
Characteristics; and the Entrepreneurial Response. Each of these is discussed at length in 
subsequent sections, along with analysis by sub-category and supporting evidence and quotations 
from interviews. Looking at this from another perspective, some themes occurred more 
frequently than others, and increased frequency reflects a higher chance of importance and 
commonality to the analyst. Furthermore, the nature of these themes may be categorized in an 
alternative way, revealing themes that reflect personal (psychological) or social (environmental) 
issues, as well as themes that describe retrospective and reflective viewpoints versus prospective 
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and future-facing themes. In summarizing the analysis in chapter 5A, 5B and 5C, both of these 
categorization schemes have been used. 
Observations	  on	  Overall	  Research	  Design	  
 
A number of methods and techniques have been used here, though primarily IPA. The overall 
intention remains to examine and understand the stories of entrepreneurs in order to draw 
conclusions about their attitudes to failure. In this respect, we deploy whichever techniques are 
appropriate to reveal insights, but should remember that: “It is in the struggle between different 
approaches that we learn, and from the diversity and ambiguity of meaning; not through the 
recitation of a presumed uniformity, consensus and unity, given in a way that requires 
unquestioning acceptance.” (Clegg and Hardy 1996: 8). 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
 
 
This analysis phase involved several months of manual reading, coding and collation to produce 
findings which cover: the reasons and context for failure; how the use of language reveals 
attitudes and trends; environmental and psychological factors at work - and reflections on 
learning and opportunity identification. However, it is useful to remember in all this detail that 
this research can be reduced to answering three simple questions: what happened when these 
entrepreneurs failed, what did they learn and what did they do next?  
In the following three chapters, analysis of interviews is presented for each country in turn: 
Chapter 5A outlines analysis for interviews in Munich, 5B for Cambridge and 5C for Silicon 
Valley. Each of these chapters documents the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) of 
six interviews, including (1) a summary of each case outlining some background, context and 
reasons for failure as well as a brief personal profile and commentary on each individual subject; 
and (2) a thematic analysis of each subject, including a cross-case analysis of the regional cohort.  
Each interviewee is anonymous, and labelled as follows: D1 – D6 for German subjects, B1 – B6 
for British subjects, and A1 – A6 for Americans. Interview length varied from 50 to over 120 
minutes. German interviews tended to take longer and therefore more coding took place (more 
thematic codes in total) in the IPA analysis for German subjects (Table 10). The overall number 
of unique thematic codes in each region was more consistent between the three regions - a range 
of 79-92. 
 
 Munich, 
Germany 
Cambridge, 
UK 
Silicon Valley, 
USA 
Total of thematic codes identified 1,178 894 873 
Number of unique thematic codes identified 79 78 92 
Table 10. Numbers of Total Thematic Codes and Unique Thematic Codes Identified, by Region 
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This analysis forms part of the overall IPA process defined in Chapter 4 and visualized in Figure 
10 and Figure 11. 
Before embarking on this analysis, a clarification: when entrepreneurs discuss their venture 
‘failure’ (including the business context), these subjects are all habitual entrepreneurs, meaning 
each of them has founded multiple ventures and at least one of these ventures has failed. This 
could be their first startup; their second (or subsequent) venture, or in some cases a combination 
of successes and failures within a number of startups. The analysis contained herein relates to 
one or more failures, according to the various experiences of the individual entrepreneur, but 
they all describe a common experience: that of (at least) one of their ventures having failed. 
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CHAPTER 5A: ANALYSIS OF GERMAN INTERVIEWS 
 
In this analysis, as outlined in Figure 13, each interview transcript was analyzed according to the 
process described in Chapter 4 and summarized in Figure 10, leading to a written profile of each 
interviewee (background, context and personal profile, as documented in Table 11), followed by 
a thematic analysis which is then further reviewed to ‘enfold’ relevant literature with references 
to key themes. The detailed process for thematic analysis is further explained in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 13. Process Schematic Outlining the IPA Analysis and Outputs for German Interviews. Each Interview is Analyzed using 
IPA Methodology before Performing a Cross-Case Thematic Analysis (within each Country, in this case Germany) 
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Summaries	  of	  German	  Interviews	  
	  
PROFILE of D1. American-born male, early-50s. 
D1: Background. D1 is an American-born graduate of Wharton Business School who has lived in Germany for 
decades. He started his first software company (‘spontaneously’) in Vienna in 1983 before moving to Munich. This 
company struggled before closing in 1996. After founding multiple software firms in Germany, he successfully 
sold one venture, with mixed consequences. D1 now runs an Entrepreneurship Centre and lectures to 
entrepreneurship students. 
D1: Context. D1 started his first venture after graduation, confident he could achieve anything: he chose a nascent 
industry (software) in a difficult location (Vienna). Starting with inadequate resources, he trusted friends to help: 
“not a classically bright move.” He sees his failure as a result of bad luck and business factors. His sales director 
embezzled money, leaving unpaid tax liabilities to German authorities, which treat this as his personal liability. To 
avoid personal bankruptcy, D1 worked for three years to pay off €850,000: his reward was ‘getting back to zero.’ 
“It was eight years of failure, followed by three years of figuring out how to do it and fixing the failure.” (D1). 
Despite his naïve start, he has a strong sense of self-efficacy and is skilled at building companies. 
D1: Personal profile. D1 has a positive personality. In his lectures he asks students what is the key word in the 
phrase – ‘Every breakdown is the opportunity for a breakthrough’. The correct answer, he says, is ‘every.’ He 
recommends they identify the positive challenge in all that goes wrong, rather than panic. He returned to Germany, 
rather than avoid his debts; he split a successful company and took on the less-profitable part; and he re-built 
several companies while supporting a growing family. He reflects on personal cost and self-doubt. “It's always 
wonderful to hear about how other people fail. But in the middle of the failure, it's really miserable." (D1). 
PROFILE of D2. White German male, mid-40s. 
D2: Background .D2 is a physicist who transformed university research in magnetic refrigeration into a 
commercial venture with ten collaborators. The firm ended in corporate bankruptcy. Unaware that his finance 
manager was embezzling funds, he became liable for unpaid tax and social security. He took ten years to clear his 
record. With his wife, he purchased the assets of the bankrupt company and started again, resulting in a trade sale 
five years later. He now advises multiple ventures in Munich. 
D2: Context. D2 raised three million euros, which was later embezzled. In the creditor-led bankruptcy, tax 
obligations passed to D2 personally as Geschäftsführer. The finance manager was later imprisoned. D2’s company 
team was too large with eleven co-founders and ten investors, leading to disagreements about technology and 
strategy. No system was actually produced. When D2 purchased the assets and restarted the phoenix company, a 
set of specific (funded) customer requirements led to the development of a new product in a new market and the 
company was sold in 2007. [A ‘phoenix’ company is one in which an original failed firm is ‘re-born’ as a new 
venture, typically with similar assets, plans and staff]. 
D2: Personal profile. D2 is analytical and scientific. His language is unemotional and straightforward, but he has 
faced traumatic business challenges including bankruptcy. Being a victim of fraud makes it difficult for him to 
trust advisors and partners: he is cautious and sensitive to changes in circumstance, yet he has learned much and 
feels he prevailed due to self-confidence and clarity. Although the stigma of failure and bankruptcy is common in 
Germany, he feels it does not apply to him. He has dealt with aggrieved investors clearly and directly at the most 
difficult times. He has a strong sense of self-efficacy, and believes he has done nothing wrong. He does not seem 
angry about his experience and the views of others do not appear to be important: “I don't think there was any 
schadenfreude at all.” (D2).   
PROFILE of D3. White German male, mid-40s. 
D3: Background. D3 trained as a PhD physicist in Munich. After a number of student entrepreneurial businesses he 
started his first software company with several co-founders. Despite early deals with German content providers, the 
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company declined in the technology crashes of 2001 and is now dormant. D3 became director of one of Munich’s 
entrepreneurship centres. 
D3: Context. D3 is unsure why his business failed to grow. He analyses contributory factors in the interview, but 
remains uncertain why his business failed. Timing was a factor: in the nineties’ software boom companies were 
funded easily at inflated valuations and when D3 tried to expand, the funding market had disappeared. In his target 
market, sustainable revenue models were unclear. 
D3: Personal profile. D3 has entrepreneurial skills and experience. He ran a successful student agricultural 
business, importing mistletoe into Germany. After working in large corporations he started his own firm at the 
height of the dot-com era. He learned from this experience but regrets its failure. In his current teaching activities 
he tries to simulate real-life rejection and failure for students, believing that Germans find this difficult. He 
suggests re-education is necessary for German economic growth: instead of looking for ‘another SAP’ he thinks 
innovation emerging from new business models, and experience of failure is increasingly important. 
PROFILE of D4. White German male, mid-50s. 
D4: Background. D4 is the son of a Regensburg German professor and spent his early career working for US 
software companies. His post-graduate degree in Texas helped him develop excellent English language and 
literature skills. Working in start-ups since 1996 including Netscape and Commerce One, he later founded several 
start-ups. The first venture failed and consumed all his finances; a second start-up took ten years to reach 
sustainability. 
D4: Context. D4’s first venture suffered from poor planning and over-reliance on his own finances. He believes his 
mobile technology was too early for the market and platforms had not yet matured. His second venture took a 
decade to develop and his equity was heavily diluted. He is proud to have built a sustainable business but regrets 
there was no exit event. He spent years making little money from his company and debates whether or not this can 
be described as a success. 
D4: Personal profile. D4 grew up listening to American radio and would prefer to be American. He has spent much 
time in the USA and thinks that “going to work for Netscape … was just the greatest thing ever.” He is 
spontaneous and intuitive in evaluating opportunities: his first company involved investing his own money quickly, 
without planning. He articulates lessons from his failed ventures but is keen to start another venture, even if it 
means risking his personal wealth. 
PROFILE of D5. White German male, mid-40s. 
D5: Background. D5 is an engineer who applied his doctoral work into his software company (now trading for 23 
years). He has almost closed the company three times: D5 is not an obvious ‘failed entrepreneur’ but he believes if 
he had lived in the USA he would have closed the company. His company endured several multi-year periods of 
disaster and recovery. He suggests there are economic cycles: in the automotive industry his experience makes him 
better prepared to deal with future downturns. 
D5: Context. D5 experienced three catastrophes in his software venture: the first through economic recession (early 
1990s) and over-dependence on key customers; the second arose from a bad merger involving advisor 
misrepresentation that brought his company to the edge of bankruptcy; the third came from the automotive industry 
contraction in 2008. These events forced D5 to the brink of total failure each time: he thinks that in America these 
would have resulted in bankruptcy and a fresh start, but the German environment offered no choice but to persist: 
“to give up would have been far too expensive. So there was only one way – to fight to survive.” 
D5: Personal profile. D5 speaks in a neutral fashion: he is analytical, dispassionate and rational. He is not angry 
about his experiences but is not overtly optimistic either – he responds to setbacks with tenacity and realism. He 
describes his strong sense of responsibility to customers, investors and employees and is aware of the economic 
cycles that inevitably impact a business, feeling he has learned to be more prepared for failure in future. 
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PROFILE of D6. White German male, mid-50s. 
D6: Background. D6 is a medical scientist who won a business plan competition in Munich: he ran this firm for a 
decade before it collapsed and he went bankrupt. Subsequent ventures in software have also failed. He has suffered 
significant personal cost including marriage breakdown and hospitalization from ‘burnout’. He is trying to 
resurrect his career in Germany but hopes to move to the USA, which he believes offers more opportunities for 
visionary technologists. 
D6: Context. D6 started his company in biotechnology and moved into software. His first venture failed for 
multiple reasons: it was geographically spread-out (Munich and San Diego) and lacked focus; it was under-funded, 
and required too much research without investment. When conditions worsened, personal differences emerged 
between D6 and his investors. The company never recovered and assets were sold to a competitor in which one of 
the investors had a (conflicting) material interest. D6 ran an early ‘virtual company’ using technology for 
collaboration between motivated scientists. It failed. After a difficult and stressful winding up process, D6 suffered 
major family and health problems. In recovery, he has started several ventures, and is seeking funding. 
D6: Personal profile. D6 suffered severely as a result of his failed ventures. As well as personal costs (marriage 
breakdown and health problems) he has difficulties finding employment or attracting investors. He believes there is 
a bias (stigma) against failed entrepreneurs, identifying groups of individuals in Switzerland and Germany who 
have not found work since their companies failed: they are restricted to consulting contracts from supportive 
friends. D6 is keen to participate in research into entrepreneurial failure: he believes this represents a significant 
psychological issue in Germany - more studies are needed to reduce stigma and encourage innovation. He yearns 
for an era of collaboration in which entrepreneurs can harness technology to leverage the skills of many 
contributors, rapidly developing new ideas (services, drugs) at lower costs. 
Table 11. Summaries of Six German Interview Subjects, covering Background; Business Context and Reasons for Failure, as 
well as Personal Profile and Commentary 
 
Thematic	  Analysis	  Arising	  from	  IPA	  –	  Germany	  
 
In the overall German analysis, a total of 83 thematic codes (themes) were identified with a total 
of 1,178 references to these themes across the six interviews. A summary of the most frequently 
occurring themes is provided in Figure 14, along with an approximate mapping of these themes 
into four categories. The mapping in Figure 14 is intended to indicate the main themes arising 
from the German analysis; the relative frequency of occurrence of each theme (themes in bold 
occur more often); and whether these themes are personal or social, and retrospective or forward-
looking in nature. This allocation of themes into four quadrants is not based on prior literature, 
but is reflected in the summary section of the research design: however, Figure 14 ultimately 
reflects the author’s subjective categorizations of themes arising from the analysis. 
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Figure 14. Mapping of Most Frequently Occurring Themes Emerging from IPA Analysis of German Interviews 
 
A narrative account follows of these themes, combined with extracts of text from the interviews 
and relevant references to ‘enfolding’ literature to add context from prior research to the 
interview findings. 
Business	  Context	  
 
Business Reasons: Reasons for failure and business context. D1 and D2 describe how 
embezzlement and the German legal system led to the failure of their ventures. As a consequence 
of an undetected fraud within the business, “we had been insolvent for more than six weeks, 
[and] had pierced the corporate veil and we were personally liable.” (D1). D2 also became 
personally liable for the actions of others (Seung-Hyun, Peng et al. 2007; Lee, Yamakawa et al. 
2011) and it took ten years to escape the restrictions of bankruptcy. D5 experienced this when a 
merger went wrong: “from a legal standpoint I was … guilty for all the weaknesses and gaps of 
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my new sister company.” (D5). Over-dependence on key customers is a key factor for D2 and 
D5. D2 built complex products at high prices for technical buyers and D5 depended on a small 
market. Both were exposed to economic downturns. Other reasons for failure include a lack of 
focus; underestimation of the technology challenge (D2); market timing; lack of capital (D3); 
involvement in too many projects, and poor business planning (D3, D4). (Bruno and Leidecker 
1988; Richardson, Nwankwo et al. 1994; Pretorius 2008; Gulst and Maritz 2009). 
D3 remains puzzled why his business failed. He and D4 started their companies at a time of high 
valuations, but little planning in terms of technology or finance. Most interviewees focused on 
their companies but D3 and D4 were involved in other simultaneous projects: when D3 advises 
new ventures he now requires them to generate immediate revenue, avoiding the ‘dead zone’ 
where further investment is needed when most vulnerable. D5 recalls other reasons: recession, 
customer failure, negative consequences of poor mergers and a global industry decline.  
Most of their ventures ran out of funds and subsequently D2, D3, D4 and D6 have followed a 
lean-startup model, developing ideas in collaboration with others, validating their models at each 
stage. D5 sees funding as his responsibility: “I was … unable to convey to [my investors] the 
promise … of some of the projects we were pursuing." (D5). Personal conflicts made matters 
worse. D6 recalls arguments with investors and advisors: “there was a lot of unprofessionalism 
in the communication, validation and decision-making processes.” (D6). His funding requests 
were declined and recriminations stifled further progress. D6’s plans were perhaps over-
ambitious, tackling complex technical challenges in a demanding organizational environment. 
Definitions of failure (and success). D2 believes definitions of failure are less important than 
learning lessons and being honest with oneself: “I was always of the opinion that failure helps in 
the end to do it better the next time. You just have to be honest.” (D2). D3 does not regard his 
venture as a failure: it is dormant but still exists, and he still sees potential for resurrection. This 
recurs in the German interviews – higher inclination towards company survival, even on life 
support. D3 is proud of the patent obtained by his startup: pride in technology is clear in German 
interviews and is perhaps perceived as more important than business success.  
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D4 says that although his first venture folded, it was funded by IPO proceeds from a dot-com 
company that collapsed: he asks himself ‘which was the greater failure?’ His ‘success’ came 
after years of no salary, during which he could have been a high-earning executive at Siemens. 
He concludes that failure represents a subjective shortfall against expectations. D4 re-started a 
failed company to avoid bankruptcy, with its negative social impact. He regards failure as a 
personal and a social construct (McKenzie and Sud 2008), and if perceptions of others are 
manipulated in certain ways there might be no stigma. The interview with D5 stretches the 
concept of failure further. He has run the same company for 23 years and believes it has failed at 
least three times, but he regards his recoveries as a necessity in Germany where the cost of 
failure (and bankruptcy) is so high. 
Germany. D1 regards German attitudes to failure as deeply rooted. “In Germany, … the whole 
culture had one of the great failures of modern day with World War II and with the Holocaust ... 
So there is this desire to do the right thing.” (D1). Perhaps the obverse of a desire to get things 
right is a fear of failure and this is embedded in the Bavarian culture: “It's the 'haben net, können 
net, gibßt net'. In … Bavarian that means, 'we don't have it, we can't do it and we never will do 
it." (D1). He goes further, saying Germans actively avoid risk: “People spend a lot of time 
avoiding failure here… it takes a lot of time and energy to avoid failure.” (D1). 
D2 explains attractive German state funding sources such as High-Tech Gründerfonds. He 
obtained funding (around €3,000,000) through government grants with few strings attached, and 
views the grant process as undiscerning yet he remains a happy beneficiary. D3 criticizes the 
German emphasis on patenting: he describes a generous Bavarian funding scheme but criticizes 
how commercialization was forbidden. D6 describes German VC as “restrictive,” providing not 
enough to generate growth. 
D3 suggests Germans approach business situations differently to Americans. Germans will say: 
“First I prove. Then let's see … [if] I can survive for the first year." (D3). In contrast, Americans 
act first and think later. D3’s incubator students are now required to generate revenues in one 
week to demonstrate viability. D4 suggests Germany is strongest when tackling difficult 
technology, but this engenders arrogance: “We didn't really think hard about whether that was 
going to be a viable business … We were fascinated by the technological challenges.” (D4). 
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D4 describes how the concept of ‘selbständig werden’ (becoming independent) is highly 
regarded and ‘makes parents proud of their offspring’ in Germany. However, taking capital from 
investors is viewed as risky and undesirable. He considers the German emphasis on sustainable 
financial and social value: success does not mean flipping a company for a profit but long-term 
impact. German attitudes to business lack ambition and flexibility: after the freedom of a startup, 
D4 thinks re-adapting to corporate life would be difficult. He also describes the German stigma 
attached to ‘walking away’. Perhaps entrepreneurs persist longer with ventures because this is 
more socially acceptable than giving up. This relates to legal terms too: “to give up would have 
been far too expensive. So there was only one way – to fight to survive.” (D5). This perception 
of Germans as persistent is supported by subsequent GEM research (Brixy, Hundt et al. 2010). 
Observations Regarding Other Countries. American-born D1 describes how Germany 
compares to other countries. He sees a strong difference in outlook: “America does have a very, 
very strong culture, … the culture of the new.” (D1). The German distrust of the new produces 
an aversion to risk and a fear of failure, whereas in the USA “if you don’t fall down you're not 
running hard enough.” (D1).  
D4 believes his personality is more American than German. “I've always wanted to be an 
American.” (D4). He considers risk-taking as un-German, feeling more at home in the USA: 
“going to work for Netscape … was just the greatest thing ever.” (D4).  He also describes how 
the Neuer Markt (German technology-rich stock market) encouraged a wave of optimism among 
hitherto conservative German investors, but this was destroyed by the 2000 market crash. 
Analytical and Academic Perspective. D2 is analytical in describing his experiences. He 
marries and plans to restart his company on the day he files for bankruptcy. D2, D3, D5 and D6 
obtained scientific doctorates and describe their analytical approach to problems and 
opportunities. However, D4 regards himself as intuitive: “I've never been very analytical and 
very systematic in terms of decision-making.” (D4). D5’s doctoral research involved the study of 
how to ‘organize decentralized dynamic processes’ and this may have helped in planning his 
recovery from failure. “I believe … in a clear analysis. Sometimes if you get involved and know 
people, then you add a sympathy factor.” (D5). 
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D6 is a medical researcher and regards academic hierarchies as hostile to innovation. This drove 
him from medicine to software, which he felt might accelerate the development of new 
technology. He is critical of academics’ closeness to industry, establishing an inaccessible elite. 
Perhaps this makes him angry (or jealous), but he still submits academic papers to the elite 
journals he claims to dislike. 
Phoenix Companies (Restarts). D2 endured corporate bankruptcy and subsequent personal 
liability. During this ordeal, his VC wife bought the business assets and IP to establish a phoenix 
company. It is perhaps surprising that the German legal system, with strong creditor protection, 
enabled such a creative re-start. D4 admits that his business never closed: to avoid the stigma of 
bankruptcy (Fossen 2011) he re-purposed and re-named his original company and raised more 
funds. Despite his confidence, fear of failure was important: re-starting his venture was “a way to 
salvage, if you will, … the ego, the reputation, the not having to go look for a job.” (D4). 
Collaboration and Teamwork. D2 was one of eleven collaborators: after bankruptcy he was 
left with all the responsibility and had no qualms taking all the equity as he was taking all the 
risk. D3 is engaged in collaboration through his incubator and teaching responsibilities. As a 
CEO he noted the lack of common vision in his first (failed) venture: collaboration, he learned, 
requires more than good intentions. 
D5 was content to be part of a founding team but his co-founders quickly left. All of D6’s 
ventures involve strong collaboration as a guiding principle: he believes drug discovery 
processes must be replaced by a faster, collaborative approach. German investors fail to 
appreciate this model, as it is difficult to measure and control (D6). This puts Germany at a 
disadvantage: German investors want to create the “next SAP” rather than generate a number of 
growth opportunities (D3). D6 has been damaged by this go-it-alone approach: one of his six 
collaborators requested sole IP rights at the last minute, killing his venture. 
Investors. D1 tried unsuccessfully to raise money from VCs but he remains positive. “Venture 
capital was certainly the best thing that never happened to me.” (D1). He teaches entrepreneurs 
to expect no external funding and rely on customers from the start, a lesson also taught by D3 
and contemporary literature (Blank 2005; Ries 2011; Blank and Dorf 2012). D2’s angel investors 
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felt aggrieved at the failure of ‘their’ business, reflecting perhaps their naïvety but also D2’s 
inability to manage investor expectations. Liability rested on D2 personally: “The investors were 
all pissed. You always learn how people really are when things are bad.” (D2). D4 criticizes 
Munich VCs: they stop investing when conditions tighten but continue hearing entrepreneurs’ 
pitches. To an entrepreneur this misleading level of interest is encouraging: D4 spent too long 
chasing money that was not there. 
D5 secured last-minute VC investment, rescuing him from personal bankruptcy after a bad 
merger beyond his control. D6 experienced other difficulties: he received a million 
Deutschmarks in business plan funding, but later failed to secure additional funds. He believes 
that subsequent investor actions were illegal, but minority investors were powerless and could 
not support him. 
Risk. D1 and D4 started with enthusiasm but little planning to mitigate the risk. D2 sees risk in 
terms of what can and cannot be controlled. In re-starting his failed venture, he controlled the 
situation and thus minimized the risk. This suggests he alters his plans to take account of risk: his 
world-view factors in what might go wrong, making him clear and confident about tackling 
various scenarios, as in real options theory (McGrath 1999; Cave and Minty 2004; Klingebiel 
and Adner 2012).  
D3 describes the risk levels in large companies (low), startups (high) and his current academic 
role (minimal). D4 spent ten years slowly building his company and identifies the risk of 
balancing expansion with consolidation (growth management): he knows that failure is a 
possible outcome of each growth step. 
D4 describes his sense of responsibility to employees who he persuaded to leave good jobs. After 
extinguishing his initial funding, his employees refused to believe he had no more personal 
funds. He relied on the support of his co-workers who had a very different risk perception, and 
they left him to return to large companies. He describes such risk aversion as very German in 
nature. D4 sees things in simple terms, with reward (upside) linked to risk – he lived without 
salary for years and there was no large exit at the end, but that was a risk he was happy to take. 
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At the time D5 started his company there were few entrepreneurs around: he was seen as an 
“interesting animal, something for the museum or for the zoo” (D5). He feels the risk of failure 
in Germany is higher than elsewhere due to the personal tax liability when a company fails 
(Metzger 2008). 
Luck and Serendipity. D1 believes in the impact of luck and chance on one’s life (Cooper, Woo 
et al. 1988; Liu 2010). He traveled 4,000 miles to ‘prove himself’ and start his own venture and 
the tragic death of his father coincided with a time of significant business turmoil. Unpredictable 
events change the course of one’s life: “I often say failure comes in the strangest ways.” (D1). 
D2 feels unlucky to have been defrauded but fortunate to extract the assets and restart, and lucky 
to sell his company in 2007 before a major financial crash. Furthermore, his later success 
stemmed from bidding an excessive price to a customer, winning the deal and building a new 
product.  
D2 believes he put himself in the position to be lucky, as does D3, who became a university 
director after applying and failing three years earlier. D4 met his future angel investor through 
frantic networking, believing luck emerges from unlikely sources. D5 sees himself as lucky 
despite multiple collapses in his company and D6 feels fortunate to have won a million-euro 
business plan competition, although this ‘easy money’ made subsequent investment more 
challenging. 
Pragmatism and Realism. D2 recognizes the technological challenge faced by his company, 
and suggests Germany is a good place to tackle difficult problems. He remained calm and 
realistic during periods of intense pressure, dealing openly and fairly with lawyers to develop 
relationships that eventually brought rewards. D5 emphasizes trust and integrity, and is the only 
German interviewee to talk explicitly about ‘values’: without such principles he feels he would 
be unable to face such business challenges. He remains close to his childhood friends and his 
supportive family, which carries him through difficult times. 
Personal Cost. D1, D5 and D6 suffered high personal costs. For three years D1 worked to repay 
debts and ‘get back to zero.’ He pursued legal actions against former friends and experienced 
“tremendous personal sacrifice.” (D1). D4’s wife supported him financially while he gained the 
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confidence of investors and customers, working for years on no salary. Over fifteen years he says 
he could have earned more in a Siemens executive role. D5 endured extended periods close to 
corporate extinction: “I would have lost everything.” (D5). Sleep is important: his problems 
“created one or two nights where I did not sleep a lot.” (D5).  
D6 has perhaps suffered most from his failed venture: “It was very traumatic and it lasted until 
the last month when I lost my money. In line with that my second marriage broke up." (D6). His 
wife left him and their young children, and he was hospitalized with exhaustion. He is keen, 
however to participate in this research and believes lessons from his experience may benefit 
future entrepreneurs. His energy levels dropped to “zero” when his company collapsed. He 
recalls a contemporary in Munich who experienced similar personal cost, spending ten years 
working off loans incurred without his knowledge. D6 now has no capital or reserves and is 
currently unemployed. 
Blame. Despite clear external causes of failure (fraud, embezzlement), D1 does not ascribe 
blame in his interview, but focuses solely on the consequences. D2 regards the fraud he suffered 
as a catalyst for failure but does not blame anyone. D5 feels misled by advisors: in his words, 
once damage is done he must deal with the consequences not pursue the villains. D6 allocates 
blame for his first failed venture to one particular investor (Rogoff, Myung-Soo et al. 2004). He 
feels betrayed by legal advisors who forced him to close the company then excluded him from 
further participation, damaging his reputation and discouraging other investors from backing him 
further. 
Control and Conflict. D1 was a victim of embezzlement, leading to personal tax liability and 
near-bankruptcy. D2 describes how loss of control through anger or panic is detrimental to plans 
for success, and recognizes a direct connection between responsibility and what can be 
controlled. He realizes too that “being nice” to people like lawyers, tax officials and bankers at 
difficult times has a positive effect. D5 desires control so he can steer his destiny, but accepts the 
situation when he has no control (Mueller and Thomas 2001). He describes negotiations with 
investors who control the situation: “At this point in time it was crazy … knowing that you are 
already dead or mostly dead and still going for a reasonable price.” (D5). 
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D6 describes the frustration of losing control. “As long as the company was alive, basically I had 
the relationship with the investors” (D6), but he lost access to stakeholders and observed the 
destruction of his own firm, partly due to a consultant he describes as bullying and emasculating. 
Language	  and	  Narrative	  
 
In the German interviewees, use of narrative analysis of language (Harmeling 2011) revealed 
issues and themes that were not necessarily explicit in the text. 
Language. D1 is a successful lecturer, fluent in German and English using real-life stories in his 
lectures. Describing a failed deal he uses short sentences to build dramatic tension. He builds the 
narrative up to a punch line using questions to draw in the listener. He invents dialogue to make 
his story more immediate, although one could suggest such total recall is impossible. He uses 
irony and humour when describing differences between America and Germany. He is self-
mocking and disarming, describing his first ventures as “not a classically bright move" and 
suggesting he “wasn’t smart enough” in business dealings. (D1).  
D2 tells his story in factual and unemotional language, and uses humour without pausing for 
response when describing how he filed for bankruptcy on the day of his marriage. D3 is 
understated, regarding investors taking his company down-market as a “negative connotation.” 
D4 uses positive language to convey enthusiasm. He refers to “organic” and “intuitive” and 
describes the “bio-rhythm” of companies, a holistic, interpretative view of cyclical firm 
development. He chooses dramatic, emotive terms: success means he “puts bread on the table” 
for employees; his failures are not restarted but “salvaged” or “rescued”. D4’s mobile software 
company was an early ‘collaborative social network’ in 2001 (before Facebook), suggesting new 
ventures require new language to explain hitherto unknown concepts. Perhaps success or failure 
depends partly on entrepreneurs’ ability to describe their innovation in contemporary terms 
(McKenzie and Sud 2008). 
D5 is unemotional in his use of language: people he fires have “relinquished their 
responsibilities.” He uses muted language and there is no anger or laughter in the interview: he 
describes long, relentless negotiations with investors that required calmness and persistence. He 
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talks openly about his supportive family and his desire for economic success while retaining 
honesty, trust and integrity. In contrast, D6 is somewhat bitter about his firm’s collapse: he 
dismisses an advisor as a “local pharmaceutical self-made expert,” and describes investors’ 
“revenge” against a fellow entrepreneur. He also uses destructive terms: a subsequent venture 
“was just killed by the Technology Transfer Officer.” (D6). 
Narrative. D2 tells his story dispassionately, while others (D1, D4) are compelling storytellers. 
D2 explains complex science (magnetic refrigeration) in simple terms, and this skill of 
simplifying complexity for a non-technical audience might represent a valuable asset for an 
entrepreneur. He is able to reflect unemotionally on multiple perspectives. Describing early 
investors: “I bought the assets by myself in the end. … Why would you make them shareholders 
if there is nothing to win.” (D2). He describes how others react but perhaps cannot empathize 
with them. D4 shifts to the present tense to communicate the immediacy of his first startup. “It's 
the tail end of the '90s. It's the entrepreneur vogue. It's the first time in Germany that people start 
companies left and right, venture capital easily available.” (D4). He builds dramatic tension by 
recounting various companies, talking rapidly in short sentences, and using questions to confirm 
understanding and retain engagement. D5 uses no such techniques: his story is told simply, with 
little embellishment. 
Distractions. D2 steers the conversation away from sensitive issues. When asked about his 
drinking during his bankruptcy, he adopts the voice of ‘other people’: “What people always say 
is that they manage to start drinking heavily when they get into problems.” (D2). He may not 
have had an alcohol problem but is careful to shift the focus away from his personal life. D3 also 
offers wide-ranging responses to questions, deflecting away from personal issues. He answers 
questions with other questions, perhaps the response of an experienced teacher. D6 distracts the 
conversation several times, sometimes deliberately or perhaps accidentally – although this might 
indicate his mind flitting quickly between subjects. 
English as a Second Language. D1 is American-born, and most of the interviewees speak 
exceptionally good English: D4 in particular is well read in English literature. However, the 
capture of open-ended discussion using methodologies such as IPA exposes the issue that 
meaning might be less easily ascertained when spoken in a non-native tongue (van Nes, Abma et 
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al. 2010). D3 carefully avoids answering personal questions but is very articulate in English 
when he wants to be, perhaps demonstrating a higher level of second-language skills in handling 
nuance and controlling a conversation. Although there is a potential issue when analyzing 
interviews in a non-native language, it can be suggested from the interviews that clever and 
manipulative people (notably D2, D3 and D4) will find a way to use language to their advantage. 
Environmental	  Factors	  
 
Stigma, Fear of Failure and Reputation. D1 was born in America and has lived in Munich for 
over thirty years. Still regarding himself as an outsider he observes: “Here in Germany, … you 
have a very, very strong fear of failure, a real, major fear of failure.” (D1). He feels strong 
enough to avoid the stigma of failure, but recognizes social forces that produce stigma as a result 
of entrepreneurial failure. “My kids go through German school and I am nauseated every single 
day of the year by the attitudes that they are taught.” (D1). D2 experienced bankruptcy and 
personal tax liability until cleared by the courts, yet has no comment on the stigma associated 
with such trials (Seung-Hyun, Peng et al. 2007). He suggests his failure was no problem for him. 
He suggests stigma does apply to failed entrepreneurs in Germany - “people remember” - but not 
to him. His legal problems lasted three years, but he retained contact with customers, did not 
panic or experience discrimination. Perhaps his wife (a venture capitalist who advised him 
through the bankruptcy) was important here, but D2 does not think stigma limited his progress. 
He concludes with characteristic understatement that his reputation was “probably scratched a 
little bit,” but not damaged. 
D3 has strong views on the impact of failure in Germany and how attitudes need to change. He 
builds failure into practical teaching exercises and criticizes those who think it is negative. “They 
say, "Oh, you are a bad guy because your company failed." Instead of saying, "You tried it. You 
are one who really takes responsibility." (D3). In his lessons, the positive aspects of failure are 
discussed and he believes attitudes are improving. He tries to raise capabilities of entrepreneurs 
and minimize conventional German attitudes to taking risks and failing.  
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However, D4 is critical of bankruptcy in Germany: “Nobody wants to talk to you anymore … 
you just basically can just go shoot yourself.” (D4). These extreme consequences explain why he 
chose to re-purpose rather than close his first company. He sees “the stigma is a specific German 
stigma. That is, there is – Germans like entrepreneurship of a certain kind.” (D4). In Germany 
you are a perpetrator, not a victim: “there is a phrase that "he's gone independent", which is a 
good thing. But there is a phrase that "he's gone bankrupt", meaning that he has bankrupted his 
business.” (D4). People are unwilling to hear mitigating circumstances. D5 describes the 
seriousness of his problems and how he avoids bankruptcy at all costs, yet he does not mention 
stigma in his interviews once. D6 experienced the stigma of failure more keenly than other 
interviewees. Potential German employers and investors have shunned him. He describes a 
“failure club” in Martinsried, comprised of other entrepreneurs who have started companies and 
failed. His personal conflicts with investors made things worse: “you get the attitude of being a 
troublemaker.” (D6). Much was based on gossip, demonstrating how intangible forces can act 
against an entrepreneur. 
Trust and Honesty. D1 faced a dilemma in his first venture: as an American, he could have left 
his debts in Germany, but honesty and integrity compelled him to return to Munich. He quotes 
his father – “Don't measure the person by how they deal with success. Measure them by how 
they deal with failure.” (D1). D2 feels that by remaining honest with key customers and suppliers 
he was able to restart trading again later, but he now distrusts business advisors, keeping 
financial and legal issues under tighter scrutiny. He now feels more attuned to conditions when 
strategic relationships are threatened. He suggests an entrepreneur should think “like a scientist,” 
questioning all aspects of the business. 
D5’s company endured a bad merger: “I learned that my new colleagues had been far too 
optimistic … and that money just walked out the door.” (D5). He does not attribute blame 
(Rogoff, Myung-Soo et al. 2004), even though he personally faced bankruptcy. D5 talks about 
keeping honest through difficult circumstances, which subsequently helped obtain critical 
funding. He emphasizes honesty and integrity as principles of conduct. D6 frankly outlines 
painful consequences of his failures. In parallel, he is professionally interested in the extension of 
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trust and honesty among multiple contributors through open innovation, perhaps seeing trust as a 
form of ‘social capital’ (Boden, Nett et al. 2009). 
Family. D1 left the American family business to prove he could succeed on his own but his 
father died tragically before this could be realized. He is critical of his younger self: “it was a 
failure for me … that I was going so far abroad was to sort of show that I didn't need any help.” 
(D1). D2 received strong support from his VC investor wife. Indeed, they married during his 
difficult business period. His wife’s parents were entrepreneurs but he had no business 
background. D4 makes multiple references to the support of his wife through several ventures. 
As a doctor she supported the family when D4 was unable to make a salary. He describes how he 
has made “rash purchases in the automotive sector” which she had to guarantee, and how she has 
generally ‘indulged’ his startup aspirations. Such light-hearted sufferance is important: one 
wonders whether he would act as recklessly without it. He also refers to parental attitudes. As 
well as limited tolerance for risk – being proud of their offspring becoming selbständig 
(independent) but not for taking risk capital – he suggests deference to parental views remains 
strong, and undiminished by generations of German entrepreneurs. 
D5 was raised in rural Bavaria with no entrepreneurs in his family. He was the first in his family 
to obtain a higher degree, but he feels he benefited by having to learn by himself. His mother 
regards ‘success’ in terms of contribution to society and personal happiness, rather than financial 
reward. D5 appears to have inherited this view: he feels a strong responsibility to employees. D6 
experienced severe stress and the collapse of his first company led directly to a marriage 
breakdown: he was left in charge of two young children while trying to fight legal battles and 
seek new employment. 
Personality	  Characteristics	  
 
Personality. D1 appears reflective and self-aware. After repaying corporate debts he evaluated 
his strengths and weaknesses, discovering he no longer needed his business partner. D2 is careful 
in the way he describes his actions, but is capable of manipulating people around him including 
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co-founders. He believes his failed venture made him less trustful of others. He is able to 
compartmentalize his work and personal life: “I was always able to keep this separate.” (D2). 
D3 is enthusiastic about his companies and optimistic about re-starting his failed venture, 
without describing how such a re-start might occur. He is proud of his patents, which represent 
technological success despite the venture’s failure. D4 is intuitive and occasionally reckless, 
taking risks when he has the opportunity and funds, whereas D5 operates differently - the tortoise 
to D4’s hare: D5 appears grounded and responsible. He takes decisions seriously based on 
rational analysis, and decisions are pursued tenaciously. His confidence is based on values and 
his instincts are normally correct: “when I didn't believe in my deeper feelings, I had to learn 
that … this was a mistake.” (D5). 
Self-efficacy and Confidence. D1 started his first two businesses with confidence, sure of his 
own ability: “I saw that opportunity pretty clearly and I knew that I knew how to do it." (D1). He 
believes innovation may require the creation of new sectors as well as opportunities: he did this 
in creating the software re-publishing sector. D2 demonstrates remarkable self-efficacy by re-
starting his company during bankruptcy proceedings, despite severe German bankruptcy laws. 
Similarly, he takes responsibility for his venture’s problems while taking equity control over the 
phoenix company: confident in his own capabilities, he expects to be rewarded. 
Self-efficacy does not come without reflection or self-doubt. D1 says: “… starting again by 
myself in 1997, with no money whatsoever … was kind of scary.” (D1). D3 regards himself as 
capable, regarding technology problems as personal challenges. He has a high sense of self-
worth: “I didn't study physics for 10 years to sell plants afterwards.” (D3).  
D4 is confident in his own abilities and willing to take risks based on his judgment. He left his 
job to follow his dream and expected his co-workers to quit their jobs too, but they declined. He 
is aware that while some regard him as self-confident, others in Germany see him as fickle and 
lacking stamina. He describes his future intention thus: “I'm going to put my money on the table. 
I'm going to hire some people and we're going to do it again.” (D4). He remains enthusiastic and 
(somewhat) reckless: his first venture was a “brilliant challenge” but admits he was wrong about 
his own capabilities. He likes being an entrepreneur more than making money: the self-belief and 
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the exposure to failure offer thrills that he actively seeks – at the present time he plans to sink his 
money into another venture. His self-belief extends beyond one company, wanting to develop 
multiple startups in parallel, not to spread the risk but to multiply it across projects (Muir 2007). 
D5 is confident but has experienced economic cycles and anticipates downturns: he is a calm, 
reflective person who has learned not to over-react when events turn against him. He describes 
himself as optimistic but not enthusiastic, and is respected by customers and investors for his 
integrity. He refers to the personal support of his family, but otherwise he has strong confidence 
in his own abilities. 
D6 says his family lost confidence in him when business became difficult. As a breadwinner, he 
watched his earning capability disappear and saw the prospect of financial ruin. His loss of self-
confidence, coupled with the stress of the business decline and collapse, led to the breakdown of 
his marriage and extended periods of stress-induced ill health.  
Tenacity. D1 had the chance to remain in the USA and avoid his German liability but chose to 
return, facing creditors and the German tax system, working for years to pay down debts. “14 
years from the day we started, we cleaned the books off and closed the company.” (D1). D4 
demonstrated tenacity at his most recent startup, but he says he had “no place else to go” after his 
previous ventures – reluctant to re-enter corporate life, he regarded himself as unemployable. In 
Germany, he says, “…People here will just fight on ... where a more rational entrepreneur might 
say, ‘this has failed. I'm going to cut my losses.’” (D4), adding to the discussion on whether to 
fight on or quit (Gimeno, Folta et al. 1997). 
D5 has proven tenacious, saving his company three times. He takes the challenge early and head-
on: “a real fight is better than having to fight a small fight.” (D5). He visualizes his business 
responsibilities: “I … sat in the chair of responsibility and had no legal option to walk away 
anymore.” (D5). D6 fought to retain his first business and continues trying to re-create it. He is 
frustrated by questions of focus: his corporate difficulties distracted him - only ‘a fifth’ of his 
efforts were productive.  
Creativity. D1 started his first business in a new sector of software ‘re-publishing.’ D3 misses 
the creativity and excitement of developing new products, although he now does this vicariously 
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through his startup incubator. D4 regards the earliest stages of his startups as the most creative – 
finding talent and money and developing technology. He is proud to call himself a hacker, which 
he associates with being creative, innovative, tenacious and improvisational, as well as slightly 
weird and “an outsider”. This ‘hacker’ theme is reminiscent of theory around Intelligent Fast 
Failure (Tahirsylaj 2012). 
D5 views creativity as essential not just in products or business model but also in negotiation and 
deal discovery. He secured capital at a difficult time, just before closedown by liquidators. He 
had to identify and secure funding when the alternative was personal bankruptcy, so he feels 
necessity made him creative. D6 sees creativity not just in the creation of new ventures but also 
in collaboration between motivated experts, and he has established online communities of 
scientific researchers for medical technologies. 
Drive and Motivation. D3 differentiates between levels of commitment in large companies and 
startups, the latter being more extreme. In his incubator ventures, “bring[ing] yourself to the 
edge, … is really, really important." (D3). He is aware that such extreme commitment increases 
the risk of burnout, which may in turn reduce the chance of success. D4 feels driven to build 
companies: he says: “I feel like I'm late to the party already… I should be in there right now.” 
(D4) This urgency indicates that he celebrates the excitement of exposure and new risks. 
Counterfactual thinking. D1 talks positively about his experiences, but when his companies 
were struggling to survive, he viewed his contemporaries from Wharton with regret: “it looked 
like they had made the right choice and I had made the wrong one.” (D1). D2 is content to 
disclose his mistakes, being too trusting of key personnel, and starting a company with 
stakeholders who had unclear expectations. D3’s company has been dormant for five years but 
he believes he would manage the re-started venture better now. This counterfactual thinking is 
present in interviews with D1, D3, D4 and D6 (Baron 2000; Baron, Hmieleski et al. 2012). 
D4 reflects on lost opportunities: he missed the Netscape IPO window, staying at Siemens to 
reach a ten-year pension milestone. His reflections are not bitter: he focuses more on creating 
new opportunities than regretting lost chances. His only regret is his inability to sell the company 
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he grew for a decade. D5 describes what happened clearly in the past tense and believes his 
responsibility lies in dealing with situations as they are, not wishing for alternative outcomes. 
Positive outlook and optimism. D1 appears to embrace new chances, aware of the risk and 
effort required.  “Failure shows up. Instead of falling apart and saying, ‘Oh my God, its failure,’ 
you say, ‘Oh, there's an opportunity.’” (D1). He believes it is the entrepreneur’s job to see 
potential in the darkest moments, and is proud of the 80% of incubated companies still in 
business. D3 is optimistic about his students, urging them to start “with your own power [and] 
you can set up your own idea.” (D3).  
The language used by D4 is positive and extreme: things are “super”, “brilliant” and “fantastic.” 
Ideas are either excellent or poor, with little moderation. He describes his own startups 
enthusiastically and Munich excites him, with many entrepreneurs and incubators to develop 
ideas. He is keen to pass on his experience through business interaction and mentorship. He 
remains perhaps over-optimistic: his first venture technology deliverable was planned for 60 
days, yet took a year to deliver. 
Entrepreneurial	  Response	  
 
Learning. D1 describes how much he learned when he repaid his company’s debts, “That was 
the biggest, steepest, fastest, best learning curve that I have ever had." (D1). Mentors assisted 
this education: his former professor identified problems too gradual for D1 to detect himself. He 
now tries to see opportunity in every failure. D2 describes how a positive team became frustrated 
when too many intellectual co-founders got involved. Then he had to learn rapidly about law and 
finance after discovering embezzlement. He learned to follow his instinct, and be honest with 
suppliers and customers. He suggests this cannot be classroom-taught: “Until you have burned 
your finger in a flame, you leave it [there].” (D2). He feels he mistakenly trusted advisors and is 
now reluctant to delegate decisions on contracts and finance. 
D3 runs an entrepreneurship incubator and sees that Germany has problems combining different 
mindsets: “Technical guys don't understand how the business guy thinks.” (D3). D5 agrees: 
Germans are reluctant to cross disciplines, possibly due to specialization during formal 
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education: this is a problem when startups need all-rounders, and these are not celebrated in 
Germany. 
D3 forces rapid learning. He insists incubated ventures generate revenue within a week: most of 
them fail but he uses this ‘breakdown’ as a key learning stage. He is wary of trying to educate 
students too much from his own experiences: he says new entrepreneurs have to “make their own 
experience” including all the failures (D3). 
Business focus is essential and D3 feels his venture lacked focus on customer acquisition and 
sustainability. D4’s learning did not diminish his urge to do it again. He now separates talent 
from money, talented people being harder to find. Like most entrepreneurs, he is not a good 
listener: “They listen. They understand. But it doesn't register.” (D4). He takes advice reluctantly 
and thinks most entrepreneurs have to learn from their own mistakes. If they succeed, they may 
never learn these lessons. 
D5 has learned by doing, and through setbacks (Cope and Watts 2000). Beyond his professional 
knowledge (finance, law and tax), he reflects on business cycles and the need to plan for 
inevitable downturns: “I have now seen enough ups and downs not to fall into panic mode too 
fast.” (D5). D6 outlines two areas of learning, regarding practical skills and enhanced self-
awareness. He believes learning from his mistakes makes him more likely to succeed. “When 
you are self-critical you can … realize what are crucial events in a relationship with investors 
and partners.” (D6). He also suggests key learning is “all in the soft skills.” (D6). This involves 
three steps: the mistake itself, the consequences, and then the reflection on these consequences. 
Pain of failure intensifies (Cope and Watts 2000) this learning experience. (D6). 
Teaching. D1 and D3 run entrepreneurship centres in Munich universities and develop many of 
their own courses. D3 criticizes business schools teaching students how to write a business plan: 
he believes more practical teaching is needed, with failure and rejection as necessary 
components. D4 sees difficulties in teaching entrepreneurship beyond the sharing of personal 
stories: one needs to experience failure for oneself. D5 shares this view: although the 
contemporary startup scene is rich in education and advisors, he thinks the only way to really 
learn is by doing, and the strongest lessons emerge at the most difficult times. 
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Opportunity Identification. D1 is decisive in the way he identifies and addresses opportunities: 
“I saw that opportunity pretty clearly and I knew that I knew how to do it.” (D1). He appears 
more intuitive than analytical and insists all new opportunities have an early revenue model. He 
asks his entrepreneurship students which is the most important word in the sentence 'Every 
breakdown is the opportunity for a breakthrough.' His answer is ‘every,’ suggesting that the 
entrepreneurial instinct should address all opportunities, however they arise, and he believes this 
approach “becomes an automatic system for dealing with failure.” (D1). D2’s startup arose from 
academic research: only later did he consciously consider how to identify opportunities. He 
bought the assets of his start-up from bankruptcy based on information on the business 
opportunity he already knew very well. 
D3 had prior experience of being a student entrepreneur. He enjoys his teaching role and is not 
keen to start another venture himself. D4 believes talent (people) and financing are pre-requisites 
and opportunities will emerge when they are in place: he sees himself more as an opportunity 
assembler than creator (Corbett 2005). He also describes the ‘internal logic’ of startup 
entrepreneurs, describing his startups as a ‘logical’ thing to do at the time, even though they 
proved unsuccessful. For him, the attractiveness of an opportunity arises from a sense of self-
efficacy, a suppression of the risks involved, and the opportunity cost of ‘missing out’. 
D5 considers his next opportunities logically. His long-term faith in his own technology makes it 
logical to persist in the venture he knows well. D6 feels his future opportunities have been 
blighted by past failure: he is pessimistic about gaining employment or starting a new company. 
His best opportunities are outside of Germany but family commitments constrain him from 
moving. In the interview, he probed for business connections to explore a new venture. He grew 
more animated talking about these opportunities. He remains ambitious and keen to work with 
like-minded collaborators. Perhaps this explains his collaborative software bias: he sees online 
collaboration as a way of circumventing the limitations of working in Germany. 
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CHAPTER 5B: ANALYSIS OF BRITISH INTERVIEWS 
 
This chapter presents findings from the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of six British 
interviews, including (1) a profile of each case outlining background, context and reasons for 
failure and a brief personal profile and commentary on each individual subject, and (2) a 
thematic analysis arising from the application of IPA analysis to interview transcripts and a 
cross-case analysis of the British cohort. 
In this analysis, as outlined in Figure 15, each interview transcript was analyzed according to the 
process described in Chapter 4 and summarized in Figure 10. This resulted in a written profile of 
each interviewee (background, context and personal profile, as documented in Table 12) 
followed by a thematic analysis, which is then further reviewed to ‘enfold’ relevant literature 
with references to key themes.  
Among the detailed analysis contained here, the overall goal remains to address a simple issue: 
what happened when these entrepreneurs failed, what did they learn and what did they do next? 
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Figure 15. Process Schematic Outlining the IPA Analysis and Outputs for British Interviews. Each Interview is Analyzed using 
IPA Methodology before Performing a Cross-Case Thematic Analysis (within each Country, in this case the UK) 
 
 	  
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 105 of 216 
Summaries	  of	  British	  Interviews	  
	  
PROFILE of B1. White British male, mid-50s. 
B1: Background. B1 is a Cambridge-educated engineer, now running an outdoor activity start-up in Australia. 
He was CEO for several Cambridge-based technology start-ups in digital display technology and holographic 
data storage. His primary failed venture involved a company he joined as CEO, where he spent a year 
convincing investors the technology would not work. Eventually, they agreed and money was returned. As a 
result, his reputation is high with VCs and other CEOs. 
B1: Context. B1 experienced two major company failures after a successful venture in Internet commerce, which 
was sold in 1997 but subsequently under-exploited. The first venture failed due to technical holographic data 
storage challenges proving too great. B1 worked in strategy consulting and this helped him rapidly evaluate the 
situation and recommend company closure, returning remaining funds to investors. This placed him in conflict 
with the investors but he succeeded. As a result, B1 remains regarded highly by major Cambridge investors: “I 
somehow got a very good reputation in Cambridge, having been CEO of an abject failure.” (B1). B1 led a 
(second) display technologies firm through initial funding, product development and sales, handing over the 
company to another CEO, who almost broke the company before B1 helped it recover again. 
B1: Personal profile. B1 has a positive outlook: he displays strong values regarding family and work-life 
balance, taking extensive periods of family leave between start-ups. His use of language is instructive: he makes 
self-deprecating comments, is reluctant to discuss his achievements and keen to recognize the contribution of 
others. He uses positive language: he is enthusiastic about “hyper-exciting” opportunities, motivational in 
describing sales efforts, and grateful for being “fortunate” for such “lovely” opportunities. He is a strong 
storyteller, using short sentences to build tension, using questions to confirm understanding when simplifying 
complex technology and holding back the conversation to heighten the drama of a particular episode. Learning 
from his failed ventures feeds directly into his next one, and he feels confident to assess new opportunities: “I 
asked all the toughest questions … once you have had the experience, it's clear in your own mind.” (B1). He has 
a strong sense of confidence and self-efficacy, demonstrated by his ability to raise funds in tough conditions. 
PROFILE of B2. White British male, mid-50s. 
B2: Background. B2 is a long-time entrepreneur with multiple failed companies. A Cambridge Engineering 
graduate, he studied Financial Management and psychology after his ventures failed. His first company has 
traded since 1984 despite two major frauds and customer insolvencies. He defines failure subjectively: 
contemporaries believed B2 was bankrupt (twice) but he avoided the stigma of personal bankruptcy. After his 
second firm collapsed, he developed a portfolio approach involving multiple companies, charities and properties. 
He currently runs a local high-profile seed fund. 
B2: Context. His primary company, founded in 1984 and still trading today, is a developer of ruggedized 
peripheral devices. This company failed twice and is regarded by B2 as a ‘lifestyle business’ after experiencing 
two total shutdowns in the 1980s, when an accounting error led to the appointment of receivers. This was during 
UK recessions when many firms failed. Through careful planning, he avoided bankruptcy: though stressful, he 
started another firm to purchase all its assets. This ‘phoenix’ strategy failed when a business partner reneged on 
the deal and B2 spent several years repaying significant debt before eventually restoring the company to his own 
name. 
B2: Personal profile. B2 experienced personal setbacks and failure during his career, including a failed marriage 
and alcohol abuse. The longevity of his long-term technology venture demonstrates persistence, although he sees 
survival as rational: product margins were high and his skilled team were keen to continue. After 27 years, his 
company retains staff from its earliest days. B2 considers the impact of failure on his career and personality. 
Critical of psychology and therapy when younger, he studied psychology and attended alcohol rehabilitation: he 
is now an advocate of self-awareness and support. He enjoys inventing and developing new products. B2 worked 
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in Bavaria and compares Germany to the USA. He believes the stigma of failure is strong in Germany and 
weaker in the USA, but in the UK public perception is complex: he gave a UK TV interview after his company 
failed, where the BBC exaggerated the company’s failure to heighten the drama. B2 suggests this British 
predisposition for celebrating bad news fosters stigma that might not otherwise exist. 
PROFILE of B3. White British male, mid-50s. 
B3: Background. B3 studied economics at the LSE before gaining a PhD in Computer Science. He invented chip 
designs, hardware and software, and co-founded two ventures in advanced printing technology. B3 was CEO in 
his first venture, which failed through its inability to raise more capital. The second start-up had technical and 
business goals but also failed because investors declined to invest more funds: in this case, B3 believed this was 
the correct outcome. He reflects that learning from failure provides a double education. “You gain a lot of 
experience … because it grows through so many stages and then it collapses through so many stages.” (B3). 
B3: Context. B3 experienced early success as a student and he is proud his software was widely adopted. In the 
first of several ventures, he joined as a turn-around CEO, successfully for a few years before it closed. He is 
ready for adversity: “I'm always prepared for … bad things to happen.” This attitude is communicated through 
unemotional language when talking about failed ventures – he is dispassionate, not angry or bitter. He makes 
rational scientific choices based on available facts, even decisions on company survival. Perhaps this 
demonstrates insufficient passion to advocate the survival of one’s own start-up at all costs. 
B3: Personal profile. B3 was born in Sweden and raised in the UK. He demonstrates high self-confidence and 
self-efficacy regarding technology, but realizes this can be counter-productive as an entrepreneur. He is not 
prepared to win at all costs. B3 comments on how British social structures discourage crossover between 
technical and business skills and this reduces innovation. He sees such crossover as a celebration of intellectual 
capability but reflects that: “The UK, as a culture, doesn't really promote intellectually driven activity.” He is 
critical of entrepreneurial opportunities in the UK, but points out an underlying factor – “It's not so much the 
failure to which they object. It's the creativity that went into getting to the position where you could make it a 
failure.” (B3). 
PROFILE of B4. White British male, mid-50s. 
B4: Background. A Cambridge graduate, B4 has founded many ventures in the USA and Cambridge since 1980. 
His portfolio approach to mitigate risk involves running a consulting company with steady income, which also 
offers a platform to explore new technology opportunities. Some of his ventures represent ‘disappointments’, 
where he made a positive financial return but investors lost money, providing a subjective definition of failure. 
B4: Context. B4 built companies in the US and UK. His first software company grew rapidly developed in the 
UK before expanding to America. VC funding brought a reduction in control and he watched competition erode 
the opportunity he had built. New management declined acquisition offers and B4 was powerless to influence 
events. After this failure, B4 returned to consulting as a lower-risk business. This consulting company proved 
successful, spawning four new technology companies. He held board roles in several ventures, but focused his 
executive energy on one company at a time. From this strategy he achieved multiple exits but is not satisfied. 
One venture received large amounts of capital, but spent it all and late-stage investors lost money. His subjective 
definition of what constitutes ‘failure’ recurs in the interviews. 
B4: Personal profile. B4 developed a portfolio approach to spread risk. He is self-confident in starting companies 
and raising funds, and has learned mainly from failure rather than success. He regards self-efficacy as essential, 
but this comes with the need to be self-critical. He suggests success might lead to decline and failure increases 
the chance of success. “I think if you come out of a situation that was less successful you are more disciplined 
about how you analyse the opportunities... I think you get an amazing surge of self-belief and optimism when 
you have a successful exit that can lead you to folly in the next venture.” (B4). 
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PROFILE of B5. White British male, late-40s. 
B5: Background. B5 is an Engineering academic, lecturing and running research at Cambridge University. He 
has founded three companies: the first is still trading but was not a success. His current two ventures are 
bootstrapped and he hopes to avoid taking in external capital. He is CEO of one and board member of another 
Cambridge start-up, both developing advanced technology in physical sciences. 
B5: Context. B5 mitigates risk through parallel careers as entrepreneur and academic. His first unsuccessful 
venture was never liquidated: perhaps he feels that liquidation makes the failure visible. This first venture 
recorded only £250k in sales over 15 years, although the technology is still in use by many customers. He admits 
he has ignored market analysis and feasibility before starting a new firm. Also, he and his technology partner 
spent too much time refining products at zero cost, without building a sustainable business. B5 suggests 
academics may be “probably the worst people to do business, because they're too soft. They're too prepared to 
want to show people how clever they are.” (B5). Perhaps it is hard to fear failure if the cost of failure is so low: 
with no visibility or exposure to investors, there is nobody to notice when the firm fails. This in turn questions 
how ‘failure’ is defined: B5 clearly thinks his venture failed because it did not succeed as a profitable entity, but 
much was learned and customers benefited from the cheap technology. 
B5: Personal profile. In his academic field B5 meets senior industrial, political and academic leaders – the 
rewards of this are prestige and recognition without much financial success. During his career, he has observed a 
shift towards the engagement of academics in industrial entrepreneurial projects, and he embraces this fully. The 
combination of academia and start-up life may lead to being seen as a ‘gentleman entrepreneur,’ who likes to 
play at the fringe of business without leaving the safety of the university. However, being an entrepreneur can be 
seen as academic outreach: “ultimately you want to make a difference. As an engineer, you want to get your 
work applied rather than applauded.” (B5). 
PROFILE of B6. White British male, early-40s. 
B6: Background. B6 left a Cambridge University academic role to become a physical sciences entrepreneur. He 
founded two companies in the same field and both have failed. He feels the pain of failure from these two 
ventures and reveals some bitterness. He feels betrayed by key academic customers who did not understand his 
situation. 
B6: Context. B6 started a company in a similar technical field to (German interviewee) D2, who was also 
unsuccessful in his first venture. The firm developed specialist scientific instruments, for a limited number of 
geographically dispersed customers, each with a different procurement process. These customers could not be 
compelled to sign deals on a timely basis. B6 appealed to his former university department, to execute deals 
promised to him but these appeals were ignored. Bitterness and a sense of betrayal are apparent throughout the 
interview. 
B6: Personal profile. The interview with B6 differs from other Cambridge transcripts. There is resentment, anger 
and betrayal in his language: his former university colleagues are described as “princes” in their own “kingdom”, 
implying a privileged culture closed to outsiders. He suggests the Cambridge colleges perpetuate this limited 
outlook: “it can make people think that … they are untouchable.” He describes university entrepreneurs as 
“paper tigers” that are not ‘110% committed’ to success. His attitude to failure is very negative and attributes 
blame to his former colleagues. He does not offer extensive reflections on learning. Although he says, “you learn 
much more from defeat than you do from victory”, this seems perfunctory in light of other comments. This 
interview was possibly a rare chance for him to talk openly about painful experiences and an opportunity to 
release tension. B6 appears still very angry and about the failed venture. Academic literature has pointed to the 
role of grieving in the response to failure (Shepherd 2003), and B6 appears to have barely started this journey. 
Table 12. Summaries of Six British Interview Subjects, covering Background; Business Context and Reasons for Failure, as well 
as Personal Profile and Commentary 
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Thematic	  Analysis	  Arising	  from	  IPA	  –	  United	  Kingdom	  
 
In the overall British analysis, a total of 78 thematic codes (themes) were identified with a total 
of 894 references to these themes across six interviews. A summary of the most frequently 
occurring themes is provided in Figure 16, along with an approximate mapping of these themes 
into four categories. The mapping in Figure 16 is intended to indicate the main themes arising 
from the British analysis; the relative frequency of occurrence of each theme (themes in bold 
occur more often); and whether these themes are personal or social, and retrospective or forward-
looking in nature. This allocation of themes into four quadrants is not based on prior literature 
review but is reflected in the research design. Ultimately, this remains the author’s subjective 
view of how various themes might be characterized. 
 
 
Figure 16. Mapping of Most Frequently Occurring Themes Emerging from IPA Analysis of British Interviews 
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A narrative account follows of these themes, combined with extracts of text from the interviews 
and relevant references to ‘enfolding’ literature to add context to the interview findings from 
prior research. 
 
Business	  Context	  
 
Business Reasons: Reasons for failure and business context. In the UK interviews, 
entrepreneurs raised a variety of reasons for failure. Economic factors figured highly, either due 
to recession or poor sales (B2, B3, B6), competitive pressures (B4), or the lack of prior market 
validation (B5). B2 experienced accounting errors, fraud and misrepresentation, and B6 felt that 
he was treated badly by customers. 
Both academics-turned-entrepreneurs (B5 and B6) suffered from lack of market validation and 
planning. B6’s highly priced products had a limited market and long sales cycle while B5 had a 
different problem - when a customer bought a product they extinguished their need for further 
products. B1’s second startup failed due to technological challenges proving too difficult for a 
commercially sustainable business. B3 suffered a variation on this: his prototype did not justify 
further funding. Concern over technical excellence sometimes disguised other commercial 
issues: “what we didn't really think about was the nature of the market. We were so close to the 
technology” (B5). 
B4 saw how VC-funded expansion wrested control away from him: by the time strategic 
decisions were being made about company direction and acquisitions his voice was no longer 
heard. 
Definitions of failure (and success). Definitions of failure varied. The entrepreneurs 
experienced lack of success in one or more of their ventures: B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5 had 
experienced “abject failure” at some point. B5 regards his first venture as a failure for not 
realizing its potential and lack of financial return. B1 however sees his failed venture as a 
success that made his reputation in Cambridge, yet regards his earlier company (successfully 
sold for £6 million) as a missed opportunity. 
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This variation in perception makes analysis of failure more complex (McGrath 1999; Politis and 
Gabrielsson 2009; Cope 2011). B2 endured two receiverships in the same company but is proud 
he avoided bankruptcy. B4 distinguishes between perspectives and outcomes in one venture: 
“Everybody could pretend it was a success. But actually it was a real bonfire of investors' 
money.” (B4). 
For B3: “Nothing smells as rosy as success and nothing stinks like failure.” (B3). He has a clear 
view of how failure is viewed in the UK, worth quoting in full.  
“In a way, it's not so much the failure to which they object. It's the creativity that went into 
getting to the position where you could make it a failure. … If you make a success of it, all of 
that is forgiven. If you don't make a success of it, then all of that counts against you” (B3). 
Observations about other countries. All six UK interviewees remarked that America was more 
tolerant of failure, B1 suggesting that self-belief and self-efficacy differ by country, and attitudes 
to failure follow this (B1). The merging of life and work in the US was also seen as positive by 
B2: American entrepreneurs are simply ‘less remarkable.’ 
Comments about Germany suggest Germans are better at tackling difficult technical problems 
and applying a longer-term view. B2 worked in Bavaria and praised Germany’s engineering 
focus, but indicated their engineers might be mystified by the lack of focus in a ‘portfolio 
entrepreneur.’ B6 compared the ‘poor’ UK funding scene with the German Fraunhofer, and how 
Germany better integrates university students with new technology ventures.  
B3 spent his early years in Sweden and reflected on his UK career: “It's not so much a stigma of 
failure. It's that there is no value attached to … experience.” He identifies a British lack of 
respect for valuable experience unlike other European countries, and suggests failure is simply 
another outcome with which to under-appreciate people. 
Academic and analytical viewpoints. Cambridge entrepreneurs (mostly Cambridge science 
graduates), tended to discuss their experiences and opportunities analytically. For example, B6 
felt attracted to startups being more meritocratic than academic departments: failure can be seen 
as a natural outcome of meritocratic (or capitalist) systems. 
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B1 and B4 worked in strategy consulting firms and this sharpened their quantified approach to 
evaluating businesses, while B5 (and B6) were more drawn to a curious, impartial view: “Part of 
me thinks, ‘It would be really good to get a full academic understanding of why that happens.’” 
(B5). Both B5 and B6 have published papers in prestigious scientific journals but B5 recognizes 
that popular adoption of technology is a goal in itself: “As an engineer, you want to get your 
work applied rather than applauded” (B5). 
Pragmatism and Realism. Prior practical experience was not always positive. “Most start-ups 
consume an enormous amount of time and yield very little.” (B4). B1 took a low-paid logistics 
job to learn the business for his startup; B5 and B6 saw friends and colleagues as potential 
customers. B3 was pragmatic to the point of diffidence: “We had a reasonably high burn rate and 
there was no prospect of raising more money.” (B3). 
The personal cost of failure confronted all the UK entrepreneurs, with dramatic experience of 
failed marriages, alcohol abuse, and laying-off of dependent colleagues (B2). B5 suggests 
personal cost is the obverse of wider aspirations – laying-off of staff is the opposite of building 
value and jobs for a large team. 
Control and Conflict. B4 insists that control is essential when managing a startup. He now 
avoids external funding whenever possible. B2 describes the feeling of being in control even 
during receivership even describing sales of assets at auction as a game, as fun. He learned many 
operational lessons through the winding-down stage when disparate aspects of a business are 
brought together. 
Conflict in the declining stage of a company may be inevitable. B1 describes problems with one 
executive, taking significant time and causing more stress than any other issue. He had to 
confront investors to persuade them it was better to take a small return than nothing at all. B3 
sees an in-built conflict between commercial and technical mindsets: “If one person speaks, the 
other person doesn't hear what was said in the way that the person speaking intended. I often find 
that stressful when negotiating between those things.” (B3). 
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Language	  and	  Narrative	  
 
Language and Narrative. As the transcripts were analyzed according to IPA guidance, the use 
of (English) language and styles of narrative (story telling) in interviews were strikingly 
different. Some interviewees were excellent communicators and storytellers: B1, B3 and B5 used 
techniques to engage the researcher in the story, including variation in sentence length to create 
tension and drama (short sentences to build tension and emphasise a point or event); use of 
questions to confirm understanding in the recollection; and control over the flow of their stories 
(Harmeling 2011). These skills are augmented by use of hyperbole and emotive language. B1 
uses positive and flamboyant terms to describe situations: “hyper-exciting” opportunities and 
“flying the flag.” He is grateful for being “fortunate” for such “lovely” opportunities. 
Good story telling implies engagement with the listener: all except B4 could clearly explain 
complex technology and made efforts to simplify and check understanding during the interview. 
B1 and B3 were also very clear on business situations, on who did what and when. Business 
interactions during a corporate decline can be complex, involving multiple characters. 
B4 differed by being less explicit: his use of language was precise and sparse – less effusive, 
more guarded and restrained. Perhaps for him, detailed explanation is superfluous. B4 changed 
during the interview, starting expansively and becoming less verbose: perhaps he had 
unexplained time pressure. 
B3 lived in Sweden until the age of eight. He uses precise language and is more timid than 
others: things are “a bit”, “very small”, and work “quite nicely”. He produces unusual phrases, 
pleasing and noticeable during the interview: an invention is “a wonderful bit of cleverness.” 
There was little cursing or swearing during the interviews and used sparingly for dramatic effect. 
Apart from B6, most entrepreneurs demonstrate a sense of humour, often self-deprecating (Fox 
2005). B5 uses the word “Muppets” to describe himself and his team in a playful, mocking way. 
He changes from the present to the conditional tense when describing his current startup and 
switches from first to third person, possibly indicating a distant relationship with his startup. 
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The most revealing use of language involves B6. Although passionate and engaged when talking 
about technology, he is cynical, mocking and cruel, especially when describing institutional 
haplessness. He refers to “burning bridges” and “never” when talking about former colleagues. 
This negativity, almost petulance, comes through clearly, demonstrating that his personal attitude 
and response to failure has not yet been resolved. He also uses irony and sarcasm when 
describing the business partners who betrayed him. However, he seems unaware of the irony in 
some of his statements, criticizing funding bodies while taking grants from them. 
Self-deprecating language. Most of the UK interviewees made self-deprecating comments, 
perhaps confirming a stereotype of the UK sense of humour. Fox describes self-deprecating 
speech as combating what the British dislike in social behaviour: “the most important rule is the 
proscription of earnestness. Pomposity and self-importance are outlawed.” (Fox 2005). B1 
understates his achievements and credits the contribution of the ‘smarter guys’ in his team, 
seeing himself as ‘fortunate’ to have the trust of others: this seems self-effacing, since trust must 
undeniably be gained through his actions. B2 is also happy to expose and embrace his 
difficulties: “Well yeah, you've come to the right person. I've had a reasonable failure.” (B2). B3 
is also self-mocking, describing himself as a CEO ‘dogsbody’ doing the ‘donkey work’. 
However, he is also very understated, preferring to relay the minimal amount of facts required: 
“We couldn't get any funding, no. It was just sad.” (B3). 
Such self-deprecating behaviour is covered in academic literature: self-effacing modest 
behaviour is regarded as mildly pleasing, which “presents the self in a likable way” (Zell and 
Exline 2010). However, Zell also describes how cultural filters can make self-deprecating speech 
work well in some cultures but not in others, and it “may risk negative reactions if observers 
perceive it as insincere, manipulative, or negative.” (Zell and Exline 2010: 72). 
Cynicism. B6 demonstrates resentment, anger and a feeling of betrayal in his language: his 
former university colleagues are “princes” in their own “kingdom”, implying a privileged culture 
closed to outsiders. He denigrates funding bodies, IP lawyers and support agencies, and regards 
German organizations such as the Fraunhofer Institute as superior to anything in the UK. This 
establishes some distance between himself and his situation – nothing is right, everybody else is 
wrong. Perhaps this represents a transitional phase, the early painful stages of loss and denial 
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arising from entrepreneurial failure as documented in grief recovery models (Shepherd 2003; 
Jenkins and Brundin 2009; Shepherd, Wiklund et al. 2009). 
Distractions. It is worth commenting on distraction techniques used by B2 and B6: they change 
the subject away from painful topics. When the interview starts to examine painful personal and 
business-related events, B2 talks about other failed companies to distract from the flow of 
conversation. B6 changed the subject twice to distract from his failed ventures: once to discuss 
individuals who caused problems for his company, another time to discuss changes to the UK tax 
system. Although both valid discussion topics, they were clear distractions from the interview 
flow, indicating he was keen to avoid painful or sensitive areas. 
 
Environmental	  Factors	  
 
Stigma. Interestingly, B6 is probably the most adversely affected by stigma, but does not 
mention it explicitly. He has failed twice in the same specialized area of physical science, a small 
field in which academics and vendors know each other. This represents an insular community in 
which ‘social’ stigma may be most visible and hardest to conceal, but B6 does not mention it. At 
the end of the interview he suggests ‘failure’ is a social construct lying under the surface of 
everyday activity. He seems to be referring to stigma but does not use the word. Apart from B6 
all interviewees subsequently overcame failed ventures to succeed in later ventures or 
employment: if stigma exists, it has not restricted their career progress. Perhaps the self-efficacy 
required to be an entrepreneur might involve sufficient self-confidence and self-belief that stigma 
can be observed and overcome by these entrepreneurs. The stigma of failure for B2 and B3 exists 
only as a social phenomenon – they can articulate it, but it does not impact them. 
B1 suggests he experienced ‘reverse stigma’, where his proposal for company closure attracted 
positive rather than negative attention. He describes interviewing for a subsequent CEO role: "I 
gather you have just shot a business. We'd love to have you." (B1). B2 describes how timing and 
social perception mitigate social attitudes: his company went into administration during 
recession, and failure was so widespread one could hide among the herd. This suggests stigma 
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involves isolation of exceptional and vulnerable cases, supporting Wiesenfeld’s concept of 
‘singling out’ so that social, economic and legal arbiters can work to establish stigma 
(Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann et al. 2008).  
In summary, the interviews do not confirm general UK attitudes to stigma from business failure, 
exemplified by the following comment by Alan Sugar, a leading British entrepreneur: “ The 
English culture is that if you go into the market with a big fanfare and then it fails, there’s a 
stigma attached. There’s a loss of confidence in that individual among investors.” (Cowan 2011). 
There may be a corollary with literature on confidence, where 81% of entrepreneurs believed 
they had a 70% chance of success, with the remainder anticipating a 100% chance of success 
(Cooper, Woo et al. 1988). Perhaps entrepreneurs have full knowledge of the stigma of failure, 
but do not believe it really applies to them as individuals. 
Trust. For B2 and B6, the betrayal of trust had a dramatic impact on their lives. Breakdown in 
trust led B2 to a long-running feud with a board member, but they are now good friends: perhaps 
B6 will experience similar rapprochement in due course. 
B1 and B5 developed long-standing trusted relationships with customers and investors, 
becoming useful when new ventures emerged (Welter and Kautonen 2005; Caliendo, Fossen et 
al. 2010). Trust appears to be commercially valuable: after multiple ventures one develops 
awareness that trust is important for long-term return. This applies to B3, despite several failed 
ventures: investors, who routinely seek his opinion on potential investments, trust him. B3 calls 
this group of collaborators his ‘social network’ even though elsewhere he describes himself as 
“the world’s worst networker.” B5 identifies a different aspect of trust: after working with his 
business partner for two decades he regards partnerships as key to leveraging the skills and trust 
of others. This spreads the ‘upside’, in the sense that income and value appreciation may be 
divided, but also shares the effort and the ‘downside’ risk of failure. 
Cambridge University. A single institution - Cambridge University, dominates the Cambridge 
region. This is unlike Munich (with LMU, TMU and the Strascheg Centre) and Silicon Valley, 
containing Stanford University, UC Berkeley, and UC San Francisco among others. Interviews 
reveal Cambridge University as a recurring, multi-aspect theme regarding failure. There is much 
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literature on regional ‘clusters’ (Glaeser, Kerr et al. 2009; Wennberg and Lindqvist 2010), and 
the Cambridge cluster in particular (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005; Herriot and Minshall 2006). 
B4 credits the region with having good infrastructure and support when ventures fail: 
“Cambridge is a very entrepreneurial place and start-up guys will frequently fall off their horse.” 
(B4). He suggests venture capital firms in Cambridge have returned to London, creating a 
dependency on smaller angel investors. B3 adds that investment banks never moved to 
Cambridge like they did in Palo Alto. Around Cambridge University, an ecosystem was created 
early but its momentum has not been maintained (B3). 
B3 identified a phenomenon peculiar to the city: “I think there's also a lot of quasi-success in 
Cambridge, people who are a bit successful. They kind of acquire a social network and 
reputation which maybe extends beyond that success.” (B3). Unlike in London, entrepreneurs 
with moderate financial success might live well in Cambridge where property and lifestyle are 
relatively cheap. This may make Cambridge an easier place in which to appear successful, but 
may be counter-productive if people are less driven to succeed. 
B1 comments on structural problems: the city is too small and insular. There are few suppliers 
and customers so a self-sustaining ecosystem remains under-developed. Close university-based 
relationships can become stifling, and local interdependence is limiting: if deals go wrong there 
may be few other people to go to next. B3 describes the university’s colleges as “ivory 
dungeons” (B3) limiting expansion opportunities for startups. B5 adds an element of envy: “We 
have many, many examples of multi-millionaire academics … but deep down there's also a lot of 
resentment, which actually is the green-eyed monster.” (B5). If B5 is correct, a city with so many 
academics can perhaps lead to envy of those who have left academia and succeeded, and a sense 
of Schadenfreude towards those who have left the university and failed. 
Cambridge University generates extreme opinions from B6, based on his recent unsuccessful 
relationship with scientists. He finds it difficult to separate his personal problems from general 
comments about Cambridge University. For example, he describes weaknesses compared to how 
German universities deal with scientific startups; he sees problems in the collegiate system 
creating a closed community, which does not have to engage with the commercial world; and he 
outlines a reluctance in Cambridge academics to break away from the university and innovate.  
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Personality	  Characteristics	  
 
Personality. With the exception of introspective B3, the UK interviewees present themselves as 
extrovert and happy to inform others about their technology and business ideas. They are also all 
reflective about their failure experiences. B2 is active in charitable and social causes in the 
Cambridge region: he is also highly self-aware after psychology training, alcohol counseling and 
experience with a life coach. He is now comfortable sharing his experiences and keen to help 
others. 
B3 describes himself as a poor networker and prone to “massive self-doubt and a feeling of 
failure and inadequacy and so on at times, tempered with belief and knowledge about my own 
abilities.” (B3). He sees himself as a mixture of many attributes, most comfortable when tackling 
difficult engineering challenges. This introspection may also make him less susceptible to failure 
stigma – perhaps he is unable to suffer from what he does not recognize. 
B6 is an experienced researcher, motivated by a desire to be independently successful. Unwilling 
to remain in a leading research laboratory, he left the university to prove he can succeed in 
industry, although this has not (yet) happened. He seems to desire acceptance by the community 
of physicists he left behind. In his interview, he describes confrontations with customers and 
funding bodies. He appears isolated in his business position, with no trusted advisors or 
colleagues. This lack of self-control manifesting in confrontation, combined with high 
expectations of how customers should behave can make B6 appear arrogant. This highlights how 
the failure of companies places stress on the entrepreneur and might reveal hitherto unexplored 
personality aspects. 
B1 displays strong personal values regarding family and work-life balance. Although he works 
hard, he took six months’ unpaid vacation when his child was born (“lovely time off”). He has 
strong self-confidence he can find work when he needs to. Like B1, B4 is confident: he secured 
multiple offers for his first job and never looked back. He reflects on his separation of 
intellectual stimulation from lifestyle satisfaction. He knows that what keeps him happy is not 
the same as what makes him economically productive. This degree of self-knowledge may 
represent a strong source of his self-confidence. 
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The review of personality attributes (or traits) brings to mind various ‘five factor’ models that 
have evolved in psychology and other domains. Digman provides a history of this framework 
from the 1932 list of McDougall – ‘intellect, character, temperament, disposition, and temper’ – 
to more recent lists of personality factors (Revised NEO Personality Index, or NEO-PI-R) from 
Costa and McCrae: Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness (O), Agreeableness (A), and 
Conscientiousness (C). (McDougall 1932; Digman 1990; Costa Jr. and McCrae 1992). 
Self-efficacy and confidence. Confidence and self-efficacy appear to go hand in hand, and all 
entrepreneurs interviewed demonstrated strong self-efficacy, although B3 and B6 had their 
confidence dented recently. They express no doubt about succeeding in the future and believe 
lessons from their failed ventures make future success more likely. This view is not entirely 
supported by relevant literature: 30% of previously successful entrepreneurs succeed in 
subsequent ventures, while the probability is 18% for first-time and 20% for previously failed 
entrepreneurs (Holland 2008; Holland and Shepherd 2011). 
B1 and B4 received multiple job offers as new graduates; they feel they will have no problem 
obtaining funding for their next venture, and B2 believes he is able to fix problems and get things 
done. B4 suggests self-efficacy has parallels with self-criticism and he can be his harshest critic. 
B6 possesses a strong sense of self-belief, but appears isolated by his circumstances and has 
nobody to turn to for peer-level advice. 
Excess of confidence, or an overwhelming sense of self-efficacy may lead to hubris. B4 reveals: 
“I think you get an amazing surge of self-belief and optimism when you have a successful exit 
that can lead you to folly in the next venture.” (B4). He goes further, adding: “Eventually it all 
ends in tragedy, doesn't it, because [entrepreneurs] … strive once too often and one-step too far.” 
(B4). 
Tenacity. Two interviewees held onto failed companies for too long: B2 for 27 years and B5 for 
16 years. Such positive tenacity can also be regarded as negative: it is evidence of persistence in 
the face of adversity, but alternatively it might represent bad, deluded strategy or a fear of 
admitting defeat. For B2, recapturing his company took several years of stressful debt 
repayments: he experienced several betrayals but retained his belief in a company making good, 
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high-margin products with responsibilities to staff and customers he won back. Consequently, he 
“retrenched to home … and just trucked on.” (B2). This concept of a ‘phoenix’, or re-started 
company recurs throughout the research, particularly for UK and German companies (Metzger 
2006). 
B5 persisted through multiple years of poor sales, justifying his venture because closure was 
more costly than keeping the business going. This reflects his portfolio approach to academia 
and business: if his company represents a positive opportunity (‘upside’) with no strings 
(‘downside’) attached, why eliminate it? 
Counterfactual thinking. The issue of counterfactual thinking, or ‘what if’ analysis, is 
presented in two ways. It appears either as an intellectual consideration (such as B1’s 
retrospective analysis as to whether his company would have been better aligned as a corporate 
project than a startup), or as an emotional expression in the form of regrets (such as B2’s 
personal distress for his family and alcohol abuse or B6’s regrets about working with unreliable 
friends). Clear-cut failure is not the only source of regret. For example, B1 regrets selling his 
first company profitably during the dot-com bubble because he feels its potential remained 
unfulfilled. Similarly B4 regrets losing control of his first failure, after building its success. 
A trend emerges from the interviews connecting counterfactual thinking and control. From B4’s 
perspective, the cost of accepting VC investment was his inability to guide the board through 
avoidable strategic challenges. He remains frustrated by his inability to save the company. B1 is 
disappointed by his successful exit and realizes through counterfactual thinking that the cause of 
his frustration involves his loss of control. Even though he was well compensated, he remains 
disappointed by the delta between what actually happened and what might have happened. 
Positive outlook. B1 and B5 were positive in describing their experiences, so setbacks do not 
appear to have affected them adversely: they seem to regard these as opportunities to strengthen 
their skills and learn lessons. This reflects research by Baron on Dispositional Positive Affect 
(Baron, Hmieleski et al. 2012). B1 regards himself as fortunate and explicitly thanks the work of 
collaborators. Like B5, he embraces new opportunities, exudes enthusiasm and takes risks. B2 
looks for the positive side in a troubled business career and finds joy in the darkest of times, 
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explaining the fun and excitement of bidding up his company’s assets in receivership. B3 is more 
withdrawn, preferring the comfort of technology, displaying a serious outlook on his 
experiences. B4 is guarded and reticent, careful not to reveal too much about his personal life.  
Negativity and Critical outlook. Although positive dispositions were evident in UK interviews, 
there was also a strong display of negativity and bitterness, especially from B6. He appears 
unhappy with the outcome of his failed ventures and uncomfortable with his current position. As 
stated earlier, this has much to do with his view of his university counterparts: “they were quite 
happy in their own little academic world, spending taxpayers’ money, but never had what it takes 
to … make something commercial.” (B6). He is mocking and bitter about his former colleagues 
and critical of UK funding, UK tax systems and the support infrastructure for startups in the UK. 
His career history might indicate a desire to leave academia and prove he could succeed outside 
the university: having failed twice, this causes enduring problems, and his bitterness remains. 
Perhaps he needs time to consider his experience and reconcile himself to his situation 
(Shepherd, Douglas et al. 2000; Shepherd, Patzelt et al. 2011) before he feels more positive 
about his future. 
 
Entrepreneurial	  Response	  
 
Learning. UK interviewees indicate they learned lessons from their failed ventures: “I learned 
about understanding the true risk of a start-up.” (B1). B6 is clear: “You learn much more from 
defeat than you do from victory.” (B6). However, as well as gaining specific business skills, 
more subtle kinds of learning were noted - about future approaches and strategies. 
Business skills include how to run and manage a board of directors (B1, B4); the value of acting 
decisively with problem employees and executives (B1); business disciplines such as accounting, 
legal structures and operations (B2, B3); how to handle external investors (B4), and the need to 
validate markets and customer propositions (B5, B6). More nuanced is learning how to learn, 
and how this develops over time (Cannon and Edmonson 2004; Cope and Cave 2008; Holcomb, 
Ireland et al. 2009). B3 provided an elegant metaphor from his work on simulated annealing 
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algorithms - incrementally solving and reconciling problems like annealing metals into further 
degrees of hardness and ductility. For him, learning requires time and experience over a series of 
formative experiences (good and bad, like heating and cooling), which cannot be taught in a 
classroom. 
B1 also learned about asking questions to evaluate future opportunities. B3 explained this as 
follows: “I think when you have done one venture, you are very experienced …because it grows 
through so many stages and then it collapses through so many stages.” (B3). The importance of 
seeing business issues twice (or more) may be critical. Perhaps entrepreneurs whose companies 
succeed first time simply learn how to repeat the same pattern, whereas founders of failed 
companies examine many what-if scenarios in their post-mortems. B6 explains why learning 
from failure is so powerful: “you don't know what could go wrong. Chances are that you'll 
discover sometime. If you've already learned what could go wrong, you probably will not make 
that mistake ever again” (B6). 
Opportunity Identification. How opportunities are identified and assessed may depend partly 
on the personality of the entrepreneur (Ardichvili, Cardozo et al. 2003; Hayton and Cholakova 
2010). Some are analytical and approach new opportunities as experiments that can be validated 
or disproven by asking probing questions (B1, B3, B4, B5). Others may be more intuitive, such 
as B2. 
Self-confidence also plays a role. B1 has sought and found work in new places by networking as 
a self-starter: traveling to Australia with no business contacts and having to start afresh. B2 and 
B3 immediately restarted failed ventures with a more complete understanding of the business. B3 
is philosophical about how he discovers opportunities: “I suppose on one level everything finds 
you” (B3). 
B4 adopts the most analytical and intellectual approach. His method resembles that of A4, 
incubating new opportunities through a consulting company allowing him to prototype 
technologies and business models before making investments. B5 is different, with business 
scalability being most important. He believes an opportunity could be worth an academic paper, 
a research project or a new venture: each representing a different level of risk, effort and 
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resources. He can only start two companies in a decade, but is able to develop multiple academic 
papers in collaboration with others. 
Risk and Uncertainty. After their failed ventures, B2 and B4 developed ‘portfolio entrepreneur’ 
strategies. “I am entrepreneurial. But I am not a very high-risk entrepreneur in anything I do.” 
(B2). By creating a number of companies and charitable projects, he retains some upside in 
corporate ventures and a positive work-life balance. B4 on the other hand, uses his consulting 
company to generate revenues while creating a platform for new opportunities. In 1998-2000, his 
consulting company spun out four funded ventures including several successful firms. 
Risk is not easily assessed and individuals may evaluate uncertainty in different ways. B2 
accumulated significant debt on credit cards to fund projects but perceived the risk as far lower 
than facing rejection from a bank manager. Fortunately, he repaid the debt and was never ‘caught 
out’ holding high-interest obligations when payments fell due. Similarly, B5 invested around 
three times the value of his house in his first venture, but over many years it went largely 
unnoticed. He suggests the level of visibility is important to the individual’s perception of risk: 
announcing a venture to the world creates a credibility risk for the entrepreneur as much as a 
financial risk. This personal exposure is paramount to B5. 
Stress and Personal Cost. The personal cost of failed ventures seems to depend on 
circumstances. Some may have invested personal funds (B5, B6) or provided bank guarantees 
(B2); others risk other people’s money (B1, B3, B4). Also, speed of failure can impact the 
preparedness for survival. B2 describes how accounting errors were identified in his successful 
manufacturing venture. The realization was so sudden that the stress was compressed in time. 
There was no period of decline, which may provide a time of anxiety as uncertainty over survival 
increases by degrees (Pretorius 2008). Once the accounting error was discovered, B2 had little 
time to worry. B6 suffered from a long period of decline, dealing with prospects who may, but 
ultimately do not, sign. This anxiety was perhaps heightened by the closeness of a limited 
number of customers: while cash was declining, several large deals could have rescued the 
company, and B6 was critical in getting the customers to sign. They never did. This power 
relationship, in which his prospects (former colleagues) decided the fate of his company, is 
possibly the source of much of B6’s bitterness. 
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B3 points out that stress happens during the decline, not just the failure. Firstly, there is a 
stressful period when the company can be saved by the focus of management resources. Over 
time, under relentless scrutiny by directors, employees and investors, the probability of survival 
decreases. Selective stories may be told to persuade investors that customers will sign, and 
reassure employees of further funding: the founder may sustain multiple conversations involving 
different facts, which for some is a source of tension in itself. Secondly, there is the post-failure 
stage where a founder can reflect on what happened, deal with the consequences and focus on 
new opportunities. B3 points out that saving the company (which when successful is called 
‘recovery’) is always stressful, but ‘having failed’ may not be stressful at all. His outlook is low-
key and rational: apart from having to find a job, his failure appears inconsequential - by then his 
tension, stress and conflict are over. 
This is not always the case. B3 and B4 emphasize the value of physical fitness in dealing with a 
failing venture. They regard this as one of the few things they can control to make a difference: 
remaining healthy and removing a point of weakness in their fight for survival. B2 took on 
personal guarantees from the bank and turned to alcohol: he regrets this aspect of his past but is 
proud to have dealt with it, having repaid his debts and returned to sobriety. 
B1 and B6 view people as the highest cause of stress in a failing venture: dealing with problem 
employees; arguing with investors and board members over strategy; persuading customers to 
sign deals with a company that may soon be out of business; obtaining credit from suppliers for 
materials when there is insufficient cash; balancing the distribution of sensitive information, and 
handling lay-offs. These represent the hardest aspects of being an entrepreneur in a failing 
company. 
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CHAPTER 5C: ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN INTERVIEWS 
 
This chapter presents findings from the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) of six 
Silicon Valley interviews, including (1) a profile of each case outlining some background, 
context and reasons for failure and a personal profile and commentary on each individual 
subject; (2) a thematic analysis arising from the application of IPA analysis to the transcripts of 
each interview, including a cross-case analysis of the American interviewees. 
In this analysis, as outlined in Figure 17, each interview transcript was analyzed in line with the 
process described in Chapter 4 and illustrated in Figure 10, leading to a written profile of each 
interviewee (background, context and personal profile, as documented in Table 13) followed by 
a thematic analysis which has then been further extended to ‘enfold’ relevant literature with 
references to key themes. 
Among the detailed analysis contained here, the goal remains to address a simple issue: what 
happened when these entrepreneurs failed, what did they learn and what did they do next? 
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Figure 17. Process Schematic Outlining the IPA Analysis and Outputs for American Interviews. Each Interview is Analyzed 
using IPA Methodology before Performing a Cross-Case Thematic Analysis (within each Country, in this case the USA) 
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Summaries	  of	  American	  Interviews	  
	  
PROFILE of A1. Chinese-American male, mid-40s. 
A1: Background. A1 is a Stanford-educated industrial engineer running his second company in Palo 
Alto, California. After technical roles at Sun Microsystems and Oracle Corporation, he worked in 
executive roles at SAP, which offered him a perspective on German attitudes to business and 
entrepreneurship. His first venture was a US software services company for assisted living, which 
attracted venture capital, but failed four years later. 
A1: Context. A1 started his healthcare software company after extensive diligence. He obtained 
financing from investors who knew him at SAP Ventures. With a technical co-founder he developed a 
platform in partnership with early customers. After four years, A1 could not secure further investment. 
He reflects on this experience, offering several reasons for failure: his inability to ‘change customer 
behaviour’ was crucial, as was low-price competition. He suggests the main driver of failure was poor 
sales performance: his market research showed strong potential but this failed to materialize. Investors 
lost their money and employees lost jobs after taking pay cuts to rescue the business. A1 handled the 
post-failure proceedings himself, learning how to wind up a company. 
A1: Personal profile. A1 has a strong sense of confidence and self-efficacy. His prior financial success 
means he was less exposed to loss, but he has learned much from the experience. He believes his 
reputation remains intact – the failure has “not had a negative impact on me in the Valley.” (A1). 
A1 demonstrates self-efficacy: he is confident and aware of his personal social and economic impact. He 
knows his tolerance for risk, which differs from that of his wife and parents. A1 also considers the wider 
impact of early-stage failure: “how do we preserve entrepreneurs … so that they become reinforcing?” 
(A1). 
PROFILE of A2. White American male, mid-40s. 
A2: Background. A2 began programming at High School and later studied Art with Computer Science. 
He founded several software and consulting companies, securing multiple patents. His first founded a 
video compression company that received interest from investors who then tried to apply retrospective 
terms after their deal was done. In response, he returned their money and placed the IP in escrow. After a 
subsequent consulting venture, he founded his third venture and attracted $8 million in venture funding. 
After several pivots in strategy, he built this into a successful social media business but it collapsed in 
acrimonious circumstances, leaving A2 facing personal bankruptcy. 
A2: Context. A2 founded four companies, two of which have failed. His largest venture collapsed with 
insufficient funds and was sold for a nominal value. Before the 2008 financial crisis, A2 secured a cash 
acquisition offer, but his main investor tried to ‘shop the deal’ against the explicit instructions of the 
would-be acquirer. The deal failed and A2 had to rely on emergency business funding to survive. He 
went from a deal-in-hand to personal debts of over $300k in a few weeks. He recovered from this 
situation by developing a piece of code on his own, selling it to a Swedish company and generating 
enough cash to pay off his debts. 
A2: Personal profile. A2 remains bitter towards his main investor. He left Silicon Valley after his 
company failed, and now lives closer to his hometown on the East Coast – “I think in California in 
general I had done everything I wanted to do. I was kind of bored with it frankly.” (A2). During difficult 
times, he has appreciated the value of lawyers and advisors, either positive or negative. He feels the legal 
representatives of his advisors have bullied him but he has also used legal counsel to fight his own 
corner. He is tenacious and does not shy away from a fight. 
  
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 128 of 216 
PROFILE of A3. Indian-born female, mid-40s. 
A3: Background. A3 was born in India and moved to Stanford University for postgraduate studies. After 
working in product management she earned a Berkeley MBA and founded a number of companies in 
security and search software. The second of these companies failed after several years due to funding 
problems and a strategic disagreement with investors. Throughout this experience, she enjoyed the 
mentorship of two professors, one of who died young. The conjunction of a failed venture and the death 
of a mentor caused her to reflect on her own life and goals: she started a mentor network in the name of 
her late professor, and this has grown significantly. She has subsequently started another company that 
ended in failure and acrimony with fellow co-founders. 
A3: Context. A3 identifies differences of opinion between her management team and investors: this split 
the company and prevented additional funding being raised. One camp wanted to pursue a patent 
infringement strategy while she (and others) wanted to build an organic search engine. The cause of 
collapse was the lack of external funding, exacerbated by internal dissent. 
A3: Personal profile. A3 is reflective about her experiences. After the company failed, she travelled 
extensively alone in India. She is empathetic and keen to understand others. On her return, she co-
founded a social network of entrepreneurs in the name of her former mentor. She finds satisfaction in the 
collaboration she has encouraged. 
PROFILE of A4. Iranian-born male, mid-40s. 
A4: Background. A4 was born in Iran and moved to the USA as a teenager on a soccer scholarship. He 
remains a keen sportsman, using physical exercise to combat the stress he experiences in his start-ups. He 
runs an engineering consultancy, from which he developed several start-ups, some of which have failed. 
Early in his career he took the traditional approach to building a start-up: he now uses his consulting firm 
to identify opportunities and when one seems substantial, he forms a customer project with a view to 
spinning IP out of the incubator. 
A4: Context. A4’s most significant failed venture was a Voice Over IP technology which worked on 
existing telephone lines. It was technologically advanced in its time, but unable to secure the large 
telecommunication companies as channels. As with a later venture in automotive infotainment, lack of 
customer traction was the main reason for failure. When these ventures failed, the IP was simply folded 
back into his consulting company and he continued with limited consequences. 
A4: Personal profile. A4 is logical in the way he approaches opportunities: he stays within his area of 
expertise (telecommunications hardware and networking), identifies a clear target market and invests a 
long period in planning before embarking on technology development. Despite this careful approach, at 
least two of his ventures have failed, due to being too early in a nascent sector. 
PROFILE of A5. White American male, mid-40s. 
A5: Background. A5 is a software executive in Menlo Park, California, co-founder or executive in more 
than five start-up companies in software and telecommunications He suggests there may be more start-
ups in Silicon Valley because more people with financial security are willing to risk time and money in 
new ventures, but success in Silicon Valley has become harder to achieve – equity distribution is less 
widespread, and concentrated in fewer founders. He comments on how salaries have changed too – start-
up companies now offer higher compensation and there is less ‘sweat equity’ in growth companies than 
in previous generations. 
A5: Context. A5 recognizes various reasons for his failed ventures: management team disagreements 
over strategy (especially funding and exit strategy); lack of funding and inability to raise more; and 
market failure (lack of customers). These firms have ended acrimoniously but A5 has been able to depart 
with no personal financial loss or debt except for the opportunity cost of potential earnings at a larger 
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company. 
A5: Personal profile. A5 has been deeply involved in multiple start-ups and is more cynical than he was 
twenty years ago. A series of failed ventures diminished his appetite for risk as he established a family. 
He describes Silicon Valley culture undergoing dramatic changes – the enthusiasm and collective sense 
of opportunity has evolved into an elitist culture where some people have ‘made it’ and others have not. 
PROFILE of A6. Iranian-born male, early-50s. 
A6: Background. A6 was born in Iran (like A4) and came to the USA as a teenager, also on a soccer 
scholarship. He excelled at University earning a doctorate before enjoying a successful senior executive 
role at a leading telecommunications firm. He started his own company, based on many small companies 
he had seen (and bought) in his corporate career, and was surprised by how difficult this was. His first 
venture failed but has subsequently been successful. 
A6: Context. A6 started an online video company around the same time as YouTube, but his company 
was unsuccessful, eventually being sold in an Action By Creditors for minimal value. Even though he 
brought with him a CEO-level business network, he was unable to control the funding, strategy, 
technology and talent required. He raised initial funds on the strength of his background, but later 
struggled to secure additional investment. When the company downsized, he brought in several CEO and 
COO-level staff. Venture Capital firms declined to provide bridge funding and the company closed. 
A6: Personal profile. A6 is a successful large-company executive who struggled in his own start-up. He 
is now more comfortable collaborating with other entrepreneurs. He was unprepared for the intensity and 
demands of the entrepreneurial role and tried to delegate this too often; he was surprised by the lack of 
resources; he was disappointed with the unsupportive attitudes of venture capitalists; and he apportioned 
blame for various failings to others rather than taking responsibility himself. 
Table 13. Summaries of Six American Interview Subjects, covering Background; Business Context and Reasons for Failure, as 
well as Personal Profile and Commentary (by Author) 
 
Thematic	  Analysis	  Arising	  from	  IPA	  –	  Silicon	  Valley	  	  
 
In the overall American analysis, a total of 92 thematic codes (themes) were identified with a 
total of 873 references to these themes across the six interviews. A summary of the most 
frequently occurring themes is provided in Figure 18, along with an approximate mapping of 
themes into four further categories. The mapping in Figure 18 is intended to highlight main 
themes arising from the American analysis, the relative frequency of occurrence of each theme 
(themes in bold occur more often) and whether these themes are personal or social, and 
retrospective or forward-looking in nature. The allocation of themes into four quadrants is not 
based on prior literature review but this framework for presentation was included in the final 
section of the research design. Ultimately, however, Figure 18 reflects the author’s subjective 
view of how various themes might be visually grouped together. 
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Figure 18. Mapping of Most Frequently Occurring Themes Emerging from IPA Analysis of American Interviews 
 
A narrative account follows of these themes, combined with extracts of text from the interviews 
and relevant references to ‘enfolding’ literature to add context to the interview findings from 
prior research. 
 
Business	  Context	  
 
Business Reasons: Reasons for failure and business context. American entrepreneurs 
described a wide variety of reflections on how and why their ventures failed. A1 planned his 
venture carefully and tried to do everything ‘by the book,’ yet it still failed. Reasons for this 
included sales execution, the impact of competition and the difficulty of changing customer 
behaviour. A2 recalls taking on personal debt while simultaneously being prevented from 
working because a formal board release was withheld. He blames his main investor for mistaken 
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strategy and incompetence in deal making. A3’s company went dormant, employees were laid 
off and the future of its IP remains disputed. She appears passive when describing her experience 
– bad things have happened but she remains detached. A4 tried and failed to raise money for one 
of his ventures after building prototype technology. He says, “There was obviously something 
positive out of that.  But it took two and a half years of my time and I put a lot of money into it.” 
(A4). 
A5 describes how several of his ventures failed, one due to the “greed and over-reach of the 
founder” (A5). Another failed slowly when a long-successful product became obsolete without a 
replacement strategy. His third company was dis-intermediated in the market when customers 
started buying direct from a (larger) partner, and another was wiped out by the 2008 financial 
crash. A6 is reluctant to accept personal responsibility for his failed companies: “Failure has 
never been an option for me.” (A6).  
A2 started his company without a detailed plan, just seed money and enthusiasm. A3 describes a 
disconnection between aggressive sales rollout and product readiness: the timing of sales ramp-
up is a lesson she learned at her security company. A4 had a different problem: he had a well-
targeted list of prospects but they did not sign deals, a factor that has terminated several of his 
companies. A5 sees causes of failure in management disagreement and neglect of core strategies. 
Often, he suggests, his companies had a solution looking for a problem.  
Definitions of failure (and success). A1, A2, A3 and A5 all started companies that closed in 
administration. None of these entrepreneurs experienced personal bankruptcy, although A2 came 
close through personal bank guarantees. A4 and A6, both born in Iran, have more creative 
definitions of failure. A6’s company ran out of money and creditors sued for closure in an ABC 
– ‘Action By Creditors’ - that involved a forced sale of the IP but he reclassifies this experience 
as an exit. If a failed CEO wishes to re-interpret his failure, it may be hard to question his 
opinion, and events within private companies are rarely transparent. However, later in the 
interview he admits: “It was a failure of not being able to return the money to the investors, 
which made me unhappy, and I'm kind of a very emotional person.” (A6). He reveals the truth 
only to declare the emotional aspect of his character rather than stating what happened in the 
business. 
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A1 was surprised by the logistics of failure – how long it takes to wind up a company and deal 
with legal and creditor issues – and A3 suggests there is a difference between the end of the 
venture and the process of self-recovery. She spent four months traveling and considering what 
to do next. She felt she recovered quickly: “I didn't really need recovery time.” (A3). 
Observations about other countries. A1 received investment from German Venture Capital 
(VC) investors, leveraging his strong SAP connections.  His subsequent failure was a 
disappointment to them: although they were not hostile he detects a “a strong residual of the 
German culture.” (A1). He also reflects on his Chinese heritage: in Hong Kong, entrepreneurs 
are unforgiving and “eat their young,” encouraging a resilience in which the strong survive and 
you “just pick yourself up.” (A1). A4 and A6 comment on the unique qualities of Silicon Valley. 
They see California as their home, where entrepreneurial culture is pervasive in a way totally 
absent in Iran. Born in India, A3 talks about an Indian VC friend and his religious views: “when 
things go wrong, … people who are religious in India could easily feel that, ‘Well, if that's what 
God wanted, what can we do?’” (A3). 
A2 is now working with a Swedish firm. He describes them as less innovative and more 
conservative than US companies (Berglund 2011), in line with what he regards as a Northern 
European stereotype. However, he says that Swedes and Germans are better at taking a long-term 
view of investments. 
The American subjects have extensive international social networks (Anderson, Park et al. 2007; 
Klyver and Hindle 2007). Based on his (extensive) contacts, A6 suggests India and China are 
more capable of taking others’ IP and exploiting it then inventing their own, and that Latin 
American countries are too laid back. A3 thinks national differences are misleading: “in Silicon 
Valley, it doesn't matter where the entrepreneur is from, what ethnic culture or background, the 
thing I see is people are very, very, very driven to make things happen.” (A3). 
Analytical and academic perspective. Most US interviewees displayed analytical approaches to 
planning and opportunity identification. A1 is an engineer and former VC, and conducted the 
same due diligence he would have required as an investor. Although unsuccessful, A1’s 
company was planned thoroughly: “we had domain expertise, we had technology expertise and 
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[were] delivering services with a hosted model.” (A1). A4 is also careful, planning each venture 
at length within his own incubator. A3 is analytical, though prefers to collaborate to generate 
ideas. A4 compares attitudes to failure with an engineering approach: he says that engineering 
involves breaking things and understanding why they break. He uses probability-based scenario 
analysis to probe what will happen if conditions apply, almost like a real-options approach 
(McGrath 1999; Cave and Minty 2004; Bratnicki, Austen et al. 2007). In contrast, the only non-
scientist in the group (A5) tends to use the language of business textbooks, highlighting 
“innovator dilemma issues and … owner/operator issues.” (A5). 
A3, A4 and A6 gained post-graduate qualifications and A6 has a doctorate. Both Iranians suggest 
higher education in Iran is a handicap to entrepreneurship, as academics in Iran are socially 
celebrated but not action-oriented. A5 started multiple firms with advanced software algorithms 
and hardware technology, although he was a Political Science major at college, demonstrating 
his ability to learn quickly. 
A1 is clear that market conditions were against him. A3 describes herself as analytical and 
carefully weighs each side of the story: she talks about game theory as an analytical framework 
when she might have been more decisive. A4, with his long-standing consulting practice, talks 
about resource utilization and allocation and is unemotional in describing his failures. In 
contrast, A3 and A6 both describe themselves as relying on gut feel: “I do rely heavily on 
instinct, my own instinct and instinct of others I trust.” (A6).  
Investors. A1 secured funding by leveraging his corporate VC background as a first-time 
entrepreneur, but his estimation of VC value declined over time: he feels they added nothing to 
his business apart from cash. A2 feels betrayed by one investor in particular - a family fund 
without formal investment guidelines managed by an ineffective manager. During high personal 
stress (with his wife pregnant and his mother seriously ill), he was repeatedly denied funding he 
had been promised. He describes it as follows: “Our investors gave us bad strategy, bad advice 
and even though we succeeded despite them they screwed us in the end.” (A2). This culminated 
in A2 personally paying off creditors in a two-part funding exercise, but “we never saw a penny. 
[Our investor] essentially lied to us. He fucked us and … [my co-founder] and I found the 
company about $230,000 in debt.” (A2). Meanwhile, the fund manager “just cowered and hid in 
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the shadows.” (A2). Prior to this venture, A2 founded a video technology firm where investors 
tried to seize preference rights. He prevented these investors from doing so, at significant 
personal cost. 
One investor informed A3 (incorrectly) that existing managers had no rights to new funding. She 
found it difficult to understand why investors make false statements so openly and expect to get 
away with it. A4 made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain funding from VCs, who did not 
like his risk-mitigated consulting company model. They preferred him to be financially exposed 
and focused exclusively on their venture. 
A5 has seen multiple companies fold. “Our existing investor essentially said, ‘We're not putting 
any more money in.’ … for $5 million, they let $30 million go down the drain.” (A5). He is 
critical of Silicon Valley VCs, not working hard enough and following the herd. A6 questions 
their honesty and integrity: “You can't get these VCs … to be honest with you.” (A6). 
Serendipity and Luck. A1 recognizes that luck plays a large part in venture success and failure. 
Certain things cannot be controlled: “In some cases, failure or success is not indicative of what 
that person is like as an entrepreneur, it could be just the right opportunity or the right time.” 
(A1). A2 feels lucky that his first (failed) venture resulted in a patent being granted which he was 
able to exploit five years later. At the time of crisis, the company was a disaster but “it kind of 
worked out in a weird way in the end.” (A2). A3 and A5 both feel they have had bad luck, but 
this is neutral, not damaging: it is a way to rationalize their experience and does not cast a 
negative shadow over them personally (Liu 2010; Nielsen and Sarasvathy 2012). A6 is positive – 
he had bad luck in terms of business outcomes, but the technology worked and so to some extent 
his venture was a success. 
Focus. US interviewees talked about the need for focus. For A1, mismatched customer 
expectations led to his first venture failure and he will not repeat the same mistake. A2 feels he 
needs multiple skills but he was focused on survival when he had to recue himself from 
bankruptcy: “Building the product was completely on my own. Marketing it I did in 
collaboration, … you got to be completely focused on one or the other you can’t do both.” (A2). 
A5 has focused on the essentials, quickly identifying problems and putting together partnerships. 
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His single-mindedness contrasts with the lack of focus of others around him, which he sees is a 
(lack of) leadership issue. 
Personal Cost. A1 experienced opportunity cost and family pressure, but little financial damage: 
“I did not take a salary for the last year or so … because it’s the right thing.” (A1). The 
perspectives of his wife and mother are important, as they disapproved of the energy and 
commitment he made to his ventures instead of higher salary and prestige in a large company. 
His only physical concerns were energy and relaxation - “it’s a fact for all dedicated 
entrepreneurs. We all sleep poorly.” (A1). 
A2 had severe health problems at the height of his business conflicts, exacerbated by stress. He 
adopted a restrictive diet and needed physical exercise to stop thinking about business. He was 
working 80 hours a week, making no money and accumulating debt while his mother was ill and 
wife was pregnant. Burnout seems to be a high risk in startups (Coombs, Webb et al. 2009). He 
now reflects that his health issues are part of natural adaptation: stress is neither good nor bad - 
you have to learn how to deal with it. A3 chose to resign from her dormant company rather than 
take it to closure – whereas A4 (and A1) chose to liquidate ventures completely. A4 sees the 
personal sacrifice in terms of pride rather than finance, even though he lost money. A5 thinks 
differently after huge personal effort on multiple failed ventures: “basically I spent four years 
there killing myself.” (A5). He took a year out when his son was ill, but apart from this he spent 
twenty years working hard on companies at significant family cost. 
Creativity and Innovation. A2 feels proud of creating something, but acknowledges such 
creativity can set you at odds with the world: “When I tried to raise money … I actually got 
laughed at by a bunch of VCs." (A2). He is proud his patent was granted and he made money 
from its sale. A3 sees creativity emerging from collaboration, preferring the stimulus of sharing 
ideas to detailed analysis. This may be possible in startups but harder in large companies: after 
her co-founder left, “it was less innovative, less like a start-up feel, much more like a big 
company feel.” (A3). Since her most recent failed company, she has taken up social 
entrepreneurship and says innovation is just as creative in this sector. 
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Career. In exploratory Silicon Valley meetings, it was suggested that in America 
entrepreneurship represents a career. In the formal interviews, A1 regards starting a company as 
part of his career: it is like ‘finishing school’. A3 planned to start her own company as part of a 
career plan, too: failure is part of her career building process, a natural part of the cycle. A4 runs 
his consulting company and spins off new ventures: he is learning and building things that 
interest him, not to please others. A5’s career however represents a series of (so far unsuccessful) 
switches to capture value in early-stage companies. 
A6 has the most prestigious career of the US interviewees with his senior executive position at 
one of America’s leading telecommunications firm. The blame he attributes to others (Poon and 
Lau 1999) in his failed startup is perhaps an attempt to deflect negative events from tarnishing 
this reputation. 
Anger and Blame. Of all the interviewees, A2 was the angriest at his treatment by investors. 
Although now financially recovered, he remains bitter about one particular investor: he still feels 
that “I would not piss on him if his back was on fire.” (A2). Through a series of events, A2 was 
promised tranches of bridge funding but each of these failed to materialize. He accumulated 
personal debt of $300,000 and still needed a release from his board of directors to work to pay 
off the debt: his investor would not give this release and he ended up even further in debt 
because he had to buy his ‘freedom’. He recalls how he was trying to do the right thing for 
employees, customers and partners but was consistently lied to by one investor. A5 was angry 
too – he had to fly weekly from California to Toronto for a CEO meeting that was frequently 
cancelled.  
A3 sees the value but also the danger in getting angry (Jenkins and Brundin 2009; Welpe, 
Spörrle et al. 2012) although she does not appear to be an angry person: “anger and guilt can turn 
very negative and can fester. … On the other hand, it could be a really strong motivator in self-
improvement.” (A3). Perhaps A3 sees blame as reflecting attitudes of others - a ‘social construct’ 
- rather than having properties of its own. A2 blames his investor for his company’s demise 
(Rogoff, Myung-Soo et al. 2004), but took on the obligation for recovery himself. A6, however 
allocates blame to others (Miller and Ross 1975): “The main VC that was investing in [his 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 137 of 216 
startup] did not like [the COO] at all because he wasn't doing his job the way he was supposed 
to.” He analyzes the situation as if he had no responsibility. 
Control and Conflict. A1 was surprised at his poor treatment by investors. His subsequent 
venture is self-funded in an attempt to retain control. He tries to minimize the impression of team 
conflict within his failed venture, but remains reflective: “there are things you can control and 
things you can’t control.” (A1). A6 experienced problems adapting to the lack of control in a 
startup: “In the corporate world, … anything I said and I did industry-wise, it was done. Nobody 
even questioned it.” (A6). Of course, ‘control’ means different things to different people. A5 
describes a co-founder as controlling: in 2008, he bought back shareholder control for $500k in a 
company where VCs had invested $32m. Elsewhere, A5 watched indecisiveness on product 
strategy lead to a loss of control. 
The greatest conflicts involved A2. One venture involved a dispute with investors before the 
company was even formed: he spent over $100,000 fighting with investors to retain IP control 
and his eventual victory was gratifying. His second venture ended in personal and bitter disputes 
with investors: promises of incremental funding were repeatedly broken and his guidance on a 
potential acquisition was ignored, leading to collapse of the company. Even A3, seemingly 
reasonable and collaborative, had a strategic disagreement with investors over a patent-
infringement strategy, and learned that strategy cannot be accomplished without control. 
A5 appears to attract conflict. He describes joining a new venture: “Now that you're here we 
need to tell you, we have got to get rid of this CEO.  He has been lying to the Board.” (A5). He 
has experienced conflict at most of his ventures over strategy, M&A opportunities, compensation 
and control. 
Collaboration and Teamwork. A3 in particular emphasizes teamwork: she has co-founded 
several ventures with others and prefers to work alongside trusted partners, believing that 
collaboration includes planning as well as execution. After her second firm failed she founded a 
mentoring network, finding herself at the centre of a large number of startup discussions in 
which she was a de facto mentor. 
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Language	  and	  Narrative	  
 
Language. A1 controlled his interview. He pre-empted questions by telling stories and driving 
the conversation, used the third person to comment on his own plans, and asked questions 
repeatedly to confirm understanding. Careful to avoid offence, he suggests in his management 
style there was “no hostility at all”, “there was no emotional outburst whatsoever,” and laid off 
employees are “disappointed that we could not take it to the next level.” (A1). His commentary 
pre-empted difficult questions, ensuring his perspective was presented first. A6 appears 
persuasive, often inferring rather than stating specifics. In describing how investors viewed his 
CEO he suggests this perception was negative “according to them, …whatever that means.” In 
this, he makes a statement, attributes it to someone else, and then sheds doubt on his or her 
views, all at the same time. 
A1 reveals additional meaning about his experiences through his narrative: he is engaging and 
uses strong images (describing that in Hong Kong, entrepreneurs “eat their young”), telling 
stories such as why the English Navy dominated the seas (Captain Cook improved the sailors’ 
diet to reduce scurvy and thereby retained men for longer). 
A4 avoids the word ‘failure’, preferring to say, “it didn’t succeed.” He is guarded in discussing 
his venture experience: when he reveals a failed customer deal he backtracks afterwards, saying 
it was not really a failure. Some of the interviews contain vague language. A6 is vague in many 
areas, perhaps deliberately so. He talks about his failed venture, then another project which was 
sold to IBM for $90m: it would be easy to confuse the two (Baker 2007).  
Narrative. A1 is skilled in handling the distribution of information at times of stress such as 
company decline and failure, knowing that dissemination leads to confusion and conflict: 
“Nobody needs to know the details. It just stimulates fiction.” (A1). A2 recreates quotations from 
memory: a compelling verbal trick but unlikely to be accurate. He uses understatement and irony 
to engage the listener: he says that laying everybody off was done ‘properly,’ and his failed 
venture was merely “a startup in trouble.” He becomes emotional when describing his company 
collapse in 2009. A3 is reluctant to cause conflict, she uses third parties to present options: rather 
than taking a position herself, she says, “I was reading somewhere that blame and guilt are 
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actually very cultural.” (A3). She responds to questions with other questions and is non-
committal (revenues might “potentially follow.”) 
A5 uses dramatic expressions: when they had no funds but were working hard he says “We were 
starving while … doing these deals.” (A5). He can be sarcastic, though, and self-mocking. “It 
was pretty clear that I was the last stupid decision that guy had ever made.” (A5). A6 likes drama 
too. He teases with mentions of ‘top secret’ work he performs for ‘government agencies.’ This 
appears impressive but there is no way to confirm this. He also repeats similar idioms to fellow-
Iranian A4 such as “to be honest with you.” These seem superfluous conversational words, 
adding little value (Riessman 1993). 
Distractions. A1 distracts from difficult issues using jokes and laughter or the introduction of a 
new topic, including obscure words such as ‘copasetic’. He is used to ‘pitching’ ideas, providing 
succinct statements of market and product value, and steering around difficult topics when they 
arise. A3 provides non-sequiturs throughout the conversation. A6 also distracts, with subtlety. 
When asked how he addressed a problem he answers with reference to a ‘normal entrepreneur’, 
abstracting himself from the response. This has the effect of providing an answer but afterwards 
the interviewer remains uncertain what he meant. 
 
Environmental	  Factors	  
 
Stigma and Reputation. The US interviewees consider stigma only to confirm its relative 
unimportance. A1 suggests perception of failure in America is complex and requires analysis but 
overall, he thinks failure is a stimulus to do better, and US investors appreciate the tenacity, 
resilience and effort of rebounding entrepreneurs. This makes America a more forgiving 
environment than others: “there are certain countries whether it’s Germany or Japan or 
Singapore where failure is a stigma, it’s a life long stigma.” (A1). He feels his executive SAP 
reputation has not been negatively affected by his failure. A6 is concerned for his reputation 
(Shepherd and Haynie 2011): as well as enjoying kudos for his work for the security services his 
reputation carries a financial premium: “I think because of my name and reputation I can get 
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them to increase their sales streams.” (A6). Perhaps A6 regards his reputation as a fungible asset 
that can be augmented and divided as needed. It can also be sold, and his current activities 
leverage this as advisor and board member. When asked whether his failed venture had damaged 
his reputation he replied: “Actually it made no difference whatsoever. Zero.” (A6). 
Trust and Honesty. A2 feels betrayed by his investors but believes he acted fairly and 
generously to others. When his technology partner resigned he organized an exit package. He 
made personal guarantees to cover employee costs, arising from a sense of responsibility to staff. 
He strived to “do the right thing” even though others were not so fair (Klotz 2010). However, 
“my lesson was, you know there is very few people you can trust.” (A2). After her failed 
venture, A3 started mentor networks and helping others. “I don't feel any animosity towards any 
of my investors, nor do I feel very negative about any of us.” (A3). She believes once something 
is complete, you move on. 
A4 is rational and talks about honesty. When asked to interpret something he says “I don't have a 
good answer for you on this.” (A4). Rather than improvise, he just says no. On the other hand, 
A6 was effusive in answering questions, not always accurately. He says, “We ultimately ended 
up selling the company to another venture firm.  It was a fairly cheap one but better than 
nothing.” (A6). In fact, this is not strictly true –the ‘sale’ comprised a disposal of IP through an 
Action By Creditors. A6 is capable of polishing his reputation and diminishing all negative 
aspects of his career. 
Ethnicity. Only two US interviewees were born in America, the others being born in Hong Kong 
(A1), India (A3) and Iran (A4, A6). A1 was raised in San Francisco and describes mentoring 
Chinese students at Stanford University, and explains how, “Their parents will put aggressive 
pressure on them to work for an established company as opposed to do a startup.” (A1). He also 
describes the strong preference of his parents and Chinese-American wife to avoid start-up life. 
A3 adds a cultural dimension, not just an ethnic perspective but regarding how new cultures are 
created. She notes a difference between large company culture and start-ups, the latter being 
more creative and innovative. Her Indian origins provide a non-Western world-view when 
considering failure: “I think in the Western world, there is a very strong sense of you control 
things. That's where the blame comes from.” (A3).  
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A4 sees ethnic origin as less important than personality traits (Saxenian 2002). Being in a 
minority is a greater driver than ethnicity, race or nationality: “I think that comes from being the 
minority and you want to prove yourself or whatever it is.” (A4). However, immigrants make 
more effort: “I know people … with a limitation, people that are minorities, they always work 
harder.” (A4). His background in Iran pre-dates the 1979 revolution and he retains strong family 
connections there. His current knowledge suggests that Iranians “may want to do advisory 
[work], but they are not entrepreneurs, because they don't teach entrepreneurship in Iran.” (A4). 
He contends that Iranians are generally happy, and the social focus in Iran is more on lifestyle 
than urgent financial success, diminishing the inclination to try harder. 
Social Network. All of the US interviewees felt their personal networks were important in 
surviving the experience of failure and recovery (Anderson, Park et al. 2007; Klyver and Hindle 
2007). A1 describes how he retained supplier and customer relationships through the decline of 
one company and resurrected them for the next. A6 has a very strong and senior business 
network and used this to establish a post-failure portfolio, his reputation undiminished. 
Family. A1 starts companies against the wishes of his family: “I’ll be honest. My wife really 
does not like me doing startups.” (A1). Furthermore, his family fails to appreciate his working so 
hard at such high risk for unclear rewards. He sees ‘social stress’ on his wife and parents that in 
turn impacts him personally. 
Personal stress is not always direct. A2 suffered from seeing his mother extremely ill during his 
company collapse: “then she got cancer and she went through chemotherapy twice and it was 
very, very stressful to not have the time to go be with her.” (A2). He is grateful for his wife’s 
support, even though his investor problems threatened her health benefits during a difficult 
pregnancy. A3 also sees an indirect influence from her family. Her grandfather was a state 
attorney in India, and she shares a family history of public service. She sees her collaborative 
startup as a social experience: “It is like a family.  Even if people don't know each other, they 
feel like a part of a family once they arrive.” (A3). A5 endured serious health problems with his 
newborn son, as has A6 with his father’s poor health: both of these were experienced during 
company declines and both responded by taking significant time off. 
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Personality	  Characteristics	  
 
Personality. A3 is curious: “What is it that motivates this person when I am sitting across from 
them?  I am always thinking, ‘Why are they doing this?’” (A3). She is the only Indian-born 
subject and the only female interviewee, and her comments in the interview indicate she is more 
collaborative than controlling, more empathetic than driven (Zhao, Seibert et al. 2010). This 
curiosity may make her less desperate to succeed: as if ‘winning’ lies more in the understanding 
and connection with an issue or person than in the conclusion of a deal or a company exit. As the 
only female interviewee she observes men are more curious than women and therefore more 
likely to establish new ventures (of all kinds); though reluctant to generalize, she feels people are 
more likely to turn to women for advice and guidance. She also seeks to avoid conflict and 
controversy. She appears passive, sounding unemotional about her company’s decline, and views 
multiple sides of an argument impartially. However she seems less effective. When survival is at 
stake, she is more likely to resign than fight to the death as demonstrated by her resignations 
from two startups. She also differentiates herself from: “type A personalities who will do 
anything and not give up easily [which] seems a very common trait here.” (A3). 
Self-efficacy and confidence. A1 is a successful software executive and venture capitalist. His 
sense of self-efficacy is illustrated in several ways: he is self-confident; he has self-funded his 
new venture to increase his self-perceived chance of success, and he has a clear belief in his 
future success. “I don’t have a diminished view of what I can accomplish and [failure] has not 
adversely affected my network or my personal view of what I want to do next.” (A1). 
A2 speaks plainly of the highs and lows of startup life, through which he has to remain confident 
and effective (Sarasvathy 2008). However, at a low point, betrayed by his investor for a third 
time and ‘tricked’ into taking on personal debt, A2 was told the board would not release him 
from his director’s contract. He spent a weekend writing code for a long-standing personal 
project and within months this formed the basis of a private IP sale and employment contract to 
rescue him from personal bankruptcy. A2 sees nothing remarkable in this: he was capable of 
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doing so, and had some good fortune, but he had belief in his own abilities to make this happen. 
“I sat down on my own and I just wrote it, and then I started my own one-person company to, 
you know to be in control.” (A2). The self-efficacy of A2 is amplified by the severity of his 
decline before the recovery, quoted in full: “Not only did they fuck us, you know [our investor] 
habitually lied to us … so five years of hard work and doing the right thing and bringing them a 
buyer for the company I almost ended up with ruined credit for life and totally broke. And, but 
what I did on my own then, was just sit down, create a mini venture and flip it and that venture 
for me ended up being a million dollar deal.” (A2). 
A3 comments on her technical capability and experience, but is keener to talk about the value of 
her network than her own self-efficacy. She reflects qualities that are perhaps the opposite of 
effectuation - deferential and accepting – and instead of driving her own future she is more 
inclined to absorb causal forces around her (Read and Sarasvathy 2005). A4 is very confident 
(like A2 and A6) in his technical abilities. He describes his rapid rise in seniority and how he 
works with senior executives: this may indicate a need for validation by association with other 
executives to ‘prove’ he is effective. A6 is perhaps the most confident of the US interviewees – 
he starts companies, advises the heads of major multinational corporations and writes books. 
Talking to him gives the impression there is nothing he cannot do. Even though his company 
failed, his self-confidence remains: “My reputation and my technical knowledge and being 
known as a world-renowned scientist is still intact.” (A6). 
A5 has strong belief in his own capabilities too. In one of his ventures: “the three of us set it up 
kind of just rolling up our sleeves and figuring it out.” (A5). It is notable that he has a political 
science degree and yet became involved in solving highly technical problems, a strong indication 
of self-efficacy. “All this stuff I had to learn and just absorb on the job essentially.” (A5). 
Arrogance and Hubris. A6 can appear arrogant: he describes investors thus - “I wasn't 
impressed ... I didn't feel like I could communicate with them at my brain level.” (A6). Perhaps 
his self-belief stems from a rich history of achievement and experience. However, this may not 
all be negative – being over-confident and hubristic may increase the chance of future success 
(Hayward 2006; Hayward, Forster et al. 2010). He has no doubts that investors would back him 
again. 
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In conversation, A4 makes statements that are difficult to believe, as if exaggeration is part of his 
everyday business language: for example, he repeatedly talks about contacting the most senior 
executives at a firm (his law firm, customers, partners) as if he is trying to impress. Perhaps such 
cultural flattery and self-aggrandizement are part of his conversational style. 
Tenacity. A2 is persistent. “I’m fully aware that I’m one of those people that just … doesn’t 
know how to give up.” (A2). A3 however, is more accepting of unfortunate consequences and 
describes her attitudes being more aligned with Indian philosophy: “You kind of have to move 
on and things happen in life, which are not in our control.” (A3). Such acceptance may not 
engender persistence at all costs but A3 also describes herself as tenacious and personally 
resilient. A4 is proud his consulting company has been trading for more than twenty years: “I am 
very persistent, myself.  I think my persistence is personal.” (A4). Tenacity applies to 
relationships in tough periods (Holland 2008; Holland and Shepherd 2011) and A2 is proud of 
the way he kept business partnerships informed during difficult times. “On a personal level … 
we did not burn a single bridge.” (A2). 
Drive and Motivation. Most American interviewees demonstrated a strong sense of motivation. 
A1 is driven by more than just success: “I wanted to do something that has a positive societal 
impact.” (A1). The fact that his second company is a more focused version of his first failed 
venture affirms this drive. A4 (like A5) sees incentives as less attractive than they once were in 
Silicon Valley. Stock option plans, which spread opportunity across a wide base of employees, 
are now more concentrated on senior executives and this alters the motivation of people in mid-
ranking and junior positions. Also, the success of many people in the Valley has provided a 
financial buffer that diminishes their drive but increases their tolerance for risk in new ventures. 
A3 has a strong social motivation, perhaps arising from her Indian family tradition of public 
service. She contrasts this with the typical story in California: “In Silicon Valley, it's a happening 
place, a lot of innovation, but there is a very strong culture of ‘what is in it for me.’” (A3). 
Counterfactual thinking. Most American subjects ponder ‘what if’ scenarios, not all in a 
negative way (Baron 2000): A3 discusses what might have happened if her chosen board 
member had supported her; what might have occurred if her mentor had not died but been able to 
advise her through difficult times. She contemplates such questions, without regret or bitterness, 
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but simply reflecting. A5 is more actively regretful: several ventures failed to tackle ‘avoidable’ 
obstacles. In his ventures, he was adversely affected by circumstances and the strategic decisions 
of those more senior than himself. 
A6 discusses counterfactual questions as a way to deflect responsibility; as if other outcomes had 
been possible he might be less responsible for his poor outcomes. He describes the constant lack 
of cash. “I never thought that we would be in that situation when I went into that venture … 
otherwise I wouldn't have started [it] at all.” (A6). Then there are other questions: if only he had 
had a better team; if only he had pursued enterprise instead of consumer markets; if only his 
timing had been better. In general, most of the interviews reveal that these entrepreneurs are keen 
to question, critique and learn: but not A6, who left a successful career and appears to regret 
starting his own company. 
Pride and Satisfaction. A2 regards rejection by investors as a source of pride. “When I tried to 
raise money … I actually got laughed at by a bunch of VCs.” (A2). He is also proud of the 
patents he has secured - a permanent record of his skill as a technologist, something shared by 
A5 and A6. 
Entrepreneurs find satisfaction in different places: A3 is most proud of how she looked after 
employees through difficult times. A4 is an inventor, and talks happily of “the box that I 
invented, I created.” (A4). He has run his own consulting company for 22 years and is proud of 
his technical achievements. A5 has been involved in several Internet infrastructure technologies 
in networking and software. He likes the contribution he made: “the App Server group was born 
and I was part of birthing that.” (A5). Because of his prior history at the world’s leading R&D 
organization, A6 has his name on thousands of patents and this is a permanent source of pride for 
him. 
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Entrepreneurial	  Response	  
 
Learning. A1 makes a simple statement about venture failure: “You learn so much.” (A1). He 
outlines specific lessons: as a CEO, the proximity to people allows insight into how people 
behave under pressure. He also explains how failed entrepreneurs accumulate learning which is 
best deployed in another startup, otherwise “it gets diluted and blends into middle management 
in other companies.” (A1). He feels strongly about the re-cycling of ideas and talent and is doing 
this in his second venture, applying lessons from his first failure to create a better outcome 
(Evans and Bahrami 1995). He also sees a self-reinforcing aspect of learning by doing – in 
learning how to learn (Argyris and Schön 1978): “Being an entrepreneur, you learn how to 
become an entrepreneur.” (A1). This includes practical strategies such as self-funding and 
keeping the company tightly controlled. 
A2 learned much from his negative experiences: he now values the protection offered by lawyers 
and is aware of pre-emptive legal ruses that have been used against him. He sees the value of the 
‘pivot’ or rapid change in strategy in response to changing conditions: he was initially funded to 
create an RFID software company but rapidly changed direction. He is a keen advocate of cross-
disciplinary training (studying art and computer science as an undergraduate) but believes 
entrepreneurship has to be ‘learned by doing’ (Cope and Watts 2000). Like A1, he is self-
funding his next venture and wants to retain control of strategic decision-making. A3 feels she 
discovered her real skills though her company’s collapse, that she is a “people person” and is 
best at building teams in supportive, collaborative environments. She accumulated additional 
skills performing multiple roles (fund-raising, management, product planning, sales) in intense 
periods of activity and under stress. This reflects the view that the locus of learning in a startup is 
concentrated in multiple activities in a compressed period of time (Evans and Bahrami 1995). 
Her most significant lesson from failure is the need for goal alignment between key stakeholders: 
“If there are disagreements, let's make sure they are not goal-level disagreements.” (A3).  
A4 states his learning explicitly - “Every time I have a failure I say, ‘Okay, alright now, what to 
do?’ Then I am more hyped and more focused.” (A4). This might reflect an engineering 
mentality, evaluating bad results and continually improving design. He believes that new 
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ventures should be revenue-funded or self-funded: the externalities involved with VC finance are 
too distracting and can destroy a project. 
A5 has seen multiple ventures fail, mostly because they are too early to market, recalling the 
‘liability of newness’ (Politis 2005; Wiklund, Baker et al. 2010). Two of his ventures have failed 
due to technology immaturity in an emerging market. He sees a cycle in the life of startups, and 
the challenge is to spot what stage the firm is at and how best to move it along, balancing market 
and technology readiness. When looking at a new startup opportunity he believes he knows what 
questions to ask: “I need to understand the dynamics, the vesting, and the incentives, the timing.” 
(A5). A6 left the direct startup world and became a board member and advisor. He sees value in 
either being completely engaged in his firm or clearly taking a peripheral mentor role.  
Opportunity Identification. A1 spent a lot of time in planning and analysis before starting his 
ventures. He learned from the first failure and is now keen to build on customer proof points 
rather than simply build a platform trusting that revenues will follow (Ries 2011; Blank and Dorf 
2012). A2 sees incremental value within each venture and tries to remain flexible when 
opportunities arise, aware of context and timing as well as technology. When he was close to 
bankruptcy, he started a new venture and rapidly developed and sold it to restore his fortunes: in 
this case, his opportunity arose from necessity. 
A3 relies on instinct and intuition and prior experience backed by analysis of markets and 
technology (Corbett 2005). She tries to separate ‘people and talent’ from ‘technology and 
market’ in evaluating opportunities, but a ‘gut feel’ influences her big decisions. A4’s approach 
has changed in identifying opportunities: his funding model has evolved from VC backing to 
self-funding and revenue-based growth. A5’s approach to new opportunities is jaded after 
multiple failures and he is less willing to risk time without extensive diligence. He feels he has 
learned all the questions to ask in a new venture, and the most important regards ‘market-
readiness’ - a compound concept involving customer readiness, market size and timing, 
technology availability and access to capital and people. He requires a large salary and option 
pool before taking on risk: “I definitely am more of a mercenary at this point.”(A5). A6 came 
from a successful corporate career before starting his first venture and did not like the high risk 
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and effort required: “I don't want to go to another project that ultimately ends up not paying.” 
(A6). 
Teaching. A3 talked extensively about mentoring. She was mentored by two professors and 
started a mentor network of supportive friends and advisors. She feels strongly about mentorship 
and inspiration: describing her first startup “I was very inspired by the CTO, who was a brilliant, 
legendary entrepreneur.” (A3). When a mentor died, she felt it left “a huge void in Silicon Valley 
in the entrepreneurial ecosystem.” (A3). It is significant that her venture failure coincided with 
the death of her Stanford mentor: perhaps in her case there is a connection between grief and 
recovery and her need to provide mentorship to others (Shepherd 2003; Shepherd, Wiklund et al. 
2009). 
Risk and Uncertainty. A1 contrasts his own perception of risk with that of his family, which is 
much less risk-tolerant. He believes however that their emphasis on company safety is 
misplaced: “[Large] companies don’t offer the safety net … safe havens doesn’t exist.” (A1). He 
sees this among Chinese students he is mentoring today. He is careful to avoid risk in his own 
way: financially he used other people’s money (‘OPM’) and lost it. Apart from loss of salary and 
opportunity cost, he did not lose out. A2 is prepared to take risks, especially when backed into a 
corner. He spent over $100,000 on legal fees to protect IP he had created when threatened by 
rogue investors. 
A3 has worked with other co-founders: this may indicate a need to share the risk, especially 
involving the “very, very intense pace that is in a Silicon Valley start-up.” (A3). A4 and A6 
developed a portfolio approach as a result of failed ventures. A4 runs a consulting company in 
parallel to his new ventures, incubating new projects. He collaborates on billable projects with a 
customer, validates the opportunity and then spins out a new company when appropriate. A6 
now does the same, advising a range of early-stage and growth companies and avoiding the 
concentration of risk in one location. A5’s appetite for risk has diminished over time too, in line 
with his personal (family) responsibilities: he only risks what he can afford to lose (Dew, 
Sarasvathy et al. 2009). He sees this as a function of changing external conditions (less upside in 
Silicon Valley, fewer opportunities) and also his own maturity: “Nobody works that hard 
anymore. No one is willing to give up family.” (A5). 
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Stress. A1 experienced stress in the relationships within his failed venture, although he tries to 
minimize this in his retelling. He reveals this at several points: “It’s a fact for all dedicated 
entrepreneurs. We all sleep poorly.” (A1). Also, he perceives that stress applies more to others - 
his wife and parents - than it does to himself. He describes how “It was stressful but … a lot has 
to do with what kind of safety net is in place. But it was stressful because of the things you have 
to deal with.” (A1). 
A2 comments that the duration of stress is important. “When the market crashed in 2009 I had to 
go raise money from [investors] every two weeks and I did that, I did that for a year. And I was 
under unbelievable stress.” (A2). He started construction work at home to have a physical outlet 
for his tension: A4 and A6 played soccer to keep stress under control. A4 comments on the sense 
of isolation, which makes stress more intense and personal: “There is a lot of stress.  There is 
tons of stress. It's a very lonely job  … it feels like that, the whole world is against you.” (A4). 
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CHAPTER 6: CROSS-REGION ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction:	  Cross-­‐Region	  Analysis	  
 
This chapter assesses findings from the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) of 
interviews in Munich, Cambridge and Silicon Valley, comparing themes emerging from each set 
of region-specific data to identify commonalities and differences between these three regions. 
Detailed analysis of the interview transcripts is documented in Chapters 5A (Germany), 5B 
United Kingdom) and 5C (USA). The goal of this chapter is to analyze these attitudes to failure; 
to identify what commonalities and differences exist within and between regions, and whether 
this reveals issues of significance for each region under study. As this thematic analysis is 
performed, appropriate literature is referenced (‘enfolding literature’) to place these findings in 
the context of existing research. 
The cross-region analysis process takes IPA to a level beyond that typically outlined in textbooks 
(Smith and Osborn 2008; Smith, Flowers et al. 2009), although there are precedents for cross-
group IPA comparisons: Cope provides a comparison of British and American groups of failed 
entrepreneurs in his examination of learning from failure (Cope and Cave 2008; Cope 2011), as 
well as a co-authored paper on investors’ attitudes to failure in the US and UK (Cope, Cave et al. 
2004). IPA is an idiographic approach with a strong emphasis on the individual experience, in 
this case of the entrepreneur: for this reason, the cross-region analysis presented does not try to 
identify a deterministic or prescriptive recipe for how entrepreneurs in these countries will 
behave in future situations. 
This cross-region analysis was performed in two steps: an initial informal and intuitive review 
was followed by a more systematic and rigorous examination.  
To begin with, after extensive analysis of each subject and documentation of themes within each 
region, a preliminary view of the importance of themes was documented and categories of 
themes were identified in an informal manner. Preliminary impressions are noted here. (1) Major 
themes occurring consistently across all three regions include language and narrative; learning; 
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reasons for failure; opportunities, and risk. (2) Themes emerged from interviews in some regions 
but not in others, such as the discussion of stigma and the constraints of doing business in 
Germany among Munich founders, as well as the impact of Cambridge University for Cambridge 
entrepreneurs. (3) Individual entrepreneurs expressed themes that failed to emerge from anyone 
else, such as self-importance and blame (A1), a high desire for power and frustration at its 
absence (D6), and the strong presence of self-deprecating comments (B1). 
Figure 19. Schematic Describing how Emergent Themes Arising from IPA Analysis are Listed and Sorted to 
Identify Commonalities and Exceptions 
 
To formalize these anecdotal findings from the IPA process a second, more systematic analysis 
was performed, as documented in Figure 19, including the incorporation of relevant literature to 
support evidence obtained from the interview analysis (the ‘enfolding literature’). Firstly, the 
note-taking and thematic analysis in each interview resulted in a list of themes (‘thematic codes’) 
and these were counted to establish the frequency of themes arising from each interview. Second, 
these emergent themes were consolidated to develop a ranking for most frequently occurring 
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themes by interview, by region and in aggregate for all interviews (see Table 14). As outlined in 
Figure 19, this formal process produces four categories of theme:  
(i) Themes that occur frequently across all interviews (‘cross-region commonalities’);  
(ii) Themes that occur frequently within each region (‘regional commonalities’);  
(iii) Themes that occur frequently in one region but not in others (‘regional differences’); 
(iv) Exceptional themes that emerge from only one or two individuals, regardless of region 
(‘individual exceptions’). 
Although this represents quantitative analysis of qualitative data, it is intended simply to evaluate 
existing IPA analysis and identify trends within a large amount of data. It is not intended to 
establish a dataset for further statistical analysis. The listing of most frequently occurring 
thematic codes is listed in Table 14 below. 
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  Frequency of Emergent Theme 
 Emergent theme (in order of total frequency of occurrence) Munich Cambridge 
Silicon 
Valley Total 
1 LANGUAGE, NARRATIVE 61 44 83 188 
2 LEARNING 62 44 60 166 
3 REASONS 60 61 29 150 
4 OPPORTUNITY 32 25 37 94 
5 SELF-EFFICACY 36 37 21 94 
6 INVESTORS 27 30 33 90 
7 GERMANY 83 - 2 85 
8 RISK 31 21 33 85 
9 PERSONAL COST, STRESS 41 16 24 81 
10 REFLECTIVE 4 59 17 80 
11 INTERNATIONAL 9 44 14 67 
12 FAILURE 30 12 23 65 
13 PERSONALITY 26 18 15 59 
14 STIGMA 43 5 4 52 
15 POSITIVE 29 17 2 48 
16 ACADEMIC 26 16 4 46 
17 SATISFACTION 15 19 12 46 
18 FAMILY 28 4 13 45 
19 
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING, 
REGRET 13 25 7 45 
20 CONTROL 24 4 13 41 
21 TRUST 24 3 13 40 
22 CONFIDENCE 15 13 11 39 
23 ANALYTICAL 9 6 23 38 
24 ORIGINAL, CREATIVE 20 7 10 37 
25 FRAUD, BETRAYAL 16 17 4 37 
26 SUCCESS 11 11 14 36 
27 PERCEPTION, PERSPECTIVE 20 9 5 34 
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28 TEAMWORK, COLLABORATION 26 4 4 34 
29 TEACHING 31 2 - 33 
30 LUCK, SERENDIPITY 23 1 8 32 
Table 14. Listing of ‘Top Thirty’ Emergent Themes from IPA Analysis of all Interview Transcripts, with Counts of all Themes 
Aggregated and Sorted by Frequency (Most Frequently Occurring Listed First) 
 
From the initial listing in Table 14, a further sorting of the data was performed to identify the 
most frequently occurring themes within each of the three regions: however, because the total 
number of thematic references varied between Munich (total 1,178), Cambridge (894) and 
Silicon Valley (873), the frequency was normalized to determine a weight-adjusted frequency, so 
that the most-frequent themes within a country (regardless of country) could be ranked. This 
variation in the number of thematic codes reflects the differing length of interviews in each 
region (Germany was typically longer). The resulting listing is displayed in Table 15 below. 
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    Frequency 
Rank Emergent Theme % Ranking (*) 
Country 
(**) DE UK US 
1 LANGUAGE, NARRATIVE 12.79% US 61 44 83 
2 LEARNING 9.24% US 62 44 60 
3 GERMANY 9.08% DE 83 0 2 
4 REASONS 8.82% UK 60 61 29 
5 REFLECTIVE 8.53% UK 4 59 17 
6 INTERNATIONAL 6.36% UK 9 44 14 
7 OPPORTUNITY 5.70% US 32 25 37 
8 SELF-EFFICACY 5.35% UK 36 37 21 
9 INVESTORS 5.08% US 27 30 33 
10 RISK 5.08% US 31 21 33 
11 STIGMA 4.70% DE 43 5 4 
12 PERSONAL COST, STRESS 4.49% DE 41 16 24 
13 NEGATIVE, CRITICAL 4.34% UK - 30 - 
14 
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING, 
REGRET 3.61% UK 13 25 7 
15 ANALYTICAL 3.54% US 9 6 23 
16 FAILURE 3.54% US 30 12 23 
17 ETHNICITY 3.39% US - - 22 
18 TEACHING 3.39% DE 31 2 - 
19 POSITIVE 3.17% DE 29 17 2 
20 FAMILY 3.06% DE 28 4 13 
21 SOCIAL NETWORK 2.93% US - - 19 
22 CAMBRIDGE 2.89% UK - 20 - 
23 SELF-DEPRECATING 2.89% UK - 20 - 
24 ACADEMIC 2.84% DE 26 16 4 
25 PERSONALITY 2.84% DE 26 18 15 
26 TEAMWORK, COLLABORATION 2.84% DE 26 4 4 
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27 CONFLICT 2.77% US 2 5 18 
28 SATISFACTION 2.75% UK 15 19 12 
29 CONTROL 2.63% DE 24 4 13 
30 TRUST 2.63% DE 24 3 13 
* This percentage represents the ratio of [frequency of theme] to [total frequency of all themes] within the region. 
** This is the country within which the “% Ranking” is calculated. 
Table 15. Listing of ‘Top Thirty’ Themes Arising from IPA Analysis on Interviews, According to Frequency of each Individual 
Code including Outliers (Exceptions) 
 
This analysis intends to highlight common (and exceptional) themes in a systematic manner: it 
does not propose a deterministic or prescriptive view of which attributes are likely to arise in 
future entrepreneurial situations. The following sections address an analysis of all 18 interviews 
and outline (i) cross-regional commonalities; (ii) regional commonalities; (iii) cross-case outliers 
or regional differences, and (iv) cross-case outliner or individual exceptions. 
 
(i)	  Cross-­‐Region	  Commonalities	  
 
Language	  and	  Narrative	  
 
A cross-region comparison of language and narrative involves two levels of analysis: the 
significance of the way language and narrative is used to reveal further insight, and analysis of 
the resulting insight itself. This is important because the methodology used in the research hopes 
to offer insight into the ‘lived world’ of the entrepreneur and draw conclusions from analysis in 
as unsolicited a manner as possible. Language therefore is an essential component of this 
analysis, and it is promising that so many language-related themes are revealed. In developing 
regional commonalities, examples are drawn from individual entrepreneurs. 
An initial observation is that these entrepreneurs make good storytellers. Some in particular – 
D1, D4, D6, B1, B2, B3, B6, A1, A2, A3 – are highly skilled, capable of telling a compelling 
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story using a number of natural-sounding techniques to keep the listener engaged to control 
chronology and perspective (Downing 2005). These include construction of a narrative structure 
– starting simple, building tension, and culminating with a punch line; use of short sentences at 
different times to establish drama and variations of pace in storytelling, and engagement with the 
listener (the researcher) through confirming questions to ensure all details are understood and to 
maintain attention. Entrepreneurs’ verbal accounts of their experience are inevitably subjective: 
for example, a special edition of the Journal of Business Venturing (Gartner 2007) addresses the 
impact of entrepreneurial narrative and how rich story-telling may result in multiple 
interpretations of the same events (Ahl 2007; Baker 2007; Hjorth 2007).  
D1 and A2 appear to give verbatim accounts with remarkable levels of detail, shifting the action 
in the story from the past to the present tense. Although such skills might appear contrived when 
de-constructed, they sound natural and unforced at the time. These entrepreneurs do not 
deliberate over how best to relate their experiences, but do so effortlessly. Even the subjects who 
sound less articulate such as D3, D5, B4 and A4 are still capable of relating dramatic stories 
about failure, betrayal, fraud and recovery.  
Humour is used frequently (D1, D4, B2, B5, A1 and A2) as a natural part of the conversation, 
and sometimes to deflect from serious subjects the interviewee wishes to avoid. D1 is self-
mocking and disarming and B5 describes his team as “Muppets,” which lightens the interview 
but also serves to lower expectations so his failure might be viewed less harshly (Fox 2005). A5 
and B6 are self-mocking in their remarks, but this sometimes conveys self-pity rather than 
amusement. 
Analysis of language can reveal what is important to the entrepreneur. B1 and D4 are positive 
and enthusiastic: people and events are “lovely”, “hyper-exciting” and “wonderful.” D4 
describes how he “puts bread on the table” for seventy people in his startup, an image of 
providing sustenance for a large group: he is proud to have created employment and value in the 
lives of employees and their families (Downing 2005). This social dimension occurs in several 
interviews: A5 says that without his deals, employees are “starving.”. 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 159 of 216 
In extremis, language can be used to damage others: D6, still angry at his treatment by investors, 
talks about ‘revenge’ with destructive words such as ‘killing’ projects. A2 is mostly calm but 
turns on a lead investor: he “would not piss on him if his back was on fire.” A6 is curt and 
dismissive of his colleagues and investors, and happy to attribute blame to those who were close 
to him. Perhaps B6 is the most extreme. Although he talks positively and passionately about 
technology, he is cynical, mocking and cruel in other respects. He refers to “burning bridges” 
and uses the word “never” when talking about future relationships with former friends. This 
negativity and petulance indicates his response to failure may not yet be fully settled, and the 
dynamic interaction between language and thought (or sense-making) remains unresolved 
(Clarke and Cornelissen 2011). 
B1, B3 and B5 engage the researcher with questions to confirm understanding of complex 
technology, possibly flattering him with more knowledge than he possesses. This simplification 
of complex technology was present in all, but B1 and B3 were also clear on business situations, 
on who did what and when: in failed ventures, there may be many conflicting parties and events 
and this can be difficult to keep clear. 
Vagueness in language may permit the entrepreneur to play the ‘art of the possible’. A6 talks 
about his failed venture, then another project which was sold to IBM for $90m: it is easy to 
conflate the two, confusing two interpretations for social or psychological benefit (Fletcher 
2007). A2 talks quickly in a stream of enthusiasm and energy. He uses understatement and irony 
to engage the listener but gets emotional when describing his company collapse. A3 is cautious 
in her speech: reluctant to cause conflict, she uses third parties to present vague options rather 
than adopting a personal position. 
Learning	  
 
Discussions of how failure leads to learning occur in all three regions. This applies to factual 
learning regarding issues such as law, finance and corporate governance, as well as skills, 
including reflections on how one learns how to learn. 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 160 of 216 
D1 describes the intensity of learning when fighting to repay his company’s debts: during this 
time, new problems required rapid reaction, heightening the experience and increasing the 
chance the lesson will be retained (Shepherd and Cardon 2009). This reinforcement of learning, a 
‘double-feedback’ loop (Argyris and Schön 1978) exemplifies how failure (and recovery) 
intensifies learning. D1 and D2 learned that knowledge of law, tax and finance is required for a 
founder, even if advisors appear to take care of such things. However, D2 believes young 
entrepreneurs should not be over-burdened by finance and legal considerations, thinking they can 
“overwhelm the imagination” and damage creativity. 
D3 highlights ‘breakdown’ events when learning is most intense (Brück, Llussá et al. 2010). He 
applies this to his current courses, forcing errors on his students by insisting on revenue from 
projects within a week. Most of these student projects fail, providing a ‘safe’ common 
experience of failure to analyze what went wrong: this is a cultural shock for many students, but 
D3 needs failure to be commonplace among his students in order for the lessons to work. It also 
reflects contemporary approaches such as the ‘lean startup’ method (Ries 2011; Blank and Dorf 
2012). 
D4 and D6 failed but this has not diminished their urge to do another startup. This confirms that 
despite learning more skills, they have not learned to stop. Perhaps they learn small new 
techniques but are incapable of learning the big lesson to do something else: having gone so far, 
they believe another venture will allow them to get it right (Hmieleski and Baron 2009). D6 adds 
that the most important learning is “all in the soft skills.” Such lessons require multiple steps: the 
mistake itself, the consequences, and reflection on these consequences (Argyris 2002). 
B1 explains how he gained due diligence insight for new opportunities from his first failure. B1, 
B2 and B4 educated themselves on business issues such as dealing with directors and investors. 
More nuanced is the skill of knowing how to learn, and B3 provides a metaphor for this with 
simulated annealing algorithms - through incrementally solving and reconciling problems (like 
annealing metals to achieve hardness and ductility), he increases his ability to deal with future 
problems. The importance of seeing business issues twice is noted: in a declining company, an 
entrepreneur sees his plans evaluated both on the way up and on the way down. B6 suggests 
entrepreneurs who succeed first time may simply learn how to repeat the same pattern. 
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A1 recommends that failed entrepreneurs deploy accumulated learning in another startup, 
otherwise the learning may be lost (Baker and Nelson 2005). A2 learned the value of protection 
by lawyers and acknowledges the benefit of the ‘pivot’ or rapid adaptive change in strategy (Ries 
2011). He advocates cross-disciplinary training but believes entrepreneurship has to be learned 
by doing. A3 discovered her real skills by having to perform multiple roles (fund-raising, 
management, product planning, sales) in intense periods of activity and under stress, recalling 
that the locus of learning is concentrated in a startup within multiple activities in compressed 
time (Evans and Bahrami 1995). Increased self-awareness is important too: A5 sees learning 
from failure as a compound issue, giving him the ability to determine the ‘market readiness’ 
cycle in the life of startups and understanding better how his skills fit.  
Reasons	  for	  Failure	  
 
Interviewees were keen to discuss reasons why their ventures failed. These reasons include: 
underestimation of the technology challenge (D2, B1); poor market timing (A5, A1, D3); lack of 
capital, and an inability to exploit growth (D3, D6, B5, A5); the ‘liability of newness’ (Politis 
2005; Wiklund, Baker et al. 2010); lack of focus (D3, A4) and poor business planning (D3, D4, 
B5, B6, A5). Causes of failure are widely discussed elsewhere in academic literature (Bruno and 
Leidecker 1988; Richardson, Nwankwo et al. 1994; Pretorius 2008; Gulst and Maritz 2009). 
Wider themes include cyclical economic factors: D5 and B2 appreciate how they can endure 
long cyclical downturns as long as they plan ahead. Decades of experience led B4 to conclude 
that control is essential: in his first venture he lost control to VCs and was unable to rescue the 
company. Some ventures failed through external factors like fraud (D1, D2, B2), or 
disagreements over strategy (A3, D6). B1 and A3 recognize that where disputes emerge over 
strategy, it is the responsibility of founders and CEO to resolve such personal disputes, not just to 
get it right. 
D3, B6 and D4 remain uncertain why failure happened. A1 feels he planned his venture carefully 
and did everything ‘by the book’ yet it still failed. This may help to explain their confidence that 
given another chance, they would succeed.  
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Opportunity	  Identification	  
 
The ways in which entrepreneurs identify and evaluate their subsequent (post-failure) 
opportunity varies by individual, not by region. Two approaches emerge from the IPA analysis - 
analytical and intuitive - although all interviewees demonstrate ‘entrepreneurial alertness’ 
(Ardichvili, Cardozo et al. 2003; Tang, Kacmar et al. 2012). 
The former academics that were interviewed tended to be analytical in identifying and evaluating 
opportunities (D2, D3, D5, B3, B4 and A4): opportunities are evaluated systematically for 
market size, technology readiness and scalability. B4 and A4 spend long periods on modeling, 
planning and evaluation before committing to new projects. It is worth noting that D2, D5 and 
B2 feel they restarted their ventures as a low-risk option. B4 appears the most analytical, seeing 
evaluation of opportunities as an intellectual exercise. He and A4 incubate new opportunities 
through their own consulting companies, allowing them to develop new opportunities by 
prototyping products and business models, similar to the Corridor Principle (Ronstadt 1988), 
where new opportunities only become visible from within a new venture. 
In the interviews, there were some indications of a “real options” approach (McGrath 1999; Cave 
and Minty 2004; Klingebiel and Adner 2012), not just regarding opportunity identification but as 
an ongoing method of making decisions. A4 and B2 share a portfolio approach to their new 
ventures, where incremental decisions seem to arise from a continual review of potential 
scenarios, assessing the value and probabilities for each option. D5 has faced several failures and 
each time he weighed his options and continued with the venture, partly reflecting the extreme 
cost of failure in a German company, but also his long-term faith in his product. He is rational 
and unemotional and appears to continually recalibrate the risk-adjusted ‘real option’ value in his 
venture (Bratnicki, Austen et al. 2007), although this calculation includes non-financial factors 
such as social implications and cost to employees, as well as simply a financial return. 
Most interviewees share a science or engineering background but some have a more intuitive 
approach to opportunity identification. D4 is the most extreme here, being almost reckless in 
tackling opportunities without detailed plans or funding. He talks about the ‘internal logic’ of 
startup entrepreneurs, describing startups as a ‘logical’ thing to do at the time, even though they 
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might prove unsuccessful, combining self-belief, a suppression of risks and the opportunity cost 
of ‘missing out’. D1 analyses the financial opportunity in new ventures but takes decisions based 
on personal and family considerations as well as the numbers (Ardichvili, Cardozo et al. 2003): 
B1, B5, A1 and A5 take a similar approach. A3 too relies on ‘gut feel’ instinct and intuition, 
backed up by analysis of markets and technology.  
Risk	  
 
Discussions of risk are common in all three regions, but several Germans (D1, D4, D6) refer to a 
high degree of risk-aversion in Germany, possibly due to stricter bankruptcy implications 
(Fossen 2011; Lee, Yamakawa et al. 2011).  
Interviewees have all started companies and thereby accepted a high level of risk: indeed, failure 
might be seen to confirm 100% risk. Most have learned to mitigate this in different ways: B4 and 
A4 through portfolio approaches and a consulting company (Westhead, Ucbasaran et al. 2005); 
D2, D5, B2 and A1 by re-starting ‘phoenix’ ventures they already understand (Wagner 2002; 
Metzger 2006), and B1 and A5 through increased diligence. After (multiple) failed ventures, B4 
and A4 retain their private consulting companies, a revenue-generating platform for pursuing 
new projects. 
B5 believes that visibility drives the individual’s perception of risk: when a venture is announced 
to the world, the exposure generates personal credibility risk as much as financial risk. D4 sees it 
differently. His sense of responsibility drives his risk level: having persuaded employees to leave 
good jobs, they now depend on him. For others (D1, D3, A5) knowledge of their situation 
defines the level of risk, and based on the quantity and transparency of information available, 
they can adjust their plans as required. Such a world-view appears to automatically evaluate what 
might go wrong, improving decision-making and confidence in tackling complex scenarios: 
parallels may be drawn here with real options theory (McGrath 1999; Cave and Minty 2004; 
Klingebiel and Adner 2012). Perhaps real options perspectives may also incorporate non-
financial issues such as social stigma as well as VC attitudes and bankruptcy implications 
(Seung-Hyun, Peng et al. 2007). 
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D3 describes the risk levels he experienced in large companies (low), startups (high) and his 
current academic role (minimal). D4 sees things more simply, with reward (upside) being linked 
with risk: his appetite for startup risk went unrewarded but was part of the game. D2 and D5 
remind us though, that the risk of failure in Germany is higher than elsewhere due to the personal 
tax liability when a company fails. 
Risk can be subjective: B2 ran up significant credit-card debt to finance his projects because he 
regarded the risk (and effort required) as far lower than requesting a bank loan. B5 invested three 
times the value of his house in his venture, but over such a long timescale that it went largely 
unnoticed – his losses were affordable (Dew, Sarasvathy et al. 2009). A1 contrasts his own 
perception of risk with that of his family, but believes their emphasis on large company safety is 
misplaced – there is no ‘safe haven’ alternative. 
Personal	  Cost	  and	  Stress	  
 
The personal cost of failure appears to be high in all interviews, with D6 and B6 suffering most.  
A2, B2 and D6 suffered high personal consequences of failure (Ucbasaran, Shepherd et al. 
2012): marriage breakdowns, alcoholism and serious illness. D6’s marriage ended - his wife left 
him and their two young children as his business was still failing. He was later hospitalized with 
exhaustion. He describes his energy levels dropping to “zero” and tells of a close friend in 
Munich who experienced the same level of personal cost and a decade of debt repayment. D6 
invested his own money in his venture and has no reserves to call upon. He is currently 
unemployed and having difficulty finding a job or startup opportunity. 
D4 suggests over fifteen years he earned less than he could have earned with lower stress as a 
Siemens executive. D5 endured extended periods where his company survival was doubtful and 
could have lost everything, but is unemotional about the experience, while A2 remains angry at 
his treatment by investors. 
The personal cost of failure depends on circumstances: while D1 and D2 took on the burdens of 
personal liability, B1, B4 and A6 simply walked away at the end of the venture. This partly 
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reflects the stringent German bankruptcy laws compared to Britain and the USA (Seung-Hyun, 
Peng et al. 2007; Primo and Green 2011). 
Speed and duration can also have impact. B2’s apparently successful company collapsed 
overnight when accounting errors were discovered: the demise was so sudden that there was little 
stress at that time. B3 points out that stress lies in the decline, not just in the failure (Pretorius 
2008). There may be an extended period of tension when, under scrutiny from investors, 
employees and customers, the probability of survival decreases. Stories need to be told to 
reassure investors and employees, and the founder may need to sustain multiple versions of the 
truth, a further source of tension. B6 had to handle prospects who promise to buy but do not sign. 
This power dynamic in which the customer (former colleagues of B6) had the ability to decide 
the fate of his company, is a likely source of much of B6’s stress. B3 describes the activity of 
saving the company (which may succeed, and be called ‘recovery’) as always stressful, but 
‘having failed’ may not be stressful at all. 
A4 and A6 both comment on their loneliness and isolation (Kilduff and Brass 2010), and loss of 
control also contributes to stress levels (B4, D6, B6). However, this is not always the case: A3 
accepts her situation when she loses control. B3, A2 and B4 emphasize how physical fitness 
helps sustain a failing venture, representing something they can control. B2 took on personal 
bank guarantees and turned to alcohol: he regrets this (Baron 2000) but is proud to have dealt 
with both issues - having restored control, repaid debts and regained sobriety. B1 and B6 regard 
interpersonal relationships as the highest cause of stress in a failing venture, dealing with 
employees, investors and board members. 
A2 experienced severe stress-related health problems at the height of his business problems. He 
was working 80 hours a week, making no money and accumulating debt while his mother was ill 
and his wife was pregnant: burnout is a high risk in startups (Coombs, Webb et al. 2009). 
However, in retrospect, he sees his health problems as part of a natural adaptation process: stress 
is neither good nor bad, you simply have to learn how to deal with it. 
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Self-­‐Efficacy	  
 
All interviewees demonstrated strong belief in their efficacy as entrepreneurs, even at times of 
vulnerability and desperation (particularly D6 and B6). 
D1 started his first business confidently, 4,000 miles from home with few resources, dependent 
on others to help him. He created a new sector, not just new opportunities, suggesting one needs 
to change one’s environment not just one’s situation (Read and Sarasvathy 2005; Pollack, 
Burnette et al. 2012). D2 demonstrates remarkable self-efficacy by re-starting his company 
during bankruptcy (Lee, Yamakawa et al. 2011). D4 is willing to take risks based on his 
judgment. He left a corporate job to start his first company, expecting his co-workers to quit their 
jobs too, but his high (false) expectations were not met. He regards himself as driven and self-
confident, but believes others in Germany see him as fickle and lacking stamina (Engelen 2010). 
He enjoys being an entrepreneur more than making money and the self-belief and exposure to 
risk offers a personal thrill (Liu and Colman 2009). For D4, entrepreneurship requires more than 
success, it involves changing his environment into one in which he can succeed. 
D5 is a calm, confident person when events turn against him. He describes himself as optimistic 
but not enthusiastic, respected by customers and investors for his integrity and honesty (Hayton 
and Cholakova 2010). He has demonstrated this by dealing with multiple crises at the same time. 
D6 does not refer to self-efficacy: his family lost confidence in him when his earnings 
diminished and he faced financial ruin. Yet despite his business collapse, marriage breakdown 
and poor health, he is developing a new venture. 
B3 and B6 believe they can succeed in the right circumstances and that their learning from 
failure makes future success more likely, although this view is not entirely supported by the 
academic literature (Holland 2008; Holland and Shepherd 2011). B1 and B4 received multiple 
job offers as new graduates and anticipate no problem getting funding for future ventures. B2 
also feels able to fix problems and get things done. However, excess confidence and an 
overwhelming sense of self-efficacy can be a sign of hubris (Hayward, Forster et al. 2010): B4 
describes the surge of self-belief and optimism after a successful exit, which may lead to folly in 
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the next venture. He views self-efficacy as a parallel to self-criticism, suggesting he is his own 
harshest critic. 
A1 is self-confident and believes in the future success of his company. A2 is proud of the 
intellectual property he generates but knows the importance of momentum in building 
companies: when things go well, self-belief spreads to employees, investors and partners (Baron, 
Hmieleski et al. 2012). At his lowest point, A2 spent a weekend writing code that within months 
provided an IP sale and new employment contract, rescuing him from bankruptcy. 
A3 is perhaps an exception to the self-efficacy theme. She is also the only female interviewee. 
She appears confident in her technical capability and experience, but keener to talk about 
mentors and supporters than her own effectiveness. She reflects qualities that might be regarded 
as the opposite of effectuation: collaborative, deferential and accepting (Shinnar, Giacomin et al. 
2012). A4 is confident like A2 in his technical abilities, but perhaps A6 is the most assured US 
interviewee – he starts companies, advises the heads of major multinational corporations and 
writes books. Talking to him gives the impression there is nothing he cannot do (Trevelyan 2007; 
Hmieleski and Baron 2009).  
(ii)	  Regional	  Commonalities	  
 
Some themes occur frequently across all regions, but appear differently in each region. 
Making	  References	  to	  One’s	  Own	  Region	  
 
Most interviewees have extensive international experience and offer insights on how 
entrepreneurial failure is approached in other countries. The German subjects compare Germany 
with other regions. D1 sees Germany’s Nazi history casting a shadow of national failure, leading 
to a cultural fear of failure and keenness for correctness, thereby avoiding unnecessary risks 
(Mueller and Thomas 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede et al. 2010). Germany is a successful economy 
and can afford strong funding infrastructure for startups (D2), but D2 believes this is poorly 
targeted and the success rate of very early-stage projects is low (Almus 2004; Lückgen, 
Oberschachtsiek et al. 2006). D3 suggests that Germans need to see evidence of success before 
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taking risks and a major societal shift is required to change this (Harhoff 2008). He also sees that 
startups represent a rare outlet for business-driven creativity in Germany and believes this should 
be encouraged.  
Tenacity is regarded as a German strength (Wagner 2002), and tackling difficult, long-term 
technical problems is seen as a suitable focus for German entrepreneurship (D4). German 
subjects recognize how independence (‘selbständig werden,’ or becoming independent) is highly 
regarded but if this involves risking other peoples’ money, it is perceived as disreputable (D4). 
There is a German emphasis on creating financial and social value (D4, D5) and stigma attaches 
to someone who “walks away” as much as to those who fail (Landier 2005). 
In the UK, B4 credits Cambridge University for providing good infrastructure and support even 
when ventures fail, but although an ecosystem was created around the university (Garnsey and 
Heffernan 2005; Herriot and Minshall 2006) its momentum has not been maintained (B3). B3 
also suggests that Cambridge is an easy place in which to appear successful, and as a result 
people may be less driven to succeed. The city is seen as too small and insular to sustain growth, 
and no self-reinforcing ecosystem (involving external institutions such as international banks) 
has developed (B1). Close relationships, especially through the university, can become too 
stifling and self-defeating, and envy often results when people succeed (B5). 
Making	  References	  to	  Other	  Countries	  
 
UK interviewees regard America as more tolerant of failure. B1 suggests self-belief and self-
efficacy differ by region, and attitudes to failure follow this (B1): entrepreneurs are simply ‘less 
remarkable’ in the USA (B2). B2 praises the engineering focus of German startups (Sternberg 
and Litzenberger 2004; Rocha and Sternberg 2005), but indicates these same engineers might be 
mystified by the existence of a ‘portfolio entrepreneur.’ Swedish-born B3 suggests there is a lack 
of respect for valuable experience in the UK compared with other European countries – in his 
view, failure may be just another outcome which the British use to under-appreciate people. B6 
blames university scientists for his downfall and sees how much better German universities deal 
with scientific startups (Buenstorf 2007). 
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A1 reflects on German VC investors (his failure disappointed them) and his Chinese heritage, 
where entrepreneurs “eat their young,” and when you fail you “just pick yourself up.” Iranian-
born A4 and A6 comment on the absence of California-style entrepreneurial culture in Iran, 
while Indian-born A3 recognizes a fatalistic cultural acceptance of failure in her native country. 
A2 is now working with a Swedish firm, which takes a longer-term investment view than 
American VCs (Berglund 2011). A6 typifies India and China as being more capable of 
exploiting the IP of others than inventing their own and sees Latin American countries as too 
laid-back. A3 suggests national differences in attitude are misleading: being ‘driven’ as an 
individual entrepreneur is much more important than your ethnicity or origin (A3). 
 
	  (iii)	  Cross-­‐Case	  Outliers:	  Regional	  Differences	  
 
German	  Exceptions:	  Tenacity;	  Collaboration;	  Luck	  and	  Serendipity	  
 
In the interviews, tenacity is regarded as a German quality (Wagner 2002; Stam, Audretsch et al. 
2008). D1 chose to face his creditors and the German tax system, when he could have stayed 
away. He persisted in the face of personal and business adversity, including a three-year period 
of repaying debts incurred by another officer. D4 endured a decade of cyclical failure and 
recovery in one of his ventures. D5 suffered multiple complete collapses in his software firm 
over 23 years: he regards persistence as preferable to the personal consequences of bankruptcy 
(Seung-Hyun, Peng et al. 2007; Lee, Yamakawa et al. 2011). 
D2 was one of eleven collaborators and investors in their spin-off company: when bankruptcy 
occurred D2 accepted all the responsibility but in his restart he took all the equity. D3’s first 
software venture was highly collaborative yet he recalls a lack of common vision leading to its 
demise. D5’s co-founders dropped out early, lacking sufficient skills to contribute despite their 
personal co-founder relationships. D5 feels more connected with companies’ technology and 
business challenges than with individual founders. D6’s ventures are collaborative as a founding 
principle: he regards drug discovery processes as too slow and they need to be replaced by a 
faster, collaborative approach. 
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Luck and serendipity featured highly in German interviews but less in the UK or USA. D1 
believes in the impact of luck and chance on one’s life (Cooper, Woo et al. 1988; Liu 2010). He 
travelled far from his family to ‘prove himself’ and start his own venture, but the tragic death of 
his father coincided with a time of significant business turmoil, changing the course of his life 
(D1). D2 also talks about luck: he feels unlucky to have been defrauded but fortunate to have 
extracted the assets and restarted the business. He believes he put himself in a position to be 
lucky, as does D3, whose persistence resulted in a perfect academic opportunity years after an 
earlier application had failed. D4 met his future angel investor through concerted networking: he 
suggests luck emerges from unlikely sources, and engaging with many possible collaborators 
increases the chance of success. D6 in contrast was fortunate to win a million-mark business plan 
competition, but sees this with hindsight as ‘easy money’ that caused problems later. 
British	  Exceptions:	  Self-­‐Deprecating	  Language;	  Teaching	  and	  Mentoring;	  Family	  
 
UK interviewees made frequent self-deprecating and self-mocking comments, perhaps 
confirming stereotypes of the British sense of humour (Fox 2005). B1 under-states his 
achievements, credits the contribution of those around him and describes himself as ‘fortunate’ 
to have the trust of others. B3 is self-mocking, doing the ‘donkey work,’ and B5 refers to himself 
and his team as “Muppets.” 
Regional exceptions arise from the absence as well as profusion of certain themes. American and 
German interviewees contain far more references to teaching and mentorship than British 
subjects (see Table 15), despite Cambridge University’s world-leading status (Quacquarelli-
Symonds 2012). All UK interviewees are Cambridge graduates, some with teaching experience, 
but their views on teaching and mentorship are separated from reflections on their ventures. In 
contrast D1 and D3 (leaders of Munich university entrepreneurship centres) weave teaching into 
their business careers. American interviewees share an emphasis on mentoring, especially A3. 
British interviewees fail to talk much about family, except B1 who describes taking extended 
leave to be with his young children. This contrasts to other regions. In Germany, D1 talks about 
the significance of his father’s death on his subsequent business career. D2 and D4 received 
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strong support from their wives. D4 mentions his parents’ supportive attitudes to 
entrepreneurship, as does D5 (Vasumathi, Govindarajalu et al. 2003). In the American analysis, 
A1 starts companies against the wishes of his wife and parents, who do not appreciate why he 
works so hard at such high risk for unclear rewards (A1). A2’s mother became seriously ill and 
his wife had a difficult pregnancy while his company was failing: A5 and A6 also experienced 
family illnesses during the downturn of their companies, and A3 describes the influence of her 
grandfather (a state attorney in India) instilling an ethos of public service and social involvement 
(De Carolis and Saparito 2006). She regards her collaborative startup partly in terms of a social 
experience. 
American	  Exceptions:	  Stigma	  and	  Counterfactual	  Thinking	  
 
Two significant themes that occur frequently in the German and British interviews are less 
prevalent in the American transcripts: stigma and counterfactual (or ‘what-if’) thinking. 
German subjects talk extensively about stigma. D1 feels a strong enough desire to avoid 
bankruptcy and the stigma of failure that he works for three years to pay off debts accumulated 
by his partner. D2 experienced bankruptcy and suggests that stigma applies to failed 
entrepreneurs in Germany - “people remember” - though not to him (Crocker and Major 2003). 
D4 and D5 are afraid of the German bankruptcy process, choosing to re-start their companies 
rather than close them, and D4 suggests that in Germany a bankrupt is regarded as a perpetrator 
not a victim. D6 corroborates this view – he feels the stigma of failure keenly and is still shunned 
by potential employers. 
B6 failed twice in his specialized scientific area: within this closed community, ‘social’ stigma 
has high impact and intensity, although British subjects said that such stigma had not restricted 
their career progress. Several British subjects indicated it might be less important to themselves 
than less entrepreneurial citizens (B2, B4): perhaps becoming an entrepreneur requires such 
reserves of self-efficacy that stigma remains observed but not felt. B2’s experience suggests that 
stigma requires isolation (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann et al. 2008) and when this can be minimized, 
so can the stigma. The lack of commentary on stigma by American interviewees may indicate it 
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is less of an issue for them: none of the US subjects sees lasting damage from their failed 
ventures. 
Regarding counterfactual thinking, D1 recalls viewing his university contemporaries with well-
paid and secure careers and thinking he had made a mistake becoming an entrepreneur. D3 
misses the creativity of his startup. D4 missed the Netscape IPO window to reach a ten-year 
pension target with his company, making the ‘wrong choice’. Later, he left a second startup early 
in his stock-vesting plan. His reflections are not bitter but pragmatic: he focuses on making new 
opportunities not regretting missed chances (Baron 2000). D5 alone makes no reference to ‘what 
might have been’ - dealing with reality, rather than wishing events had turned out differently 
(Arora, Haynie et al. 2011). 
British interviews reveal some regrets, regarding B2’s alcohol abuse and B6’s poor choice of 
business partners, but failure is not the only source of regret. B1 regrets selling his first company 
too early in the dot-com bubble. Similarly B4 regrets the loss of control in his first venture, as do 
B1, B2 and B6 (Baron 2004). 
	  (iv)	  Cross-­‐Case	  Outliers:	  Individual	  Exceptions	  
 
The following contains exceptions, which either represent the only interview to reveal certain 
themes or the only interview to not address them. 
D4.	  Feeling	  More	  Like	  an	  American	  Than	  a	  German	  
 
D4 appears to be extrovertly positive and enthusiastic in his interview: things are “super”, 
“brilliant” and “fantastic,” or a waste of time (Baron, Hmieleski et al. 2012). He believes his 
personality is more American than German and considers his risk-taking attitude as un-German 
(Guo and Zhao 2010), feeling more at home in the USA, especially in Silicon Valley where he 
worked for several years. He grew up listening to American Radio in Germany and has always 
read widely in English, watched American TV and believes American business attitudes of 
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creativity, risk-taking and assertiveness are strongly preferable to German conservatism, and that 
his experience of failure would be very different in the USA (D4). 
D6.	  Extreme	  Personal	  Costs	  of	  Failure;	  Frustration	  with	  Lawyers	  
 
D6 won Munich’s first business plan competition but subsequently failed to secure further 
funding. He believes the actions of his investors and their lawyers were illegal: in particular, 
appointing an external consultant to replace him as CEO and subsequently buying company IP 
out of bankruptcy for a competing firm. He later discovered these aggressive legal tactics were 
indeed invalid but at the time he was overwhelmed by events: they damaged his reputation 
(Crocker and Major 2003; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann et al. 2008) and subsequently this 
discouraged potential investors and employers. 
D6 endured much conflict in the collapse of his first venture and describes the frustration of 
losing control and becoming an observer of the destruction of his own firm. He frankly describes 
the painful personal consequences of his failed ventures, including the extreme isolation and 
loneliness arising from his experience and the extreme cost to his health and to his family (a 
failed marriage). 
A3.	  Emphasis	  on	  Mentorship	  and	  Ethnicity	  
 
In her interview, A3 describes how cultures develop and the difference between (slow and 
conservative) large company culture and creative, innovative start-ups. She sees collaboration 
and a willingness to listen to other perspectives as integral to the startup process (Leskinen 
2012), confirming her strong advocacy of mentorship. As a student and a startup co-founder she 
enjoyed strong relationships with two mentors, both academics. When one died, she experienced 
more sadness and grief than when her startup failed (Shepherd, Wiklund et al. 2009). In his 
memory, she co-founded a Palo Alto-based mentor network that now claims five hundred 
supporters. Born and raised in Gandhi’s home state, she describes how peace and fairness 
(Janson, Levy et al. 2008) guide her everyday life. She addresses attitudes to failure in a cultural 
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context: “When things go wrong, there is a lot of acceptance that comes from people from 
Eastern cultures.” (A3). 
Her Indian origin and ethnicity provide a non-Western perspective of failure and its 
consequences: “You kind of have to move on and things happen in life, which are not in our 
control. I think in the Western world, there is a very strong sense of you control things. That's 
where the blame comes from.” (A3). This acceptance of consequences, rather than a quest for 
control and blame (Miller and Ross 1975), differentiates India from Silicon Valley. She talks 
about the essential self-efficacy of immigrants (Hart, Acs et al. 2009), validated by surviving the 
immigration process itself, but suggests ethnicity does not determine entrepreneurial success or 
failure – the culture of the entrepreneurial survivor does. 
A4.	  The	  Absence	  of	  References	  to	  Learning	  or	  Learning-­‐By	  Doing	  
 
A4 states “Every time I have a failure I say, ‘Okay, alright now, what to do?’” (A4). He is 
assessing the impact and consequences of a venture failure here, but he makes no explicit 
references to learning, simply recalling what happened in his various ventures. Perhaps this is 
reflected in his portfolio approach (Westhead, Ucbasaran et al. 2005), running a consulting 
company in parallel to incubating new ventures through customer projects. It is curious he does 
not refer explicitly to learning or lessons arising but moves on quickly in the interview, without 
reflection: it is possible that he sees learning is implicit, requiring no mention. 
A6.	  Blame	  and	  Self-­‐Importance	  
 
There was little attribution of blame among the interviews except in the case of A6. While others 
talked about failed ventures and conflicts with investors and board members, they did not 
allocate blame to others: typically they accepted responsibility for their situation (Poon and Lau 
1999). A6 however, makes multiple references to people who led to his downfall. His investors, 
failing to secure his company's future, are described as unsupportive and intellectually inferior. 
People he hired, and who he was therefore responsible for bringing into the company, are weak 
and ineffective. Moreover, his strategy was poor – but he distances himself from the failed 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 175 of 216 
strategy by attributing it to others. This attitude is striking: all the other interviewees demonstrate 
a strong sense of personal responsibility for their ventures, especially D1, D2, D6, B1, B2, A1 
and A2. B6 allocates some blame to a cadre of academic customers but A6 is particularly quick 
to name investors and colleagues when explaining what they did wrong.  
This is accompanied by a high degree of self-importance (Miller and Ross 1975). A6’s 
background as a top executive with the world’s leading telecommunications company may partly 
explain this, but he offers examples of his self-perceived effectiveness (being an advisor to secret 
government agencies and transformation executives), and describes himself as well-connected 
with many world leaders. In the interview, his approach was charming and effective, including 
his attempting to flatter this researcher with comments about his skills and experience. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 
 
This research applies a phenomenological approach to examine the attitudes of habitual high-
technology entrepreneurs to early-stage failure in several regions. The findings are presented in 
analysis Chapters 5, 5A, 5B, 5C and 6. This analysis is necessarily idiographic, concentrating on 
the subjective experience of individuals, rather than a generalized examination that may lead to a 
predictive model of behaviour. 
The primary goal of this research is to investigate attitudes of early-stage technology 
entrepreneurs to failure: in phenomenological terms this means examining the ‘lived world’ of 
the entrepreneurs regarding a specific experience (failure), and making a direct connection, as far 
as possible, to individual subjects, seeking to explore and reveal the essential types and structures 
of experiences (Burrell and Morgan 1979), and to do so without preconceptions or assumptions. 
Themes that emerge from this examination do so directly from the interviewees: they are 
responding to the request to describe their experience of one or more of their failed ventures, and 
their reflections flow from this stimulus. Other qualitative approaches such as case study analysis 
require, to some extent, a pre-existing framework to evaluate responses to surveys or structured 
interviews, or may apply an ethnographic approach to observe entrepreneurs ‘in the wild’. In 
contrast, we have attempted to gain access as directly as possible to entrepreneurs’ attitudes 
about their failure experiences and their responses. Therefore, although any prescriptive findings 
emerging from this research should be viewed with caution, it is hoped that any statements made 
by the entrepreneurs themselves are as authentic and ‘unsolicited’ as possible. 
A secondary purpose of the research is methodological: to explore this subject using a 
phenomenological method (in this case, IPA) and probe the limitations of this approach – is this 
a valid way of researching complex entrepreneurial experiences and outcomes? Does it reveal 
insights not possible through other methods? This chapter examines such issues, discussing the 
findings of the research and the appropriateness of the research methodology used here. 
A third goal of this research is comparative, evaluating evidence from interviews to determine 
whether attitudes to failure differ between regions. As well as summarizing the analysis of actual 
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interviews, there is a cultural context to be discussed (Mueller and Thomas 2001; Hofstede, 
Hofstede et al. 2010). 
In the spirit of ‘engaged scholarship’ (Ven 2007) the preliminary findings from this research 
have been documented and presented at multiple conferences (Cotterill 2011a; Cotterill 2011b) 
and in peer-reviewed journal papers (Cotterill 2012). The formal comments of reviewers and 
informal conference conversations arising from this wider academic engagement are reflected in 
this thesis. 
On a personal note, this research offers subjective findings beyond the formal results discussed 
in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Firstly, there is the paradox concerning issues regarded as important 
phenomena by entrepreneurs (such as stigma), but which are not a practical concern to them: a 
social force appears to be recognized as important while its relevance is diminished. This may 
indicate that self-efficacy among such entrepreneurs is sufficiently strong that such social forces 
they understand intellectually may not impact them personally. 
Secondly, some UK interviewees indicated the importance of social context: themes of bitterness 
and jealousy were observed, particularly regarding the attitudes of others to their failure. In the 
researcher’s exploratory first-year interviews, Cambridge was described as a network of (merely) 
400 relevant people, and the veracity of anyone’s entrepreneurial account could be ascertained 
by two phone calls within that network. This may suggest that attitudes of British entrepreneurs 
to failure are affected by their social network and context, and this may be less prevalent 
elsewhere. 
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Review	  of	  Research	  Question	  
 
The research question for this thesis is:  
How do attitudes of habitual high-technology entrepreneurs to early-stage failure differ in Silicon 
Valley, Cambridge and Munich?  
It is appropriate at this stage to ask whether this question has been answered or whether the 
research drifted into other areas. Although a literature review (Chapter 2) disclosed that 
academic writing on entrepreneurship does not necessarily emphasize high-technology or 
habitual founders, the research design and interviews for this thesis are highly focused by all 
aspects of the research question. To the extent that differences in attitudes of individual 
entrepreneurs are documented in chapters 5A, 5B, 5C and 6, I believe that evidence indicates the 
research question has been directly answered. 
It may be argued that a wide-ranging interview process such as that employed here inevitably 
risks deviation into areas that interviewees want to pursue. The skills of the interviewer help to 
mitigate this risk (Smith 2010) and such dangers are hopefully offset by the benefit that themes 
emerging from analysis of these interviews are as undiluted as possible, offering raw 
recollections of these difficult experiences and attitudes towards them. It must be noted that this 
researcher is new to academic research and much learning was conducted ‘on the job’ without a 
direct IPA mentor, but the skill of guiding interviewees to remain focused on the interview 
question is backed by 25 years of handling complex business meetings requiring tact, subtlety 
and clarity. 
Although the interviewees occasionally stray into peripheral areas, the explicit aim of each 
meeting is to discuss their failure experiences, and transcripts demonstrate that this goal has been 
achieved. However, even when the subjects try to distract from painful experiences, this was 
noted as relevant behaviour: even attempts to distract might reveal something of their attitudes to 
failure. 
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Detailed findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 suggest there are more commonalities than 
differences in attitudes of habitual entrepreneurs in early-stage high-technology ventures across 
these three regions.  
More	  Commonalities	  than	  Differences	  
 
The interview analysis indicates that the attitudes of high-tech habitual entrepreneurs to failure 
present more commonalities than differences between regions. Perhaps the effort and motivation 
required to become an habitual entrepreneur establishes a core set of skills and attitudes that 
prevail regardless of location, region, ethnicity or background (Mueller and Thomas 2001). 
For example, most interviewees see the importance of learning from failure (Cope and Cave 
2008; McKenzie and Sud 2008; Cope 2011). Similarly, entrepreneurs appear to share similar 
approaches to opportunity identification (Sarasvathy 2004; Tang, Kacmar et al. 2012), although 
where differences emerge they are at the individual rather than regional level (Cave and Minty 
2004; Hayton and Cholakova 2010). Another commonality lies in the willingness to discuss 
reasons for failure, sharing many themes in the literature on failure (Larson and Clute 1979; 
Zacharakis, Meyer et al. 1999; Pretorius 2008) but adding context with further, personal reasons. 
Self-efficacy was well represented in all interviews and this offers the opportunity to discuss 
‘effectuation’ as a lens for entrepreneurial failure (Read and Sarasvathy 2005; Sarasvathy 2008; 
Dew, Sarasvathy et al. 2009). Such self-efficacy may be needed to set against the personal cost 
and stress (Shepherd, Wiklund et al. 2009) which was recalled by all interviewees. 
Finally, the importance of language and narrative is common throughout the analysis. Many 
category codes which were analyzed into emergent themes were explicit, but others involved use 
of language to reveal underlying themes such as family influences (A1), recklessness (D4) or 
bitterness (B6). Most interviewees present themselves as skilled, persuasive storytellers 
(Downing 2005; Gartner 2007; Harmeling 2011) even when describing their failed ventures, and 
the detailed analysis of language is essential to seek hidden meanings in the transcribed text. 
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The	  Significance	  of	  Effectuation	  
 
Although there are only limited explicit references to ‘self-efficacy’, many themes arising in the 
interviews point to the importance of this in the way entrepreneurs face failure and respond. 
These entrepreneurs drive change in their industry and firms: ‘habitual’ entrepreneurs 
(MacMillan 1986) have started other ventures, and many do so after having failed. Yet 
comments they make about their experiences and actions consistently demonstrate that they feel 
they are not victims of causal forces acting against them, but controllers of their destiny. Even if 
they subsequently fail, their attitude may reflect the world view described by Sarasvathy, which 
is that entrepreneurs effect change on their environment, including business opportunities they 
identify and drive forward to a conclusion (Sarasvathy 2008; Read, Sarasvathy et al. 2011). 
The interviews therefore display strong evidence of self-efficacy, regardless of region. The worst 
affected entrepreneurs (perhaps D6 and B6) remain driven to master their environment and build 
the business they desire. This goes beyond an awareness of skills and talents (Klyver and 
Thornton 2010; Pollack, Burnette et al. 2012) to make things happen, towards a holistic personal 
philosophy that an individual can change his environment (Sarasvathy 2008). 
Language	  and	  Narrative;	  Implications	  for	  Methodology	  
 
In the analysis chapters there is evidence of how language and narrative reveal insights about 
attitudes of entrepreneurs to failure. For example, British self-deprecating comments indicate a 
willingness to acknowledge defeat (B1, B5), and American vagueness in terminology permits 
more positive inferences from loose interpretation of facts (A4, A6).  
This evidence has two implications. (1) Findings emerging from language, which are outlined in 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6, indicate that the analysis of language and narrative is an important 
tool for this research. (2) It can be argued that this chosen methodology (IPA) identifies certain 
themes that might only emerge from analysis of language in such complex subject areas. Perhaps 
this suggests the analysis of language and narrative should play a greater explicit role in such 
future research. 
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Opportunity	  Identification	  
 
Interviewees in all regions described their approach to new opportunities, how they identify and 
evaluate them. Although this represents a range from highly analytical (B4, A1) to more intuitive 
(D4, B5, A3), the process of opportunity identification is considered to be an important aspect of 
failure and its aftermath. As ‘habitual’ entrepreneurs, these interviewees have faced the 
consequences of failure and found their next opportunity, so they each have personal reflections. 
One aspect of this involves the application of real-options theory to the way opportunities are 
evaluated, not just initially but at each stage of the development (and decline) of a startup 
company. 
Stigma	  
 
In preliminary interviews in Germany, stigma arising from failure was identified as particularly 
strong in German society. Paradoxically, the formal German interviews contained extensive 
references to this phenomenon, yet only one interviewee (D6) felt directly affected by it. For the 
others, it was a social force, difficult to define but easy to recognize, which pervaded German 
society through history, the education system, the funding process for early-stage startups and so 
on (Crocker and Major 2003; Landier 2005; Burchell and Hughes 2006). 
Even D6, who experiences stigma in practical terms as discrimination against him for new 
employment and investment, is keen to start a new company as soon as possible. Perhaps this 
reflects necessity – he needs to start his own company because nobody will hire him – but also 
demonstrates his individualism and self-efficacy. It is possible that individualistic entrepreneurs 
are predisposed to be at odds with a collectivist social context, and that anyone strong enough to 
become an entrepreneur in the face of such latent hostility may be less likely to be affected by 
such intangible social forces. 
Another example of a social force is the ‘fear of failure’ referenced by German interviewees, but 
despite such forces the individuals concerned have persisted in their endeavours. As a 
phenomenon it is present in Germany and observed by interviewees (D1-6) and academics 
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(Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann et al. 2008; Damaraju, Barney et al. 2010): it is seen as impactful and 
important, but still largely ignored in practice by entrepreneurs. Perhaps this provides further 
indirect support for effectuation. 
Review	  of	  Cultural	  Dimensions	  
 
A comparison of attitudes to failure in multiple countries invokes a discussion of national 
‘culture’ and the findings of multiple GEM studies. Although Hofstede’s studies are national 
rather than local, our IPA findings appear to reflect themes in his model (Hofstede, Hofstede et 
al. 2010) particularly concerning Individualism (‘IDV’) and Uncertainty Avoidance (‘UAI’). 
German interviews emphasize teamwork and collaboration, reflecting a lower level of 
individualism than the UK and USA. Furthermore, recurring references by Germans to their own 
cultural issues indicate a self-referential concern. In terms of risk avoidance and the associated 
fear and stigma of failure, Hofstede’s rankings are significant, indicating Germans may avoid 
risk and failure more than other nations. 
On the other hand, this research might suggest that characteristics and self-efficacy of habitual 
(technology) entrepreneurs transcend regional boundaries. Baumol documents how (American) 
entrepreneurs have been perceived over time by large corporations and government (Baumol 
2004), and introduces the term ‘counterculture’ to describe a degree of disruption in economic 
and technology cycles, which he suggests entrepreneurs are uniquely suited to trigger and 
exploit. Perhaps technology entrepreneurship is counter-cultural in itself: regardless of region, 
entrepreneurs present a counter-cultural stimulus to change the status quo, as well as an 
economic force taking risks to build businesses. 
Theoretical	  Implications	  
 
The findings of this research offers implications for extant theory in multiple areas, within the 
methodological constraint that these research findings describe individual experiences rather than 
offering a predictive model for future behaviour. 
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Firstly, the analysis of entrepreneurial failure might be seen to support the rising importance of 
‘effectuation’ as a way of understanding entrepreneurship (Sarasvathy 2008). Sarasvathy seems 
to offer two distinct contributions: theoretical and practical. In theoretical terms, she outlines a 
model for general effectuation (see Figure 20) and applies this to entrepreneurship, examining 
“Elements of Effectual Expertise.” The model outlined in Figure 20 (Sarasvathy 2008: 101) 
describes how entrepreneurs address their situation: developing new opportunities from self-
assessment and skills, making an impact on their environment as well as creating opportunities 
within it. In contrast to a causal, mechanistic approach in which personality traits and economic 
factors intersect and lead to the creation of opportunity, Sarasvathy describes the ‘effect’ of 
entrepreneurs on the world around them. This is consistent with findings from the interviews: 
almost all display strong self-efficacy and an approach similar to that in Figure 20 before, during 
and after their experiences of failure. For example, D1 created an industry, not just a venture, to 
satisfy the opportunity he saw, and A2 transformed his failed situation through a clear 
assessment of available resources to develop a survival plan. Sarasvathy’s practical contribution 
includes the establishment of a collaborative forum for academics and entrepreneurs providing 
research, teaching and guidance for new ventures – the Society for Effectual Action (Sarasvathy, 
Ransler et al. 2011). 
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Figure 20. Sarasvathy's Dynamic Model of Effectuation (Sarasvathy 2008: 101) 
 
Secondly, a number of theoretical areas can be revisited in light of this research: attribution 
theory, prospect theory and real-options theory. In assessing their failures, a number of our 
entrepreneurs attribute blame (Miller and Ross 1975; Poon and Lau 1999), but most do not. This 
may indicate that attribution theory may be of lower value to the examination of failure than 
expected: perhaps failed entrepreneurs want to understand and learn from their setbacks more 
than attribute blame.  
Regarding prospect theory, all of the interviewees have undertaken ventures that failed, with 
some re-starting or founding new ventures: all have persisted through difficult times. These 
individuals have regarded the (new or restart) opportunity as holding more promise than a 
rational economic analysis might reveal, offering insights for prospect theory (Valliere and 
Peterson 2004; Holland 2008). For some interviewees (A2, D2, D5), their ‘phoenix company’ 
restarts and new ventures may represent a triumph of the ‘prospect’ over ‘expected utility’ in 
their decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
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Other theories may be impacted by this research. Real-options theory has been applied to 
entrepreneurial choices (McGrath 1999; Cave and Minty 2004; Bratnicki, Austen et al. 2007), 
and perhaps the failure stories of entrepreneurs in this research help to augment it. For example, 
most interviewees demonstrate an analytical approach to opportunities and decisions, weighing 
and quantifying alternative approaches. Furthermore, in failing companies, as resources decline 
and options diminish, decisions need to be made quickly and some (D5, B3, A2 and A5) 
consciously quantify alternative options and use scenario analysis in making these decisions. 
This is particularly true for B3, who distinguished the process of failing, in which many 
decisions are made during a period of declining control, from the event of failure. Perhaps the 
‘cost of failure’ makes the value of real-options calculus more clear when choices need to be 
made and justified to multiple stakeholders in parallel under conditions of high uncertainty.  
In the area of cognitive psychology, personality traits and confidence have been widely studied 
but the impact of Dispositional Positive Affect (‘DPA’) is a more recent development (Baron, 
Hmieleski et al. 2012). Several interviews are relevant here: with the possible exceptions of A3 
and B3, most present high degrees of self-confidence and resilience, but several demonstrate 
extremely positive opinions on their own abilities and future success (especially B1, D1 and D6). 
The impact of DPA for B4 is explicitly stated, along with the risk of hubris: although positivity 
and confidence are needed to succeed, too much “can lead you to folly.” (B4). 
Other areas of theory require comment. The interviews seem to show that social and 
environmental factors such as ethnic origins or social background appear less important than 
expected from a literature review. However, the importance of narrative and use of language 
arose frequently in the IPA analysis: although some theory has been developed in relation to 
language and narrative by entrepreneurs (Downing 2005; Harmeling 2011), this thesis may 
suggest that more focus is appropriate in this area. 
Finally, the application of IPA needs to be evaluated in understanding complex and sometimes 
contradictory behaviours of failed entrepreneurs. Prior phenomenological studies have offered 
peer-reviewed papers conceptualizing failure as a learning journey (Cope and Cave 2008; Cope 
2011) and an examination of entrepreneurial narratives (McKenzie and Sud 2008). It is hoped 
that this thesis contributes to this prior research specifically through offering a comparative study 
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involving multiple different business cultures, (technology) industry focus as well as a larger 
number of interviewees. 
Review	  of	  Preliminary	  Conceptual	  Framework	  
 
Chapter 1 presented a preliminary conceptual framework (Figure 2), based on exploratory 
interviews and an initial literature review. This was not used to design data gathering or analysis, 
but rather was ‘parked’ after the exploratory stage, and now that formal research has been 
completed, it is time to re-assess its relevance. Based on the detailed analysis of interviews, the 
preliminary framework was revised to incorporate this data. An updated and revised version of 
this framework is provided below (see Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21. Conceptual Framework for the Examination of Entrepreneurial Failure, Revised and Updated in Light of Doctoral 
Research 
During the research leading up to the revision of this framework, the researcher has presented 
and discussed it at multiple academic conferences in the USA and Europe. In the spirit of 
‘Engaged Scholarship’ (Ven 2007), feedback on this has been obtained from various conferences 
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(Cotterill 2011a; Cotterill 2011b; Cotterill 2011c) and peer-reviewed publications (Cotterill 
2012), and this framework attempts to provide a useful approach to examining the experience of 
failure. The framework presented in Figure 21 has been simplified to reflect actual themes 
arising from 18 interviews. Taking frequently occurring themes across all regions, the framework 
was revised to reduce the number of factors outlined on the right side of Figure 21 from 27 to 17: 
this represents a distillation of potential factors based on preliminary literature and interviews, to 
a more evidence-based list.  
Changes were made between the preliminary (Figure 2) and final (Figure 21) versions regarding 
each of the four main aspects of the framework – (1) context; (2) environmental factors; (3) 
personality factors, and (4) entrepreneurial response. These changes are examined in turn. The 
context of failure analysis (1) eliminated three factors (types of entrepreneurs, cluster 
relationships and social networks) from the framework due to the relatively low impact of 
clusters and social networks found in the interviews. The ‘types of entrepreneurs’ identifier was 
removed because the ideographic nature of the final research did not seek (or yield) any insight 
regarding the generic classification of entrepreneurs. 
As for environmental factors (2), ‘reputation’ was expanded to ‘trust & reputation’ in the revised 
framework based on the frequent association between these two themes. Other factors were also 
removed, lacking support from the data: socio-economic background, immigration and ethnicity. 
‘Education’ was also removed during revision: although Cambridge University as an institution 
featured highly in Cambridge interviews, the impact of education did not. The number of 
personality-related factors (3) was also revised, consolidating persistence and tenacity into one 
factor (persistence & tenacity) while eliminating optimism, flexibility, passion and hubris based 
on infrequent occurrence in interviews. However, a new descriptor – ‘personality factors’ – was 
included in the revised version, to cover multiple themes emerging from entrepreneurs (such as 
passion, flexibility and creativity). 
The fourth component in the framework – entrepreneurial response (4) – was more difficult to 
revise based on evidence presented in this thesis. While some factors were removed (re-cycling, 
knowledge acquisition and real-options analysis), new factors (stress and grief & recovery) were 
included, based on the intensity of the personal cost arising from failure experience and 
    
 
Keith Cotterill  Page 189 of 216 
reflections of individual entrepreneurs regarding how they recovered. After some thought, real-
options analysis was removed from the framework: although addressed multiple times in the 
thesis, this approach to evaluating opportunities appears adequately covered by the ‘opportunity 
identification’ factor. 
The revised framework might be used for further academic research, possibly to review similar 
experiences in additional fast-growing economies with developing entrepreneurial cultures, such 
as China and Brazil. Practitioners such as entrepreneurs, advisors and mentors may also use it as 
a guide to structure evaluations of their failure experiences, including counselling for recently 
failed entrepreneurs: a suitable application of this framework would be to work with Venture 
Capital firms to apply coaching techniques for the rapid ‘recovery’ of entrepreneurs. If it is true 
that habitual technology entrepreneurs have experienced common (and exceptional) issues and 
reflections, this may be useful to future entrepreneurs in recovering from their own failed 
ventures and accelerating their next endeavour. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
Main	  Conclusions	  
 
There are five main conclusions from this research, regarding (1) core findings; (2) implications 
for effectuation; (3) the importance of language; (4) the appropriateness of the IPA methodology; 
and (5) implications for practitioners. 
(1) This research suggests there are more commonalities between regions than differences. 
Habitual technology entrepreneurs who experience early-stage failure appear to consider similar 
things: what was the reason for the failure, what have they learned, and what is the next 
opportunity? These are covered extensively in chapters 5 and 6. However, despite the 
commonalities, there are still issues such as stigma arising from failure that is highly prevalent in 
Munich, less so in Cambridge and very little in Silicon Valley. This phenomenon appears to exist 
as a social construct, and is widely reported even though the people who are the alleged victims 
(entrepreneurs who fail) may not themselves feel affected by it. 
(2) Implications for effectuation. Despite what appear to be different operating environments and 
business cultures in the three regions, these entrepreneurs possess high levels of self-efficacy 
which enables them to act in ways that override regional and cultural constraints. For example, 
our German entrepreneurs have all started and re-started multiple businesses in face of the 
cultural pressures, knowing that such ventures are high risk and the cost of failure seems 
particularly high. The recurring evidence of self-efficacy lends support to the wider theory of 
effectuation, in which entrepreneurs tend to have an effect on their environment, rather than 
reacting to psychological, social, economic and other causal factors around them. 
(3) One consequence of the IPA approach is the clear importance of language and narrative in 
the interpretation of entrepreneur’s attitudes. As IPA makes full use of verbatim interview 
transcriptions, language represents a medium of interpretation and so this should not be a 
surprise. However, the frequency with which language reveals implied meaning, or represents 
notable behaviour by the entrepreneur, is striking. It is difficult to see how such insight might 
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emerge from alternative, more structured approaches, which may limit the broadness of 
expression in the interview process. 
(4) It is hoped this research confirms that IPA provides an appropriate methodology for gathering 
rich data in examinations of new domains and new territories, particularly when addressing 
sensitive and traumatic events and relationships such as entrepreneurial failure. However, this 
researcher is an experienced entrepreneur with failed ventures of his own, which may have made 
access to relevant subjects more feasible and made subjects more willing to share experiences, 
but also introduces a potential personal bias into the research. It is hoped this bias has been 
minimized by careful research design and the use of IPA ‘bracketing’ to redact occurrences of 
such bias. Therefore, a mixed conclusion may be drawn: that IPA is capable of revealing insights 
about complex and traumatic experiences, but this does not necessarily improve access to, or 
quality of interaction with interviewees: perhaps the skill of the researcher is particularly 
important to the research outcome. 
(5) The commonalities in attitudes to failure of habitual high-technology entrepreneurs in early-
stage ventures might suggest that the conceptual framework outlined above (see Figure 21) could 
be used in discussions with (future) failed entrepreneurs as they evaluate their next steps. This 
might demonstrate another application of ‘engaged scholarship’ (Ven 2007), enabling an obvious 
crossover and communication point between academic and business domains. Furthermore, such 
a framework might be enhanced and extended by such application. 
This researcher, reflecting on his extensive personal experience, might suggest further 
conclusions, although these are not necessarily supported by evidence from this thesis. One such 
reflection is the importance of failure for future entrepreneurs: if failure is so frequent, then it 
may appear short-sighted to omit such a topic from university courses on entrepreneurship, or to 
neglect to support failed entrepreneurs when there is so much focus on other aspects of 
entrepreneurship through incubators, student startup organizations and public policy. The 
narrative accounts of entrepreneurial failure in this thesis, and the framework for analysis of new 
cases, may provide fertile material for future teaching and counselling activities. A further 
insight relates to the international context of this research: this thesis has examined three regions 
with a specific methodology, and perhaps this approach along with a revised framework can be 
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applied to additional regions, particularly areas of high economic importance such as China, 
India and Brazil. 
Limitations	  of	  this	  Research	  
 
There are several possible limitations of this research, related to how it was conducted and what 
it revealed. 
Firstly, the methodology applied here (IPA) has not been widely applied to entrepreneurship 
research and although there are precedents for phenomenological studies (McKenzie and Sud 
2008; Cope 2011), there are fewer academic references than for other qualitative approaches. 
Furthermore, IPA results are idiographic in nature and do not support the generalization (or 
universalization) of findings to a wider population: not only is sample size small (although this 
thesis includes a large number of interviews – 18 - by IPA standards), traditional sampling logic 
simply does not apply. Furthermore, since IPA focuses on the individual and their worldview, 
triangulation is not merely difficult but may be regarded as redundant. When facts came to light 
that could cross-reference events and opinions presented by the interviewees, these were 
incorporated into the analysis. However, establishing the veracity of the entrepreneurs’ accounts 
is not the researcher’s primary focus, but rather understanding the meaning of their experience as 
they see it. The level of description emerging from each of the interviews is not only rich and 
deep, but comes from an approach which aims to minimize preconceptions and pre-judgment: 
there is no semi-structured framework in place to steer entrepreneurs to particular conclusions or 
areas of focus. 
Objections may also be raised in the areas of language and the reliability of memory. All 
interviews were conducted in English, and this was part of the pre-interview briefing and 
selection process. German interviews were conducted in English, eliminating some of the 
dangers of cross-translation (Temple 2008), but this still exposes the research to risks that 
German transcripts vary by the language proficiency of the interviewees. Perhaps this is 
inevitable, but all German interviewees possessed strong English language skills, with few 
instances of hesitation to seek the correct English words. Another possible limitation is that the 
English-speaking requirement limits the number of candidates, imposing a bias on the selection. 
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However, such interviewees are sufficiently difficult to access, requiring personal introductions, 
that the value of the finding must be compared with the potential biases in the ‘recruitment’ 
process.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the reliability of memory in recalling past experiences is also a 
potential limitation (Draaisma 2006). This may be made worse by the ‘selective recall’ presented 
by interviews such as B4 and A6, who appear to recall events incorrectly for their own benefit. 
As outlined in the detailed analysis, some entrepreneurs are strong storytellers, who naturally 
embellish details in their narrative accounts. Methodologically, perhaps the recollections 
themselves (incorrect or not) are the focus here: IPA seeks to understand the ‘lived world’ of the 
subject, which includes how they might (incorrectly) recall and re-tell past memories. 
Another possible limitation is the quality of the researcher, conducting doctoral research for the 
first time. Although this researcher has extensive technology entrepreneurial experience, the skill 
of the interviewer is critical to the success of such research (Smith, Flowers et al. 2009). To 
mitigate the risk of such inexperience, this researcher attended all necessary doctoral courses, 
and moreover applied his career skills from Financial Auditing to document each step of the 
research. He will make available all working papers to academics seeking to re-apply IPA to the 
source data. Finally, the Yardley’s framework for limitations in qualitative research introduced in 
Table 5 (Yardley 2000; Yardley 2008) is re-presented here, with commentary on how this 
researcher has tried to address such issues. 
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 Principle Author’s Commentary on Yardley’s Validity Criteria. 
1 Sensitivity to 
Context 
IPA was chosen specifically to address the sensitivity around entrepreneurs and their 
failed ventures. The research explores painful and traumatic experiences, and the 
phenomenological approach offers insight with minimal filtering. The extended, 
unstructured interview process supports open sharing of sensitive issues. 
2 Commitment and 
Rigour 
IPA offers clear guidance on how to plan, gather and analyse data (Eatough and 
Smith 2008; Smith and Osborn 2008; Smith, Flowers et al. 2009). This thesis has 
followed such guidance and documented each step in great detail. 
3 Transparency 
and Coherence 
Working papers, including transcripts, source audio files and sequential note-taking 
documents will be available on request to other academics wishing to evaluate how 
the methodology was applied. 
4 Impact and 
Importance 
Failure rates in early-stage technology ventures are high, and failure appears to be a 
common experience. Societal pressure to encourage entrepreneurship is increasing 
(Economist 2012). The impact of this thesis involves (1) In-depth insight into the 
lived world of entrepreneurs through this experience, (2) Focus on a particular 
industry sector (high-technology), (3) Three-country comparison of entrepreneurial 
experiences. 
Table 16. Updated Commentary on Yardley's Four Criteria for Validity of Qualitative Research (Yardley 2000; 
Yardley 2008) 
	  
Implications	  for	  Practitioners	  and	  Policy	  
 
It is hoped this thesis contributes to knowledge regarding the impact of failure on entrepreneurs: 
documenting and analyzing their attitudes to failure, how they respond and what they do next. 
This contribution adds a comparative study of multiple regions, and also provides focus on a 
particular industry context (high-technology). It also makes a methodological contribution by 
extending earlier work (McKenzie and Sud 2008; Cope 2011), stretching the readiness, strengths 
and limitations of phenomenological approaches with further geographical and industrial scope. 
Further research based on an evaluation of this thesis and its methodology might involve the 
application of this approach to additional regions, particularly in Asian business cultures such as 
China, India, Korea and Japan. Access to failed entrepreneurs in these regions is anticipated to be 
even more challenging than in Germany, the UK and Silicon Valley, but given the vibrancy of 
these economies, further insight into entrepreneurial failure in these countries may be valuable. 
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Industry practitioners in early-stage entrepreneurship include entrepreneurs themselves, mentors, 
investors, advisors, incubators and innovation managers. For advisors and mentors of 
entrepreneurs, this thesis offers a framework for the analysis and understanding of failure, with a 
number of in-depth examples. This might be used for teaching entrepreneurs and workshops as 
well as counseling those whose early-stage ventures have recently failed. 
Policymakers include politicians, think tanks and administrators who direct tax and financial 
policy, as well as deploy funds and resources to educate, encourage and incubate 
entrepreneurship (Economist 2012). In the creation, collapse and re-cycling of firms in the high-
technology sector, it is hoped this research offers insight to these policy makers on how failure 
can be re-interpreted for the benefit of the economy as a whole. Examples of public advocacy of 
further entrepreneurship can be found in Germany (Hülsbeck and Lehmann 2007), the UK 
(H.M.Treasury 2011) and USA (Chopra 2012), and all point to the need for economic growth 
through new entrepreneurs. This might be improved through support for monitoring and 
mentoring of failed entrepreneurs; faster recovery of people and IP for re-cycling into the 
economy; case studies for education; and finally through better insight into the impact of public 
funding, support programmes and their legal or financial context. 
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